quartz test with destiny notes

War Crimes

Aug 23, 202426 min read

Hamas

Operation Cast Lead (2008.12.27)

Israel

Incidents

  • Using children as human shields.
  • Forcing Palestinian civilians to enter houses ahead of Israeli soldiers during military operations.

Hamas

Incidents

  • Accusations of Hamas hiding in al-Shifa basement
  • Booby trapping houses with IEDs.
  • Mannequins placed at apartment entrances and rigged to explode.
  • Militants taking cover in UNRWA buildings.
  • Ammunition and weapons stored under mosques and public buildings.
  • Soldiers dressed in civilian uniform.
  • Police officers trained as militants.

Operation Protective Edge (2014.07.08)

Hamas

Incidents

  • https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/General/hamas-use-of-civilians-as-human-shields
  • Amnesty International found Hamas urged residents to not leave homes despite Israeli warnings.
  • B’tselem found that Hamas fired from civilian areas and into civilian areas.
  • Fatah officials said that Hamas placed over 250 Fatah members under house arrest or in jail, putting them under threat of being killed by Israeli strikes and shooting them in the legs or breaking their limbs if they tried to leave. According to Abbas, more than 300 Fatah members were placed under house arrest and 120 were executed for fleeing.
  • On 16 July, 22 July, and on 29 July, UNRWA announced that rockets had been found in their schools.
  • On 30 July, the IDF said that they had discovered the entrance to a tunnel concealed inside a UNRWA medical clinic in Khan Yunis. The clinic was rigged with explosives, which then exploded and killed three Israeli soldiers. This report was later corrected by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, the military unit that implements government policies in the Palestinian areas, who later that day stated that despite its UNRWA sign, the site was not registered as belonging to UNRWA.

Articles

Operation Iron Swords (2023.10.07)

Israel

Hamas

Incidents

  • Sexual violence source
    • Rape
    • Gang Rape
    • Mutilation of genitals + breasts
  • Hostage taking source
  • Murdering civilians source
    • Killing of civilians in homes
    • Torturing civilians

