

**File: Sadat visit to Jerusalem**

## **From the inauguration of Begin's Government on June 20, 1977 to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem on November 20, 1977**

This account is based on the November 27, 2012 declassification of more than 40 documents in commemoration of the 35 Years that have passed since Sadat's visit to Jerusalem on November 20-21, 1977.

These documents, that were made public by Israel State Archive, relate to the secret contacts that were held by Israel, Romania, Morocco and Egypt and the eventual disclosure of those talks to the U.S.A.; it also relates to Israel's reactions to Sadat's visit and the plans for further negotiations between Israel and Egypt.

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### **A. Newly elected Prime Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin presents his Government to the Knesset on June 20, 1977 and delivers a statement on his Government's core beliefs and peace plans.**

Document 1 (excerpts)

Mr. Speaker and Members of the Knesset,

... We shall endeavor to deepen strengthen the friendly relations between us Israel and the U.S.A. It will be an essential fundamental foundation goal of our Government's policy. Not only

profound feelings and a Our shared belief in the values of morality and democracy are uniting us, but our relations are based on true and meaningful partnership. Israel is an integral part of the free world. However, the democratic free world has been facing sharp opposition and is being threatened. It is like an island that's shores are engulfed by raging waves, fueled by the evil waters of totalitarianism. We must amend a well-known slogan of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century: 'To free people in every country, unite.' We all have to stay united to ward-off danger and preserve human liberty.

We will make an effort to renew our friendship with France. In the past we have had friendly relations and a strong alliance. I call upon the President of France and the French government to reinstate those mutually beneficial ties with Israel. France has a friend in Israel and Israel has a friend in France. We hope to extend our hands to one another and work for the restoration of amicable relations between two nations on opposite sides of the Mediterranean.

We are interested in the normalization of relations between Israel and the Soviet Union. In the 30 years after the Bolshevik Revolution, Moscow curated an extremely hostile and anti-Semitic climate that made relations near impossible.. This began to change in the 1940's after Israel's War of Independence. Moscow viewed the aspiration of the establishment of a Jewish State as an example of human progress. The State of Israel will always remember the speeches of Gromyko and Tsarapkin on the urgent need of a Jewish State.

However, during the 1950's, Moscow reverted and extended it's hand to our enemies and equipped them with arms. The Soviets knew very well that the arms they were supplying the Arab's would be eventually used against the Jewish people. Soviet leaders provided aid to the enemies of Israel in spite of the recent memories of the annihilation of the Jews both on and off its soil.

At the outbreak of the Six-Day War, the Soviet Union completely severed all diplomatic relations with Israel. The reinstatement of these relations is completely dependent upon Moscow's initiative in reinstating relations. Furthermore, relations are contingent on the Soviet Government ceasing it's persecution of Judaism and Zionism. However, Simple tolerance is not enough, all the Prisoners of Zion must be released and every Jew in the Soviet Union must have the opportunity 'To return to the historical homeland of the Jewish People'. Mr. Chairman, our top concern is the prevention of a new war in the Middle East. I call upon King Hussein, President Sadat and President Assad to convene with me – either in our capital cities, or on neutral soil, publicly or out of the limelight – in order to discuss the road to a real peace between neighboring states. Too much blood, Jewish and Arab,, has been spilled in this region and it is time to put an end to the blood-shed that we all loath. In sincerity and seriousness, it has been too long and we must begin a negotiation process. If this appeal is rejected, it will be noted as another example of the unwillingness of the Arab's to a peace process.

My predecessors, Prime Ministers, David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett, and Levi Eshkol, may they rest in peace, and Mrs. Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin, time and again called for such meetings and the other side either did not respond or outright rejected those calls to negotiation. A solution is essential to all Israelis and Arabs. Our calls for negotiations are not for the sake of propaganda but in hope of meeting the essential needs of the people of our countries.

And now, honorable members of the Knesset, we appeal to ourselves, to our people, the citizens of Israel who left the country, to return home. In the old days, enemies of Israel said that the Jews followed one central rule: 'Wherever it is good for me – that's my homeland.' Regardless of what they use to say, let us prove them wrong and renew our sense of

independence and liberty. We should strive to make the rule: Good is found, where my country is. We must strive to ease the passage of families looking to return to their homeland.

We are calling upon the youth in the homeland and throughout the Diaspora to rise and settle in Israel. Regardless of location or background, we must come together and build Eretz Israel together. The country can support millions more who wish to return to Zion. We hope to create a country where Jews, Arabs, Druze and Circassians can live in peace, enjoying equal rights, liberty and joint social-economic progress....

....And now the basic guidelines of my Government policy:

- A. Recognizing the unity and common fate between all Jews, Israeli's or Jews of the Diaspora, in the struggle for survival. The Jewish people have a historical, undisputable right to the Land of Israel, the land of our forefathers.
- B. The Government will plan, build and encourage the establishment of agricultural and urban settlements throughout the homeland.
- C. The Government's primary goal will be to encourage Zionist immigration to Israel.
- D. The Government will actively strive to achieve a permanent peace in the region. The Government will directly extend invitations to all of Israel's neighbors in hope of starting direct peace negotiations for the purpose of signing peace treaties. These negotiations must be done without any pre-conditions and without an externally proposed formula for peace. Each party will be free to raise subjects and proposals that will be subjected to negotiations.
- E. The Government announces its readiness to participate in a Geneva Conference, once invited to do so by U.S.A. and the Soviet Union based on Resolutions 242 and 338.
- F. In anticipation of the Geneva Conference and direct negotiations, the Government announces its readiness to conduct negotiations for the purpose of reaching true peace and normalization of life in the region.
- G. In the absence of peace treaties all sides will be bound by agreements that were signed by previous governments.
- H. The Knesset authorized the Government, by law, to institute by order the jurisdiction and the administration of the state on all the area of Eretz Israel as prescribed by law; the parliamentary and the judicial authority in at the discretion of the Government; it will not be enforced while there is an on-going negotiation for peace treaties between Israel and its neighbors. This provision will be linked in choosing the proper timing, on the political considerations by the government after deliberations in the Knesset and its approval.....**

....Mr. Chairman, I have introduced my Government and brought forth to the Knesset's attention and consent the guidelines of its policy as required by law. And now I am honored to request the Knesset's approval and trust in the Government.

**Knesset records:** Volume 90

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/FA227FFE-3C6C-4366-959D-C38EB39AA33D/0/Egypt01.pdf>

**Secret**

**B. The contacts with the American Administration regarding the reconvening of the Geneva Conference.**

Documents: 2-9

Document 2: **The Principles for peace negotiations with the Arabs in Geneva Conference, submitted by Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan to PM Begin – not dated – probably on June 24, 1977.**

**A. The complexity of the subject**

In order to achieve a permanent peace between Israel and the Arabs it is necessary to reach a consensus on a variety of matters: Permanent border agreements with four Arab countries; special arrangements in regard to Jerusalem; the settlement of refugees; the status of the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip and their affiliation with the Arab countries; the link of the inhabitants of the West Bank to Jordan and so forth.