Articles

  • 2023.10.10 - Israel – Hamas 2023 Symposium – The Legal Context of Operations Al-Aqsa Flood and Swords of Iron - by Michael N. Schmitt
    • Notes
      • The resort to force is prohibited by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary international law. It is a prohibition limited to interstate uses of force unless the forcible actions are legally attributable to a State (as described in the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility). In that Hamas is neither a State nor are its attacks likely attributable to a State, it has not violated this prohibition. Neither has Israel, for it is directing its operations against a non-State group.
      • Yet, even if Hamas’s action were attributable to a State (Iran or Palestine, for those who consider the latter a State), Israel’s response would nevertheless be lawful by reference to the customary international law right of self-defense enshrined in UN Charter Article 51. Many States (including the United States) and scholars (see Gill) are of the view that at least since the attacks of 9/11, self-defense is permissible against a non-State group even if the group’s “armed attack” was not “on behalf of a State … or [with] its substantial involvement therein” (the International Court of Justice’s Paramilitary Activities standard, para. 195).
      • This begs the question whether Hamas’s actions are justified as self-defense, as some supporters claim. They are not. To begin with, it is well accepted that the right of self-defense is limited to States. Even if that were not the case, self-defense is subject to a condition of necessity (Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, para. 41; Armed Activities Judgment, para. 147). Necessity has a temporal component that limits forcible defensive actions to those responding to an armed attack that is either underway or imminent.
      • However, this nuanced provision only acknowledges the right of certain peoples to resist and struggle, not necessarily to do so forcibly. The better view is that there is no “right” on the part of a non-State group or individuals to do so except when unlawful violence is being used against them directly and immediately, as in a specific case of acts of ethnic cleansing that are underway. At the time of Hamas’s attack, Israel was not employing unlawful violence directly against any individual in Gaza. Nor were Hamas’ actions crafted to directly defend against any particular unlawful acts of violence.
      • While I accept Professor Dinstein’s general premise that the degree of control necessary to establish a state of occupation is not necessarily the exact degree required to maintain it, I find the contention that Israel has not been in occupation of Gaza since it withdrew to be more convincing. To begin with, effective control suggests some degree of power over the daily governance of the area in question. In Gaza, however, Hamas often governs in a manner that is contrary to Israel’s interests and desires. Moreover, when an area is used regularly as a base of significant military operations against a party to the conflict, the latter cannot be said to control the territory effectively.
      • Therefore, only if Israel enters the territory and stays for a period not necessitated by immediate combat operations should it be considered as occupying Gaza. Simply put, a State is not in effective control if it must fight its way into the territory concerned at high cost. But if it does stay and exert its authority, Israel will be seen as occupying the area. Although this begs the question of whether occupation can even exist in a non-international armed conflict in the first place, Israeli courts applied occupation law to Gaza before the withdrawal of its forces despite early attempts by the government to avoid its de jure applicability (see Kretzmer, p. 210; Dinstein, p. 27). They, and much of the international community, would likely do so again.
    • Conclusions
      • I believe that Hamas had no international law right to launch Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, while Israel was entirely within its rights to mount Operation Swords of Iron. The hostilities that have resulted are best classified as a non-international armed conflict. At the time of the attack, Israel was not occupying Gaza but may qualify as an occupying power if it moves into that area and controls it effectively. Each of these conclusions, however, is subject to reasonable disagreement or qualification. Sadly, much of the commentary on the conflict, especially on social media, has been far from reasonable and often inflammatory.
  • 2023.10.11 - ISRAEL – HAMAS 2023 SYMPOSIUM – HOSTAGE-TAKING AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT - by John C. Tramazzo, Kevin S. Coble, Michael N. Schmitt
    • Notes
      • “Hostage-taking during armed conflict is universally condemned. For instance, on Monday, the UN Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory observed, “[t]he taking of hostages is a violation of international law and constitutes an international crime. Persons deprived of liberty are protected against murder, torture, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and sexual violence.” Similarly, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights “call[ed] on Palestinian armed groups to immediately and unconditionally release all civilians who were captured and are still being held.” He emphasized that “[t]he taking of hostages is prohibited by international law.””
      • “As a party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Israel is bound by Common Article 3. But so too is Hamas, for, as Jelena Pejic has noted in her excellent piece on Common Article 3, “The very language used also makes clear that it binds the non-state party, as it lists obligations incumbent on ‘each party to the conflict’” (p. 9).”
      • But in this case, Hamas has threatened to execute a hostage for every Israeli airstrike. Recalling the definition above, this is a “threat to kill … [a] person in order to compel a third party to … abstain from doing any act as an explicit … condition for the … well-being of the hostages.” Additionally, an implicit reason for bringing the hostages into Gaza was almost certainly to frustrate Israeli operations there. And given Hamas’s past practices, it is highly probable that the civilians and even the IDF personnel were captured in preparation for future prisoner exchanges (see, e.g., the Gilad Shalit incident).
      • “According to the ICRC, the prohibition on hostage-taking is now “firmly entrenched in customary international law and is considered a war crime.” We agree. In this regard, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which codifies key customary war crimes, provides that hostage-taking is a war crime in international and non-international armed conflict (art. 8(2)(a)(viii) and art. 8(2)(c)(iii), respectively).”
      • “International criminal tribunals have conducted numerous cases in which defendants were charged with taking hostages. Prominent examples include the ICTY’s Karadžić and Mladić case involving the seizure of nearly 300 UN peacekeepers to shield against NATO air attack, and the 2000 Blaškić and 2001 Kordić and Čerkez cases that resulted in convictions for the taking of civilian hostages.”
    • Conclusions
      • “Shockingly, hostage-taking was a central feature of Hamas’ opening salvo in its conflict in Israel. Israel and many other nations, including the United States, are now struggling to address this horrific situation. Unfortunately, hostage rescue operations present some of the most challenging tactical scenarios for armed forces, especially in an environment like Gaza. But Hamas has violated the law of armed conflict without the slightest doubt. It is equally clear that those involved are subject to worldwide prosecution as war criminals under international criminal law.”
  • 2023.10.27 - ISRAEL – HAMAS 2023 SYMPOSIUM – THE IDF, HAMAS, AND THE DUTY TO WARN - by Michael N. Schmitt
    • Notes
      • “Seven decades later, the requirement was included in Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which binds the instrument’s 174 parties (which do not include Israel or the United States) during international armed conflict. Its Article 57 requires an attacking State to take various “precautions in attack” (“active precautions”) to avoid harming civilians and civilian objects. Among them is the requirement to give “effective advance warning … of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.” Other precautions cited in the article include verifying the target, applying the rule of proportionality during the attack, and selecting tactics, weapons, and targets to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects. Although often characterized as an aspect of proportionality (see U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Law of War Manual, § 5.11), I see active precautions as a stand-alone requirement deriving from the principle of distinction, for it applies even when an attack would otherwise satisfy the proportionality rule.”
      • “The IDF understands these realities and has accordingly long provided warnings before attacking targets in Gaza and elsewhere (see, e.g., report on 2008 Gaza operation, paras. 262-265; Sharvit, Baruch, & Neuman, p. 367-72)). These practices have drawn a great deal of attention. For instance, an International Law Association (ILA) Study Group on the Conduct of Hostilities (of which I was a member) observed in 2017 that, “Israel’s 2014 operations in Gaza, and the extensive efforts to provide such warnings, have elevated the discourse on this warnings precaution to unprecedented levels: some worry that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) created an unrealistically high bar on when and how to provide warnings; conversely, some condemn the IDF because the warnings did not produce their intended effects; finally, some suggest that the extent of warnings were the result of policy decisions, and not legal obligation.""
      • “To conduct the phone warnings, the IDF employs a specialized team of trained personnel who run a “phone bank” with the sole purpose of contacting individuals who might be affected by a strike. The calls are in some cases extremely precise. For instance, the warning may be that a strike will occur at a specified time. Live operators make some phone warnings, while others consist of generic pre-recorded messages. The personnel in the warning cell speak Arabic fluently, have received cultural training on the civilian population in the target area, and whenever feasible, use all-source fused intelligence to focus on specific individuals who might be at risk. For example, understanding Palestinian culture and family structures, the warning cell may try to contact the male head of a family in a particular apartment building, knowing that he will effectively disseminate the warning to other family members. If a minor or a female answers the phone call, the warning cell attempts to speak to the head of the family. When several buildings in a particular area are targeted, the warning cell may also contact a local civilian official or an informal community leader who will be able to spread the warning effectively and insist on obedience.”
      • “Beyond these communicative warnings, the IDF uses military actions designed to warn. In the ground environment, these include warning shots (perhaps with tracers to convey the risk better) and tactical “call-outs,” where ground forces yell to occupants in a building, warning them to leave before the IDF troops enter (also a common U.S. practice). A more controversial method is so-called “roof knocking.” As Colonel Merriam and I explained, “The technique involves employing … munitions that impact one corner of the roof and detonates a very small explosion that produces noise and concussion several minutes in advance of the strike. The civilians are hopefully frightened into dispersing. Once it has cleared the target area, the IDF launches the attack.””
      • “Warnings must be “effective.” This does not require that they prove successful. Instead, the term effective denotes a warning that will reach the affected civilians and, in the circumstances, can reasonably be expected to have the desired effect of reducing the risk to them. To illustrate, a warning to leave a building that does not give the occupants sufficient time to do so is not an effective warning. But the IDF’s warning to residents of northern Gaza to move south is effective, despite being ignored by some, for it has been conveyed to the residents, and up to a million people reportedly have heeded it. Of course, southern Gaza remains dangerous, for the IDF is striking Hamas and other organized armed groups present there, as it may lawfully do. Yet, as it is less dangerous than the north, the warning is effective as a matter of law.”
      • “Despite the presumption that an attacker must warn, it need not do so when not feasible. As the DoD Law of War Manual notes, “Circumstances not permitting the giving of advance warning include where giving a warning would be incompatible with legitimate military requirements” (§ 5.11.5.4). All the warning requirements described above are subject to this caveat, which reflects the balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations that permeates IHL.”