It does not seem to me that all these issues can be settled quickly or simultaneously. Furthermore, some of these issues – such as the problem of resettling the refugees – will require patience because a resolution would take time to implement after a principal agreement is reached. . These issues must be tackled separately so progress is not hindered by a failure to find a resolution to one of the problems.

**B. Execution in stages**

The intrinsic value of a resolution is dependent upon the impact it will have once effectively implemented. The reactivation of the Suez Canal is a prime example of the importance of allowing resolutions to materialize before they are judged. The resettlement of cities along the Canal and the construction of industry in the Suez region are intended to create peace on the border between Egypt and the IDF forces in the Sinai. Recognizing these objectives takes years. Therefore we must take an approach that calls for the execution of an agreement in stages. It is a very complicated conflict and we can only tackle the more complex issues once simpler ones are resolved. I do not believe a permanent peace agreement could be reached in the current climate, but under the best circumstances we can achieve an interim agreement on the cessation of the war situation. In such an agreement we will not return the “territories” we would have within the framework of a permanent peace agreement.

**C. Security guarantees by the U.S.A. (Defiance Treaty)**

This subject was brought up by various spokespersons of the U.S.A., in a foggy and hypothetical fashion. I am doubtful whether the U.S.A. will be ready to agree to a real long-term defense treaty. If an agreement is struck, I will regard it as a groundbreaking achievement for the State of Israel.

I know that there were some hints on this issue, that it will be a substitute for the territories from which Israel will retreat and I at this point don't question whether such deal is preferable, but express my positive opinion on the inclusion of this factor in the arrangements of peace treaties. We must therefore, in my opinion, to examine this issue diligently.

**D. The borders with Egypt and Syria**

1. Israel's interests in the Egyptian border are to guarantee safe and free passage throughout the Red Sea and the Bay of Eilat, change the demarcation of the border and secure a buffer zone in the Sinai. A buffer zone can be created by the use of a variety of military options: demilitarization; reducing the size of forces where the UN is stationed etc... Minimal political changes are required to include the Etzion and Eitam airfields, which were built on the Sinai border, and the required airspace that they need. **The settlements near Raffah including a territorial strip from the Mediterranean to Eilat (west of the international border that is required to secure free Israeli maritime navigation); the Straits of Eilat (Sharem al- Sheik), the Shlomo Region etc.** I propose not to have preset demands, but rather to simply introduce the subject and prove my willingness to listen to solutions for each problem. I do however suggest not linking these subjects to Israeli settlements. The proposition that I favor (in the framework of true peace) would create military posts, several kilometers wide, on the western bank of the Bay of Eilat, particularly all the way up from Sharem.
2. The Syrian border. Israel's interests in the Syrian border are to secure the water sources of the Jordan River and protect settlements in Northern Israel. The settlements that were built in the Golan Heights since 1967 are another separate issue. I propose that during negotiations, Israel should present and begin to address the problems of water and security. We will ask for suggestions, but unlike our plan in Egypt, our demands for changes in borders are not an ultimatum. I do ultimately believe it is necessary to have military posts throughout the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon.

### **E. The Resettlement of the Palestinian refugees**

The refugee problem is the central issue to most Palestinians. The Palestinian terror groups are mainly comprised of refugees and not the permanent residents of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. For as long as this issue remains, no agreement will be reached with their leaders and the Palestinian problem will not be resolved. The total number (in round figures) of Palestinian refugees is about one million. Half of them reside in the Jordanian kingdom, 300,000 are in Lebanon and about 190,000 are in the Gaza Strip. The roots of this problem can be traced to three simple issues: lack of citizenship; inferior living conditions in refugee camps; unemployment

1. Refugees who reside in Jordan are given Jordanian citizenship and employment. Housing for these refugees is the largest problem the Jordanian government faces. These half a million refugees become citizens of Jordan and gain a new affinity toward Jordan and ultimately leads to closer ties with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. I suggest that we should support the permanent residence of those refugees in Jordan.
2. The approximate 190,000 refugees in the Gaza Strip have no citizenship. They only carry local ID cards and a majority live in camps and work in either Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. I suggest a resettlement of these refugees in Gaza under improved conditions. I see no possible way of transferring them to another place. I do not believe that we should address the subject of citizenship. They do not seek Israeli citizenship and the only

feasible long-term solution would be to grant them the same Jordanian citizenship rights as those in the West Bank.

3. The approximate 300,000 refugees in Lebanon do not have Lebanese citizenship (some might have a Jordanian one). The majority of them live in refugee camps and for those who wish, work in Lebanon. These refugees should be given two options: To stay permanently in Lebanon (and receive compensations), or immigrate to another Arab country (and receive compensations as well). I believe a third option, to settle in Israel, is extraneous because very few people would choose to live in Israel..

The refugee problem is the key to the issue of the “Palestinian homeland”. If the problem is not solved by settling the refugees in their present countries of residence, pressures to recognize the West Bank as the location of the Palestinian State will intensify. This State would serve as a military, political and ideological spring-board in the push for the destruction of Israel. In order to prevent such scenario, it is imperative to settle the refugees in their current places of residence before a Palestinian State is even feasible. If we fail to address the problem, the negative result will be three-fold: A Palestinian state (which is not actually a state) will be established; the refugee problem will be sustained; and the “option” to conquer Israel will be granted a territorial base and will encourage those who wish to do harm.

#### F. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip

As for the West Bank we should present first and foremost our narrative to promote understanding. This is our ancient homeland and the redemption of Israel and our return to Zion should not be subjected to a refusal to allow Jews to inhabit Judea and Samaria. We will not allow Jews to become foreigners in this land of ours. It may be possible to expel us by force but they will never compel us to voluntarily detach ourselves from our land.

From an Arab standpoint it is inconceivable to propose a Palestinian State (a “homeland” that entails statehood). The narrow strip of 50 Kilometers between the Jordan River and the “green Line” cannot constitute a state. The Gaza Strip is disconnected for the Hebron Mountain range; Beit Lehem and Ramallah do not wish to be detached from Jerusalem; and Jerusalem divides the area of the Northern West Bank – Nablus and Jenin – from the Northern West Bank – Beit Lehem and Mount Hebron.

A possible arrangement for this region could be to make the West Bank and Gaza Strip into a common place for both Israelis and Palestinians. The Palestinians would retain their Jordanian citizenship and sustain their ties with Jordan. We should not propose applying Israeli Law to the West Bank and Gaza. We should rather announce that we are against the transference of the West Bank and Gaza to any Arab country, and then we would be ready to regard these areas as a part of the general Arab Israeli Conflict. Therefore, it would be subjected to further scrutiny during the discussions and negotiations. In my opinion, this issue should be included in an interim agreement, even if a comprehensive peace treaty is reached with Egypt and Syria. We should strive to reach an agreement in regard to the refugee problem and aid in its implementation in assurance that it will materialize. An “interim agreement” in the West Bank would give the

Palestinians more independence and further connect them to Jordan. While there must be changes, Israel should not reduce its military or governmental authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

### **G. Jerusalem**

The issue of Jerusalem is linked to the problems in the West Bank. Proponents of a Palestinian State in the West Bank may attempt to link it to East Jerusalem.. However, if the situation in the West Bank remains principally the same, then a distinction should be made between the non-religious matters that should be dealt with by a mixed municipality and religious matters where special protections should be secured for Christians and Muslims with regards to their holy places.

### **H. "Security Borders"**

U.S. representatives speak every so often on the possibility of security borders being different from political borders. Security borders take into account alert posts and front-line observation facilities. I do not accept that distinction. (By the way, the Arabs are demanding that those alert facilities be on both sides of the borders). In any case, such arrangements are applicable in buffer zones in cases like the Sinai under partial UN control. If we agree to make a distinction between international borders and military posts, (in Sharm al-Sheikh, on Mount Hermon and in the Golan Heights) then the military post must be Israeli.

**State archive: 6861/ 8-27**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/ronlyres/6E066F68-5766-4CFD-A15F-368C47BEB53C/0/Egypt02.pdf>

### **Top Secret**

**Document 3 - Prime Minister, Menachem Begin memorandum on ways to achieve peace between Israel and its neighbors**

**July 7, 1977; Presented (in English) to President Carter on July 19, 1977**

### **The Framework for the peace-making process between Israel and its neighbors**

1. Beginning October 19, 1977, the Government of Israel will be prepared to participate in a new additional session of the Geneva Peace Conference. It will be convened by the two co-chairmen on the basis of Paragraph 3 of the Security Council Resolution 338 of October 21, 1973 which states: (The Security council) "decides that, immediately and concurrently with a cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East."
2. Resolution 338 includes and makes reference to Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967.

3. Accredited delegates of sovereign states will participate in the reconvened session of the Geneva Peace Conference, namely: The representatives of Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan.
4. The participating states in the Geneva Peace Conference will present no prior conditions for their participation in the Conference.
5. At the public session of the reconvened Geneva Peace Conference the representatives of the parties will make opening statements.
6. At the conclusion of the public session three mixed commissions will be established, namely: Egyptian-Israeli; Syrian-Israeli; Jordanian-Israeli.
7. In the framework of these mixed commissions, peace treaties between the parties concerned will be negotiated and concluded.
8. The chairmanship of each mixed commission will be fixed by the rule of rotation between an Israeli representative and a representative of the neighboring state.
9. Having reached an agreement on the substance of the peace treaties – i.e. the termination of the state of war; the determination of the permanent boundaries; diplomatic relations; etc.: - a public session of the Conference will again be convened for the purpose of signing the peace treaties.

### **The Alternative**

(Two possibilities)

In the event that the states bordering with Israel refuse to participate in the Geneva Peace Conference, in accordance with the established framework determined by the precedent of the first session of the Conference, the organization called PLO could be added to the sovereign state delegations, it is proposed:

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- To establish, through the good offices of the United States, the aforementioned three mixed commissions by keeping with the method used during the Rhodes negotiations of 1949;
- Or: In accordance with the principle of “proxy talks”, with a view to conducting in the framework of such mixed commissions the negotiations on the conclusion of peace treaties.

Because of the vastness of the territory, we will be prepared, in the context of a peace treaty and the determination of a permanent boundary between Israel and Egypt, for a substantial withdrawal of our forces in Sinai.

We shall stay in the Golan Heights and but we will be prepared for a withdrawal of our forces from the existing line in the context of a peace treaty and the determination of a permanent boundary between Syria and Israel.

Concerning Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, our position is that we shall not place them under any foreign rule or grant sovereignty on the basis of two factors:

1. Our people’s right to the Land; it is rightfully our land.
2. Our national security, which includes the defensive capability of the State and the protection of the lives of our civilian population.



State archive: 4313 / 1 – 8

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/CF98E837-B502-4429-A601-C3899ACC5C80/0/Egypt03.pdf> (Note: This includes both Begin's hand-written notes in Hebrew of the document that was translated into English for presenting it to President Carter.)

**Top Secret**

Document 4 – **The Government Proposals for the Advancement of Peace in the Region – prepared for the talks of the Prime Minister in Washington**

Government meeting on July 13, 1977

**Prime Minister (PM) Begin:** I intend to raise the following subjects before Carter and his assistants: A framework for the peace process; problems in purchasing security materials'; the problem with settlements; the Jews in the Soviet Union – especially the release of the 'prisoners of Zion' together with the list of their names; the situation of the Jews in Syria and additional issues that may come up in the talks that are conducted as a result of Carter's initiative. The abovementioned subjects are principally my own and it is possible that Carter may raise issues of his own. As for the central issue: Reaching peace, the ways to conduct negotiations and its goals, are in coordination with the Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister. I'll present a paper on it to the Government.

There is a problem in regards to the [Knesset] Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security. I participated yesterday's meeting, but the Government was to convene afterwards and I could not divulge this information to the Committee. However, I submitted relatively important information in regard to the framework and to the peace process. I have the impression that it was not kept entirely secret – and we have to learn a lesson from that. Members of the Committee said, with some justification, that they should receive a report before the talks with Carter. I promised to review it if I could summon the committee by Friday, but I found out that I could not and I will request the Foreign Minister to appear before the Committee and read before its members the paper that we will decide upon today. The Committee has to know, before the talks what are we planning to say.

**Minister Y. Horowitz:** Things should be leaked to the press before your conversation with President Carter.

**The PM:** That is why I suggest that the meeting with the Foreign Minister and the Committee be set for Monday. On Tuesday, I meet with Carter so they will not have time to leak it to the press. At any rate, let us leave it to the Foreign Minister. Today there are contradictory, inaccurate and confusing messages, but if someone has to say something clear to say after the meeting of the Government, Carter should be the first one to hear it. I am going to read the paper that we prepared for a discussion in the Government:

Starting October 10, 1977, The Government of Israel will be ready to participate in an additional assembly of the Geneva Conference that will be called upon by the two Chairmen, in accordance with Clause 3 of UN Security Resolution 338 of October 23, 1973 that states: **The Security Council resolve that immediately and concurrent with the Cease-Fire**, negotiations will commence between the sides under proper auspices, in order to reach a permanent and just peace in the Middle East".