      • “Whether circumstances permit is a fact-dependent determination. Consider an attack on a building. If the military objective is the building itself, as in the case of one that houses civilians but also is used for military purposes (a common practice in Gaza), there may be an opportunity to warn the civilian occupants to evacuate without forfeiting the opportunity to achieve the desired military effect on the building. But if the intended target is someone in the building, providing advanced warning might allow them to escape. No warning may be required in such a case because surprise is essential.”
      • “The safety of one’s own forces can also preclude warning. For example, dropping leaflets over Gaza may not have been possible if the organized armed groups operating there fielded effective air defenses. Similarly, once the IDF enters Gaza and is engaged in urban combat, warnings by the ground forces often will be impractical, if only because they might alert Hamas to their positions.”
      • “A particular obstacle to warnings in Gaza is Hamas’s practice of human shielding. In the past, there have been many instances where civilians have moved voluntarily to the vicinity of targets following IDF warnings. Even more egregious is the use of involuntary human shields. With Hamas holding 200 hostages, the potential for their movement to locations regarding which the IDF issues a specific warning is high. When a warning is likely to result in human shielding, the situation amounts to one in which a warning is not feasible.”
      • “Passive precautions include moving civilians from the vicinity of military objectives and avoiding placing military objectives within or near densely populated areas. Although Article 58 includes no reference to warnings, it does require a defender to “take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military operations.” In my opinion, this requires it to warn of attacks when doing so is feasible. As the DoD Law of War Manual observes, “[v]oluntary removal of civilians may be accomplished through the use of warnings” (§ 5.14.2).”
      • “As we are witnessing, civilian casualties in Gaza, even when they amount to lawful collateral damage, benefit Hamas by undercutting support for Israel. Thus, it is no surprise that Hamas has violated its passive precautions obligations by failing to evacuate any civilians from northern Gaza and operating from civilian buildings, including those that are specially protected, like medical facilities. Equally, its failure to warn civilians away from areas where attacks are sure to take place violates IHL, as does urging them to ignore Israeli warnings.”
    • Conclusions
      • “Without more facts, it is too early to say whether the IDF has complied with the obligation to warn in every case. However, there is no question that the IDF’s warnings practice, in general, is the gold standard. Indeed, as a matter of policy, the IDF typically exceeds what the law requires. It is likewise clear that its warning to evacuate northern Gaza constitutes an “effective warning,” as that concept is understood in IHL.”
      • “This is in sharp contrast to Hamas’s failure to provide any warnings to the civilian population of Gaza and its efforts to neutralize the effectiveness of the IDF’s. That Hamas has violated its own warning obligation under IHL is simply indisputable.”
  • 2023.11.03 - ISRAEL – HAMAS 2023 SYMPOSIUM – WHAT IS AND IS NOT HUMAN SHIELDING? - by Michael N. Schmitt
    • Notes
      • “Placing fighters or equipment next to, in, or under facilities where there are many civilians when there appears to be no military need to do so or reasonably available alternatives exist, as in the case of a hospital or a school, is a powerful indicator of intent. As the DoD Law of War Manual observes, “An adversary’s intention to violate this rule is likely to be clear because that adversary normally would make it apparent to the opposing party that attacks against the military objective being shielded would risk harming protected persons or objects””
      • “Other cases are less clear. For instance, Hamas and other fighters are likely among those civilians fleeing Gaza City. If the fighters are on the evacuation routes solely to retreat from the area into which the IDF is striking, there is no human shielding even though civilians are using the same route. However, if they choose to retreat on that route because of the presence of civilians, they are using human shields. The difficulty would lie in determining their motivation.”
      • Although a particular action by Hamas may not qualify as using human shields, the customary requirement to take passive precautions would still apply. As explained in Article 58 of Additional Protocol I, the defender must “avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas” and has to take “other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from military operations.” Thus, operating in the vicinity of civilians and civilian objects, and thereby placing them at significant risk of being harmed incidentally during attacks when doing so is clearly avoidable, violates the requirement. This is a customary law rule applicable in this conflict (see ICTY, Kupreškić, para. 524; ICRC, Customary IHL study, rule 22).
      • “However, in my opinion, individuals who intentionally leverage their civilian status to impede the enemy’s operations are directly participating in hostilities and, therefore, lose these protections from attack for such time as they so participate. This is the position of the United States, Israel, and many prominent scholars (DoD Law of War Manual, § 5.12.3.4; here, p. 118-19; Dinstein, p. 209). The distinction between involuntary and voluntary shields makes sense, for the latter act to deprive themselves of their LOAC protections, whereas the former are being victimized. To the extent that voluntary shields can de facto (cause the attacker to hesitate) or de jure (render the attack disproportionate if they do not lose civilian protections) make an attack impossible, it would seem clear that they are “participating” in the hostilities very directly. However, although attacks on direct participants technically are permissible under the law of armed conflict, Israel does not conduct them. Instead, the direct participation status of voluntary shields only affects the application of the proportionality and precautions in attack rules during Israeli operations (see here, p. 118).”
      • “In its 2014 Operation Protective Edge into Gaza, the IDF urged the civilian population to evacuate the area of operations and identified evacuation routes, just as it is doing today. Many did not heed the warning. I later had the opportunity to meet with senior IDF legal advisers and discuss the matter in depth. They uniformly rejected the premise that such individuals should be treated as voluntary shields (see here, p. 119).”