Because of forgetfulness, or lack of knowledge it is being said that the Geneva Conference will be convened in accordance with Resolutions 242 and 338. We have to note that Resolution 242 has nothing to do with the Geneva Conference. The Geneva Conference is consequent of Resolution 338. Therefore in the second Clause we state clearly:

1. "Resolution 338 includes and mentions the Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967.
2. In the additional meeting the following delegations of the sovereign states will participate. Namely, Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan.
3. In the additional meeting of the Geneva Conference, no preconditions will be presented by the participants.
4. During the public session of the additional meeting of the Geneva Conference, the representatives of the participating parties will deliver opening statements.
5. At the conclusion of that session three mixed committees will be formed: Egyptian-Israeli; Syrian-Israeli; Jordanian-Israeli.
6. The negotiations for peace treaties between the parties will be negotiated within the working of the mixed committees.
7. The Chairmanship of the mixed committee will be based on a rotation of the Israeli representative and the representative of the neighboring country. The first chosen to serve will be decided by a toss-up.
8. After an agreement on the content of the peace treaty is reached addressing the issues of, the end of war situation, determining the permanent borders, exchanges of diplomatic emissaries, economic clauses and so forth, an open session will be held and the committees signing the peace treaties will re-convene".

Matters for clarification: We propose a framework that is based on the precedent of the relations and peace treaty negotiations between the Arab countries and us. The story of the peace treaty is very interesting from our perspective. The resolution that was made after the Six Days War, on June 19, 1967 stated that at that time it was determined to reach a peace treaty. This resolution was never cancelled formally but it was not acted on. Now I maintain that this Government must renew, courageously and decisively, the demand for the negotiations for peace treaties. After war comes peace and peace, generally, is expressed in peace treaty. This has become standard procedure not only in our jurisdiction but also in international practice. In order to reach a peace treaty it is necessary to conduct negotiations.

To our delight, that background resulted in something unexpected from the perspective of the U.S. position. In the second press conference the Spokesperson of the State Department expressed twice the idea that there must be a peace treaty between Israel and the Arab countries. The truth is that this is the first time that an official American spokesman openly and fully used this terminology. From the start, the U.S. did not support the idea of signing a peace treaty. The U.S. used such terms as "peace agreement", "peace arrangement" and so forth.

On November 1967 when I visited Washington as a minister in the National Unity Government, I had meetings with President Johnson's assistants and the substitute for the Secretary of State [who was out of the country at the time] and I had to speak to their hearts that peace treaty is necessary. I did so because our Ambassador at the time told us that Washington

did not accept the idea of signing a peace treaty, but maintained that there are other kinds of venues.

**Even if a change had taken place and the spokesperson had expressed the position of the American Administration – as there is room to hope and it will be assumed in our conversations with President Carter – it is a change for the better.** It will help us to reach an agreement. Let us agree that the discussion with the Arab countries will be in regards to three peace treaties and additionally, we will be glad if Lebanon agrees to join.

The clause that relates to a peace treaty contains a list of details. Ordinarily, when a peace treaty is being drafted there is no reason to enumerate. Who ever has read a model of a peace treaty, and I reviewed many from WWI and WWII, knows that the first clause in every peace treaty states an end to a state of war. This is important to us because we must discuss all kinds of arrangements that will be followed after a declaration of the cessation of a state of war. In a peace treaty there is no need to emphasize it because it opens with the following: ‘The state of War has come to an end.’ This is the first clause in every version of a peace treaty.

The following chapter, usually, is one that is dedicated a territorial problem and in foreign languages it is defined as ‘territorial clauses’. In this chapter the border is set. The permanent border between the countries is fixed and since it is a whole chapter some other issues are discussed as well. At times there are security, demilitarization or population exchange problems that are addressed. All these are under the heading ‘territorial clauses’ and the main thing is to set the permanent boundary, or in the vocabulary of Resolution 242 – ‘recognizable borders’. First they are recognized by the parties and it is followed by the recognition of the international community that this is the permanent border between two countries.

**Minister Y. Burg:** It does not specify by whom it is recognized?

**The PM:** Clearly, first by the two parties. In a peace treaty, such an expression is not mentioned. In a peace treaty the term ‘boundary’ appears. In a peace treaty there is an exchange of ambassadors, mutual recognition etc. In addition, there is an economic chapter – an exchange of goods and human interactions. At times specific problems must be addressed. For example, in the Japanese-Soviet Peace Declaration of 1956 there is a special chapter on fishing. This is because this issue uniquely related to both sides. We found it proper to write a peace treaty and include in it specific details clarifying its principles so that there would not be misunderstandings about our intentions. If we detail the principles of the peace treaty then we will present the President with clear matters, and in due time to the public opinion will sway as well.

A comment on the framework: What do we propose? A Geneva Conference after October 10? Fine, we are ready. I read this morning that our willingness to participate in the Geneva Conference came as a big surprise to the Arab countries. The Arabs assumed, and the Americans probably too, that based on the policy of the previous Government, that we would not rush to Geneva and would try to postpone it; As if our attendance was dependent upon an advanced substantial understanding between us and the U.S. and an early understanding with the Arab countries on what the content of the Conference will be. But our policy is entirely different. We have no reason to be afraid of Geneva. It is well known to whom the main demand for a commitment is addressed to. But since we are not willing to submit to early commitments before the commencement of the negotiations, we have no reason to fear. If it is an open Conference, we will voice our position on the Jewish People, on Eretz Israel, on our rights, on issues of national security and other important matters. These will be based on what has happened to us and what we predict will happen in the future. We will propose our views to the public on an international

stage with an overreaching echo. It is imperative that we appeal to public opinion; but that alone does not bring peace.

We propose that after the Opening Session three committees will be established – and this will be done in the fashion of the Rhodes precedence. At the time, the theoretical UN representative, Dr. Bunch, who realistically represented the U.S, served as chairman of all the three mixed committees: An Egyptian-Israeli; a Jordanian-Israeli and a Syrian-Israeli. They negotiated under the chairmanship of a foreign citizen but the face-to-face negotiations were almost directly with one another. They negotiated and then signed an armistice agreement that had the utmost international significance. In that agreement it was said that it was an unavoidable step towards the establishment of a lasting and just peace in Eretz Israel.

So, there was a precedent - this is not something new, the Arabs still might have reasons to oppose. Things happened in the past. 28 years ago, Arabs and Israelis sat and discussed the making of an international agreement and arrived at one, signed it and promised themselves that it was a step towards a peace treaty. And 28 years passed by; there were wars; we became very late. All were late, and the time has arrived based on that precedent to reestablish the mixed committees in order to discuss a peace treaty. It can be postponed but the road was already taken and according to the mutual promise of Rhodes there must be a continuation and further discussions.

We assume that the discussions in the mixed committees may be very long. It is not a matter that can be concluded overnight. It's not a matter for one day or one week. But if it is concluded and the committees arrive at an agreement or a willingness to sign a peace treaty, then the Geneva Conference will be summoned to reconvene and there will be a signing ceremony.

**Minister M. Dayan:** Jarring proposed to renew the Rhodes talks in 1970-71.

**The PM:** So much for the framework. I propose to the Government that she will authorize me to end my reading of the document at this point and tell the President [Carter] "I request your consent and permission that we shall conduct a discussion on this paper and would like to know what the U.S. position in response to it is." We shall learn if they are for peace treaty, if they for going to Geneva, if they are for the establishment of mixed committees and what the road to signing a peace treaty is. If President Carter will agree to that, we shall have the discussion.

It is possible that already at this stage the problem of the participation of the so called PLO will be brought up. I wish the Ministers to know that in a very contentious meeting between President Carter and PM Yitzhak Rabin in March 1977, Carter exerted pressure on Israel's PM to agree to the participation of the PLO in Geneva. Carter said that he needs to have that agreement immediately, without delay. And the PM responded that for now it is a hypothetical issue and therefore he suggests not discussing it. Namely, the issue was finalized.

I presume that Carter will bring up that issue. I'm not so sure though; in the meantime the Cairo Conference took place and there were published reports that the PLO is about to mitigate its positions, specifically on Clause 19 of the Palestinian Manifesto, the destruction of Israel as is. Instead of destruction, they will stand to create a secular and democratic Palestinian state, dating back to the Balfour Declaration and the beginning of the Zionist invasion.

All hopes and expectations of what was called "mitigation in the PLO positions were shattered in the Cairo Conference. We shall expose the people who stand behind the PLO. Clearly, we will be able to accept that they will be a party in any agreement with us. This is not a new policy. The previous Government took the same stand and it is the right one. In the conversation between Carter and Rabin, Carter raised the following assumption: "Cairo is ready to make peace with Israel, but not without the PLO and you will prevent peace because of the

PLO". The answer to that should be, according to our proposal, we cannot have this organization participate in Geneva. And what do we propose? We propose to walk on the paved road. In 1973 a Conference was held in Geneva and the PLO did not participate in it and we are requesting to have an additional session to that Conference. If they want to change the list of participants, Golda insisted, all sides should agree to it; if one side objects then there will be no change. We are free to say that as well.

However, realistically it is permitted to assume that Syria and Egypt - though Jordan position is somewhat problematic - will insist on the inclusion of the PLO in the Geneva Conference and if we say 'no' the outcome will be that they [Arab States] have prevented the convening of the Conference, and not us. We are standing firm on both feet on the ground of the international precedent and the consent of all factors in the Geneva Conference.

Whatever will be with the continuation of the negotiation, we have prepared an 'alternative' chapter and its time will arrive after the discussion on the previous one, if it will be made possible. It is possible that the discussion will take a different turn as a result of the response of the President. But from mythological and Israel's best perspectives, I would prefer that the discussion will focus on the first part that I read and find out where America stands. Only afterwards we will discuss the alternative. But if the discussion goes astray then we may not have a choice but to speak all in one breath.

What is the alternative? If the countries that have common borders with Israel will refuse to participate **in the in the accepted for of the Geneva conference** – based on the precedent of the Conference first session because of their demand to add the PLO to the national representations – with the good will of the U.S, it is possible to reestablish the three mixed committees on the basis of the precedent that was set in Rhodes in 1949.

A Geneva Conference is not essential to the opening and conducting of negotiations on a peace treaty. We shall tell Carter: 'Use your good services, go to Jerusalem, Cairo, Amman and Damascus and propose on your behalf, but with the knowledge that we agree, to appoint three mixed committees.' The Government of Israel will establish its committee and the Arab countries will appoint theirs. Then a place will be selected for their deliberations – it can be in Geneva, in Rhodes, in the U.S. or in any other neutral location - and the negotiations for peace will commence. That is the first possible alternative.

In order to circumvent the PLO issue there is another option. In 1972 the Americans proposed to conduct rapprochement talks with the Arabs. They suggested that the Israeli delegation will reside in one hotel, the Arab delegation in another and the American delegation somewhere in the middle. We suggest adopting this precedent and letting the Americans have another option: 'based on the principle of raprochmanrt talks, conduct within this framework for negotiations for signing peace treaties.'

In order to do so, we bring forth a detailed framework for the process of reaching peace – either in a Geneva Conference, or as an alternative of having direct negotiations for peace without re-convening the Geneva Conference.

These two options, that were either examined, or promised, cannot be overlooked. They can be rejected by artificial arguments, but if someone is seriously considering peace negotiations, they cannot reject both proposals. At any rate, as far as public opinion is concerned, our standing will not be weakened after these proposals are published – and they should.

All those who spoke with Carter and then contacted us argued that he would want 'specifics' – and I use the technical term – and the intention is to the territorial problem on all three fronts. Theoretically, we could have been satisfied with it. I'm asking my colleagues to consider this

option. We propose a framework for the process of negotiating a peace treaty. All proposals will be brought about by the participating parties during the negotiations.

**Minister A. Shostak:** Does it not give, as far as first impression is concerned, that Israel puts her willingness for negotiations on the condition that it will be a negotiation for signing peace treaties?

**The PM:** No. I said yesterday at the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security that these are our proposals and if we hear a different one that is reasonable, we shall discuss it. But the Government discussed the issue and present such a proposal that is congruent with all the accepted rules in negotiation. We do not say that it is conditional. That is why we request to discuss it with the Americans and if they have other proposals, they should present them. But then I will say to President Carter: 'I have heard your proposal, Mr. President, but in Israel we have a parliamentary system and I need to bring it to the Government for considerations.'

**Minister Abu-Hatzeira:** We oppose the PLO's participation in the Geneva Conference. What will happen if the Arab delegations will include representatives of the PLO? Another question in regards to the mixed committees' alternative in case there won't be a Geneva Conference. Did your team consider this possibility?

**The PM:** It has to do with only one country – Jordan. Neither Syria nor Egypt proposed to include PLO representatives in their delegations. If the Jordanians will incorporate Israeli/Palestinian-Arabs it is not our concern and we shall not examine the references of every Jordanian delegate – but not the PLO: Directly, or indirectly. But if the Jordanians take an ex-Minister who is originally from Western Eretz Israel, it is not our business; but this applies only to the Jordanian delegation.