    • Conclusions
      • “Whether this armed conflict is international or non-international in character, using human shields is strictly prohibited. However, the concept of human shielding in the law of armed conflict is narrower than sometimes characterized. In particular, it does not encompass merely acting in the proximity of civilians without intending to use their presence to affect enemy military operations. Nor does it extend to using civilian property to shield unless that property is subject to special protection, as with medical facilities and cultural property.”
      • “Nevertheless, Hamas has violated the prohibition by, among other acts, using hostages as shields and preventing civilians from leaving northern Gaza. It has also violated obligations not to use specially protected facilities as shields. And even when its actions do not amount to unlawful shielding, they are subject to the requirement to take feasible passive precautions to safeguard the civilian population. But it must be emphasized that violations of these obligations by Hamas do not release Israel from its obligations to, inter alia, consider involuntary human shields in proportionality calculations and when assessing feasible precautions in attack.”
  • 2023.12.01 - Israel – Hamas 2023 Symposium – Israel’s Right to Self-Defence against Hamas - by Nicholas Tsagourias
    • Notes
      • Fourth, self-defence is triggered by a factual occurrence, an armed attack. Whether an armed attack exists does not depend on the status of its author as a State, contrary to the ICJ’s opinion (see Wall Advisory Opinion, para. 139). This is evident from the wording of Article 51 which does not define the author of the armed attack but only the triggering event. Also, an armed attack is not conterminous with a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. When the ICJ defined an armed attack as a grave use of force (P__aramilitary Activities, para. 191), it provided a description of the nature of an armed attack by using factual qualifications such a scale and effects. This means there is no restriction as to who can commit an armed attack; it can be a State or a non-State actor.
      • All this means that Israel has the right to act in self-defence against Hamas because the conditions for triggering the right to self-defence have been fulfilled. There was an armed attack and Hamas was the author of the October 7 armed attack. This is regardless of whether Article 2(4) is implicated or the status of Hamas as non-State actor.
    • Conclusions
      • The main take-aways from this post are that the right to self-defence is a primary rule of international law which is not dependent on Article 2(4) prohibiting the use of force. It is also a right which is triggered by a factual event, an armed attack, and is exercised against the author of the attack be that a State or a non-State actor. If a State takes self-defence action against non-State actors on the territory of a State which is not implicated in the attack, the incidental breach of that State’s sovereignty is excused by self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness according to the law of State responsibility provided that the action stays within the boundaries of self-defence. This shows that there is no gap in international law when faced with non-State attacks and the right to self-defence demonstrates its full potential.
  • 2023.12.28 - ‘Screams Without Words’: How Hamas Weaponized Sexual Violence on Oct. 7 - by Jeffrey Gettleman, Anat Schwartz and Adam Sella
    • Notes
      • Based largely on the video evidence — which was verified by The New York Times — Israeli police officials said they believed that Ms. Abdush was raped, and she has become a symbol of the horrors visited upon Israeli women and girls during the Oct. 7 attacks.
      • A combination of chaos, enormous grief and Jewish religious duties meant that many bodies were buried as quickly as possible. Most were never examined, and in some cases, like at the rave scene, where more than 360 people were slaughtered in a few hours, the bodies were hauled away by the truckload.
      • According to Jewish tradition, funerals are held promptly. The result was that many bodies with signs of sexual abuse were put to rest without medical examinations, meaning that potential evidence now lies buried in the ground. International forensic experts said that it would be possible to recover some evidence from the corpses, but that it would be difficult.
      • Many volunteers working for ZAKA, the emergency response team, are religious Jews and operate under strict rules that command deep respect for the dead.
      • “I did not take pictures because we are not allowed to take pictures,” said Yossi Landau, a ZAKA volunteer. “In retrospect, I regret it.”
      • There are at least three women and one man who were sexually assaulted and survived, according to Gil Horev, a spokesman for Israel’s Ministry of Welfare and Social Affairs. “None of them has been willing to come physically for treatment,” he said. Two therapists said they were working with a woman who was gang raped at the rave and was in no condition to talk to investigators or reporters.
    • Conclusions
      • Lots o’ sexual crimes, lots o’ witnesses, lots of different people observed to have been sexually mistreated.
  • 2024.01.14 - NEW YORK TIMES PUTS “DAILY” EPISODE ON ICE AMID INTERNAL FIRESTORM OVER HAMAS SEXUAL VIOLENCE ARTICLE - by Daniel Boguslaw and Ryan Grim
    • Notes
      • Internal critics worry that the article is another “Caliphate”-level journalistic debacle. “There seems to be no self-awareness at the top,” said one frustrated Times editorial staffer. “The story deserved more fact-checking and much more reporting. All basic standards applied to countless other stories.”
    • Conclusion Poorly sourced articles who’s sources don’t justify any of the underlying assumptions. Some false reporting due to author’s ideological unwillingness to verify the veracity of other reporters or statements that seem to agree with their preconceived notions about the events.
  • 2024.01.09 - U.N. to Study Reports of Sexual Violence in Israel During Oct. 7 Attack - by Jeffrey Gettleman, Anat Schwartz and Adam Sella
  • 2024.02.28 - “BETWEEN THE HAMMER AND THE ANVIL” The Story Behind the New York Times October 7 Exposé - by Jeremy Scahill, Ryan Grim, and Daniel Boguslaw
    • Conclusion
      • Very poorly sourced, untrustworthy article. Standard Intercept Israel reporting.
  • 2024.03.04 - KIBBUTZ BE’ERI REJECTS STORY IN NEW YORK TIMES OCTOBER 7 EXPOSÉ: “THEY WERE NOT SEXUALLY ABUSED - by Jeremy Scahill, Ryan Grim
    • Conclusion
      • Just more garbage Intercept writing.