I reiterate – if the Government is accepting this premise then we can pursue this road: Telling the President that these are our proposals for the negotiations and what is defined as 'specific' is a matter for direct talks. The Foreign Minister and I received some information that President Carter will be disappointed if he does hear clearer words. However, we have to be prepared to have a say on 'specifics'. Hence, we propose to say the following on the territorial subject and then I will explain what we are asking of the President to say with respect to the Arabs. Conveying these subjects, in my estimate, should be done in a smaller framework than that of the official delegation that will include 16 members and is expected to commence its talks on Tuesday. But if the President would want to include his Secretary of State I don't think that we should object to it, after all he will report to him on the talks.

We shall then tell the President, in full trust, that this is our position on the three fronts: In the Sinai, because it is a vast area, we can make a significant retreat of our forces, without a map and without setting a line in this stage. As for the Golan Heights, we should remain there. In connection with a peace treaty, we shall agree to changes in the line, namely moving forces. I will not, under any circumstances discuss the issue of the settlements and their removal. As for the areas of Eretz Israel – Judea, Samaria and Gaza we shall not subject them to foreign rule or sovereignty. Our stance is based on two foundations: Our right to the land – and this is our country – and the issue of national security. For us, national security means securing the safety and the lives of all the Israeli citizens, including women and children, as is **truly can be proven**.

These are defined as 'specifics' that I will propose to President Carter and adding that he should not transmit these details to the Arab countries. This is because of the just principle that every proposal should be brought to direct negotiation. Nothing is owed to the Arabs just because of their participation in the Geneva Conference, or the mixed committee. This is a free

negotiation – we are not asking for the Arabs’ commitment to anything and they cannot demand this from us. They should come to the Geneva Conference with their proposals.

I read in the newspapers that a day before yesterday, President Carter said that he received a message from Sadat that he will not demand pre-conditions. If Sadat accepts our interpretations to what pre-conditions are, that alright.

We shall tell the President: ‘We are not requiring of the Arabs to have a pre-conditions and they should not demand the same from us. We give this message to you only.’

Afterwards there is the problem of additional stages. Secretary of State Vance will arrive in the Middle East two weeks after I conclude my visit to Washington. I suggest that we propose something instead: ‘It is your decision when Vance travels to the Middle East but we recommend that in the next stage, the Foreign Minister of Israel will come to Washington and we shall form a committee that will consist of three Ministers who hold strategic posts: The Foreign Minister [Dayan], the Defense Minister [Weizman] and Agriculture Minister [Sharon] and they will work on the ‘specification of the specifics’.

**State archives: 4269/5 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/5B69D1A3-A79F-47FA-96D0-DE592A0D6F50/0/Egypt04.pdf>

**Foreign Ministry**

**Top Secret**

July 20, 1977

**To: Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan**  
**From: Israel Envoy to Washington, Hannan Bar-On**

**Urgent**

To addressee only - Foreign Minister

Enclosed are main points from the private conversation of the Prime Minister with the President.

- A. The U.S. agrees with Israel that upon the completion of the negotiations with its neighbors it is imperative to have peace treaties.

- B. The U.S. will have, obviously, contacts with all parties. Will bring to the attention of the Arab countries the framework document and will report their reactions to us.
- C. The President defined the document a 'solid proposal'.
- D. The PM wants to note that there is no confrontation with the U.S. 'we agreed that on certain issues we do not agree'.
- E. The President emphasized to the PM that he expects that the parties will come to Geneva without pre-conditions.
- F. The President requested that we postpone settlements 'activities until the convening in Geneva'. The PM did not make any promises on that matter.

A note: We will be able to transmit a full report only tomorrow because of its length.

Bat-On

**State archive: 4349/4 – 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/C400722F-F65D-4EF4-9C02-4124226D944B/0/Egypt05.pdf>

**Foreign Ministry**

**Top Secret**

July 21, 1977

To: **Foreign Minister: Moshe Dayan**

From: **Yehuda Avner and Envoy, Hannan Bar-On. From Washington**

**(In English)**

**Urgent**

To Addressee only

The second full meeting between President Carter and Prime Minister Begin in the Cabinet Room, at the White House, July 20, 1977, 10:30 A.M.

**The President:** I am glad you finally got some rest; yesterday must have been strenuous for you. I particularly appreciated the books you gave me last night. I wrote a book myself, not as good as



yours, but which I would like to present to you. Also, I would like you to have this book which contains satellite photographs of the world.

**PM:** Thank you Mr. President for your very warm dedication in the book. I have read your book and I'll read it again.

**The President:** This morning we have an opportunity to sum up what has occurred in the course of our talks. Last night we had the opportunity to discuss the agenda of the people of the world. I want to express my gratitude. We want to be sure that to the press and the public we emphasize the positive aspects of our meetings. We have, obviously, some differences; we have to overcome some problems of significance. Our own security is deeply involved with the security of the Middle East. Our ties with Israel are irrevocable and strong. The possibility of a worldwide disruption if war were to break out in the Middle East is a paramount consideration. It is a responsibility we share with you and Western Europe. We shall be active to try and bring the parties in dispute together at the Geneva Conference. All the opinions that you have expressed are conducive to the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. This is encouraging. When the Secretary of State sees the Arab leaders he will take with him an encouraging foundation. The question of a single delegation – as some Arab want – or individual delegations could be divisive. I think that this can be resolved – although I am not sure – by our call to the Soviet Union as Co-Chairman to meet first in joint session and then divide into study groups. I think this is an acceptable approach. Your suggestion is quite good.

Obviously, if we are talking about Geneva in October then there will be a lot of details to be concluded. Secretary Vance and the Prime Minister discussed yesterday the procedural question and it was suggested that when yours and the other Foreign Ministers come to the UN General Assembly we will try to iron out the remaining difficulties to bring the parties to the Conference itself. This is a good suggestion. My belief is that they may accept this suggestion.

**Vance:** I think they probably would.

**The President:** One of the remaining obstacles concerns the Palestinian representation. There are several options that can be pursued. Some were discussed in this room yesterday and the Prime Minister and I discussed them again last night. One possibility is that the Palestinians be part of the Jordanian delegation. The other is that when the refugee issue is discussed they will join. As far as the principles which we had suggested are concerned, we have come to a satisfactory understanding on four principles. There is a disagreement on the fifth principle. We have a difference of opinion on the Palestinian question.

The Arab opinions expressed to us in private conversation are unacceptable to Israel and I have to say that Israel's position on withdrawal and the Palestinian question is not acceptable to the Arabs. There are questions that have to be resolved in negotiations with your neighbors. We shall help in any way we can without trying to impose our will. I hope that once the Conference starts you will get to know each other and ascertain your positions.

There is one other question: All the nations and leaders involved in Geneva – including ourselves - you here, the Arab leaders and, we too, have made strong statements in the past of a controversial nature. I would hope that until Geneva convenes restraint will prevail in what we can accept and cannot accept.