Israel

Incidents

Hamas

Incidents

  • Hostage taking. (second source)
    • 150-250 Hostages were captured after the October 7th attacks.
  • Co-locating military objectives in densely populated areas.
  • Operating from hospitals.
  • Preventing citizens from leaving north Gaza.
    • It is impossible to observe the events of the last several days in Israel and Palestine with anything other than horror. Multiple reports and video footage indicate that the Hamas assault inside Israel involved shocking massacres, abductions, physical abuse, and sexual violence. These acts implicate multiple war crimes, including the prohibition on killing civilians or persons hors de combat (ICC Statute, articles 8(2)(c)(i), 8(2)(e)(i)), the taking of hostages (8(2)(c)(iii)), rape and other forms of sexual violence (8(2)(e)(vi)), torture (8(2)(c)(i)), and outrages upon personal dignity (8(2)(c)(ii)).
    • What is more, given the attacks’ widespread nature and systematicity (only one of which is legally necessary), they almost certainly constitute crimes against humanity. Within that category, murder (7(1)(a)), extermination (mass murder) (7(1)(b)), imprisonment (7(1)(e)), torture (7(1)(f)), and sexual violence (7(1)(g)) are all implicated. These are not close calls; international criminal law was designed to outlaw such atrocities.

miscellaneous

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/yearbook-of-international-humanitarian-law/article/abs/application-of-ihl-in-the-goldstone-report-a-critical-commentary/F346B942ADA0671ABAD93EBCB51F0A96 https://sci-hub.hkvisa.net/10.1017/s1389135909000130 https://lieber.westpoint.edu/white-phosphorus-and-international-law/ https://www.weaponslaw.org/weapons/white-phosphorus-munitions https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/lebanon-evidence-of-israels-unlawful-use-of-white-phosphorus-in-southern-lebanon-as-cross-border-hostilities-escalate/#:~:text=The%20usage%20of%20white%20phosphorus,and%20smoke%20it%20causes%20spread. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2537368 In short, if there was a general policy of expulsion, why, at war’s end, were 100,000-160,000 Arabs, most of them Muslims, left in Israel (which at the time had about 700,000-750,000 Jews)? https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-hamas-manipulates-gaza-fatality-numbers-examining-male-undercount-and-other https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4J9QfKm0xBs https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w2qpryWt-i0 https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1409&context=ils https://lieber.westpoint.edu/legal-context-operations-al-aqsa-flood-swords-of-iron/ https://lieber.westpoint.edu/weaponizing-civilians-human-shields-ukraine/ https://www.justsecurity.org/89403/the-siege-of-gaza-and-the-starvation-war-crime/ https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1600258 https://stratcomcoe.org/pdfjs/?file=/publications/download/hamas_human_shields.pdf?zoom=page-fit https://sci-hub.hkvisa.net/10.1017/s1389135909000130 1922 Mandate for Palestine https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/gdc/gdcwdl/wd/l_/11/57/2/wdl_11572/wdl_11572.pdf https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Palestine_Mandate_(1922) Inside the Hamas ‘Terror Tunnels’ Israel has been bombing https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W4gDfSNMRx4&t=412s UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (Richard Goldstone) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=njdnBVVx6W0 Kafr Qasim massacre https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kafr_Qasim_massacre Oslo vs DC track for Oslo Accords 1993

Graph View

Backlinks

  • No backlinks found