We must all go the Geneva with an open mind. For example, last night I agreed with the Prime Minister that we would not repeat the term 'minor modifications'. I would use such a phrase again only after careful consultation with the Prime Minister. We have already asked Assad, Hussein and Sadat to restrain their remarks.

I think it is accurate to say that they have responded well. Of course, I don't want to imply that they gave up their basic hopes and positions.

The last point I would like to make is that I will accommodate your request to contact Brezhnev again about the question of immigration from Russia.

**PM:** May I hand you Mr. President of the Prisoners of Conscience in Russia. (The Prime Minister hands the President the list).

**The President:** I am going to do it very quietly so that if he complies he won't be embarrassed. If he agrees to let all of them go or some of them go we can announce it as he sees best.

**PM:** Thank you Mr. President.

**The President:** I think I can say now that we enjoy the substantial confidence of our peoples. There are many degrees of flexibility in the attitudes of our peoples. We can lead the Americans and Israelis to an acceptance of agreed principles which in the past were difficult. You have demonstrated super leadership and courage in helping to establish the nation of Israel. Now I think that more than any human beings, you and I have the chance to perpetuate, for over a thousand years, the right of Israel to live in peace. I think the people of Israel are ready to accept the proposition that an accord with the Arabs is feasible.

Mr. Prime Minister, if you would feel the desire to phone me, or to correspond with me privately, I will consider it an honor. I would like to feel that I can do the same thing with you. If I make some statement that you feel you want to comment upon, please be in direct touch with me and I will be in touch with you. We cannot espouse the position of Israel. We can only bring you and the Arab nations into agreement if we have trust on all points. We won't reveal your confidences, just as we don't reveal theirs.

These are some of the comments in summary that I wished to make. This is my interpretation of our talks.

**PM:** Thank you Mr. President. I think now we have great measure of understanding and agreement. I will now try and enumerate on what we have agreed.

One: A new and additional session in the Geneva Conference should be convened in October.

Two: We agreed that after the opening session an instrument be created to work on peace treaties between the sides. These would be mixed commissions under rotating chairmanships.

Three: The goal of the negotiations should be the conclusion of peace treaties. There will be four peace treaties including Lebanon that will put an end to the state of war and reach a normal peace.

Four: If there will be difficulties reconvening the Geneva Conference under the 'appropriate auspices' of 338 linked to 242, we should look for alternative ways how to promote the momentum for this purpose.

We made two suggestions:

One: Under the good offices of the U.S. Government we shall bring about the aforementioned mixed commissions by diplomatic means.

Two: The other alternative is through proximity talks.

These proposals are not merely a matter of form, they are substance. I believe we have a large measure of agreement on this. We are grateful. It is due in large measure to the attitude of the President.

The Foreign Ministers will be in New York in September for the UN general Assembly. The President has kindly agreed to receive our extremely able Foreign Minister Dayan at that time. Also, Secretary Vance will visit the Middle East and he has graciously agreed to go first to the Arab countries and then come to us. This will provide us with enough time to prepare concrete

documents. So, in the next few weeks and months we shall keep up the momentum. Let us hope that there will be responses from the other side. There should be a response because we don't exclude anything; it is free negotiation. Now, this afternoon I'm holding a press conference. In reply to all questions put to me on the territorial issue at the press conference, I will say this is part of the negotiations in Geneva. I shall not elaborate. Everybody is entitled to bring his proposals without prior conditions. The newspapermen will press me but I will probably withstand the pressure, believe me.

Let us meet at Geneva with open minds. I think it is important that the instrumentality has been elaborated upon about the opening session of the Geneva Conference and the mixed commissions.

Mr. President, when I come home I will take up immediately with my colleagues the matter of the over flights over Saudi Arabia. We shall try and find a way of accommodating you. I have to have the opinion of the Defense Minister. But I assure you we will try to comply with your request.

**The President**: If we can get your reply before Secretary Vance goes to Saudi Arabia it will be helpful.

**The PM**: I hope that by the week following my return, say next Thursday, I will have our reply. I hope, Mr. President you had a chance to read the document I left with you yesterday (concerning Israel's contribution to the U.S. national security).

**The President**: (Favorably) Yes, I did.

**The PM**: We shall go on helping you in any way we can. Mr. President, one further matter. I spoke yesterday to the Secretary of Defense. I brought to his attention our requirements concerning our defense posture. He promised that before I leave some replies might be given. I know, Mr. President that you will always work to see a stronger Israel. I remember very well what you said concerning the period of the 'reassessment'. If you can make a decision or several decisions on the matter it will be good tidings from Washington to Israel. It is very important for the morale of our people – the feeling that we are working together and that our strength is not being eroded.

**The President**: I hope to be able through Cyrus [Vance] to give you the information this afternoon.

**The PM**: I hope we can agree that at the press conference I can say that our relations are cordial; that there is friendship, no confrontation.

**The President**: Absolutely.

**The PM**: And then I'll add what I feel for you.

**The President**: Thank you. There are just two brief comments. If you will mention the UN Resolutions 242 and 338 it will be helpful. And also, you have my commitment not to use the term 'minor modifications' publicly. But I ask you not to mention it publicly. Concerning the military requests, I'll get together with Brzezinski and Vance as soon as they are free, to go over the requests.

**Dinitz**: One point if I may, Mr. President. We are, of course, thankful and appreciative for the economic and the military aid provided over the years. There is however a serious question which I would like to raise. After the Sinai two agreements, we agreed upon a long range military supply relationship which was based on \$1.5 billion annual appropriations. As you know Mr. President the 1976 and 1977 appropriations mounted to \$1 billion. Your Department of Defense and we agree that this amount is not sufficient to cover the actual needs. We would

therefore appreciate it deeply if you would consider recommending the additional amount for the coming fiscal year.

**The President:** I will look into it. (turning to the US Ambassador [Lewis]) Well, Mr. Ambassador, how things look to you?

**The US Ambassador:** I think it has been a splendid meeting – better than I had hoped.

**The PM:** We shall work with your Ambassador in full confidence.

**The President:** (To Vance) Have we anything new on the Ethiopian question?

**Vance:** We have nothing new. We have to look into it very carefully.

**The President:** We have information of a Soviet commitment for the weapons for the Ethiopians.

**The PM:** So we shall keep in touch on the matter.

**The President:** We have observed a build-up of border caches between Egypt and Libya in the in the last 24 hours.

**The PM:** So have we.

**The President:** Mr. Prime Minister, do you find our peace keeping mission in the Sinai adequate?

**The PM:** Very adequate, Mr. President.

**The President:** I am gratified. I want to express again my personal feeling for you. I think the relationship is one of which we can build real progress. I am very proud.

**The PM:** I thank you Mr. President. These days in Washington are good days.

(The meeting adjourned at 10:50 AM)

Avner – Bar-on

**State archive: 4349/4 – 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/C06F7A44-FD40-4A22-8108-0891E5A66D3F/0/Egypt06.pdf>

**The following is an accompanying letter to Israel's draft of its peace plan that was sent by Israel Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan to the U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance.**

**(In English)**

Jerusalem, September 2, 1977

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I enclose herewith a draft of the Treaty of Peace which the government of Israel would be prepared to conclude with the Egyptian Government. We would be prepared to conclude similar Treaties with the other neighboring Arab states involved. These drafts would constitute our proposals for negotiations on a bilateral basis with respective Arab States, namely Egypt, Syria, Jordan and (possibly) Lebanon.

As regards certain of the issues outstanding between the Egyptian and the Israeli Governments, and in particular that of the delimitation of the territorial jurisdiction between the two countries,

we have indicated in the appropriate articles of the draft that these two matters are to be settled in annexes to the Treaty.

Nevertheless, I consider it useful at this stage to state the specific issues which our government considers essential to apply in determining the respective limits of the territorial jurisdiction between Israel on the one hand and the participants in the Geneva Peace Conference, Egypt, Syria and Jordan on the other hand in accordance with the principles presented by the Prime Minister to the President during their private talks in the White House on 19 July 1977.

These guidelines are as follows:

### 1. General Principle

In seeking a solution to the outstanding problems of territorial delimitation, the practice should be guided by the principle that the respective national and security interests of all of them should be equally taken into account.

### 2. Israel and Egypt

- a. Any settlement should take fully into account the need to insure Israel's security.
- b. The right of Israel to unimpeded freedom of navigation and flying through and over the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aquaba should be insured. For this purpose Israel will retain territorial control over Sharem-El-Sheikh and the Tiran Straights including territorial continuity to Eilat.
- c. In order to maintain the security of its southern areas, the outer limits of Israel's territorial control from the Mediterranean Sea to the Gulf of Aquaba should run west of the previous international boundary, in such a manner as to incorporate an area on the Mediterranean Coast, south of the Gaza Strip.
- d. West of the area under Israeli control, there shall be, as part of the security arrangement, continuous buffer zones, demilitarized zones, and areas of limited armament and forces.
- e. Subject to these principles, and bearing in mind the means of implementing the outlined above, Israel would be prepared in the context of a Peace Treaty, for substantial withdrawal of its forces from the existing line in the Sinai Peninsulas.

### 3. Israel and Syria

In the context of a Peace Treaty, Israel is prepared to negotiate a new boundary to replace the present cease-fire line between the States.

The delimitation of the respective territories, and the security arrangements, should be such as to insure Israel's water sources and the security of the northern areas.

### 4. Israel and Jordan

- a. In Judea and Samaria equal rights and full co-existence should be insured between Jew and Arab.
- b. No part of this area should be subjected to any foreign rule or sovereignty.
- c. Any settlement should take Israel's security needs fully into account. In this context our position is that Israel's security on the Eastern border should be based on the Jordan River.

In addition to the territorial issues, as to which our views have been outlined above, a comprehensive peace settlement must also make full provisions for the refugees, both Arab and Jewish.

In my forthcoming discussions with the United States Government, I will if requested, elaborate on the views of the Israeli Government set forth in this letter.

In this letter I have set out the basic principles relating to Israel's national and security interests, which need to be implemented if a just and lasting peace is to be achieved in this area. I have also set out some of the modalities by which our government considers that these principles can best be implemented. However, we are ready to approach in a completely unprejudiced and open-minded manner to any other proposals that may be made by the Arab States. As we have previously stated, we shall enter into the negotiations without any prejudices, and regard all issues as being subject to negotiation. The Arab States concerned should enter into the negotiations in the same spirit.

The proposals contained in this letter are intended to be implemented within the context of final peace treaties with our neighboring Arab States.

Sincerely yours,

Moshe Dayan

His Excellency  
Mr. Cyrus Vance  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C.

**State archive: 4313/3 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/2E42A22C-3D17-4FE5-B096-98BA2CBDAB1A/0/Egyp07.pdf>

**FOREIGN MINISTRY**  
Liaison Department

**Top Secret**

October 5, 1977

To: The Ministry  
From: New York

Urgent

To: Kadishai, for the PM  
Copy: Director General

Comments on the working paper:

1. It was decided unequivocally that the agreed upon basis for the Geneva Conference are the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It should be noted that in the first American draft that was presented to us there was no reference to these Resolutions. In the first Geneva Conference there was a reference only to Resolution 338 – that includes reference to 242 but there was fierce opposition at the time to mention 242 and this Resolution came about following the Six Days War [1967]. And in all the signed agreements since the Yom Kippur War [1973] there was only a referral to 338 as for the Arabs insistence.
2. In the first draft there was clear reference to the PLO. In the current working paper there are no obligations – known and lesser known – to the PLO.
3. **Since** it is only in Clause 2 of the working paper, there is a reference to peace agreements, than it is obvious that the Palestinians cannot be considered as having an equal status to that of a State.
4. It is the first time since 1948 that a document that is acceptable by the U.S. clearly references the subject of Jewish refugees. This should be considered as a significant achievements.
5. It is being re-emphasized that all the first terms of references of the Geneva Conference exist unless otherwise decided by the participants.
6. The working paper cancels completely any legal significance to an American-Soviet joint declaration.
7. It is separately stated in the common announcement of Israel and the U.S. that there is no precondition that the participants should accept a joint American-Soviet declaration that would be necessary for the opening of the Geneva Conference and its procedures.
8. The Palestinians (Palestinian Arabs) are not participating in the Conference as an organization, or as a unit that conducts any sort of negotiation for a peace treaty. They are included in the united delegation and they may take part in discussions only on a certain subject. The U.S. should try and receive the names of the participating Palestinians in advance and present them to us for considerations and approval.
9. The united Arab delegation exists only for the opening session. Afterwards it will be divided into working groups during the Conference.
10. The working groups were formed for the purpose of negotiating and reaching peace treaties. Hence, the working groups are meant to be qualified to arrive at conclusions without being subjected to an approval of the plenum of the Conference, as was already noted in the first draft of the working paper.
11. The working groups will be consisted only of representatives of states.
12. The mixed committees that will discuss the West Bank and Gaza (that include Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinians) are described in a separate Clause – namely, it is special and separate from those that discusses peace treaties. It does not imply that it might include negotiations for the establishment of a [Palestinian] state.

**Written by: Dinitz and Rosenne**

**State archive: 4337/7 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/9D88BC8D-882C-4675-B261-E9573325D19E/0/Egypt08.pdf>

**A Joint Announcement of the U.S. and Israel  
upon the completion of the talks with Carter and Vance**

October 5, 1977

The U.S. and Israel agree that Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 remain the agreed basis for the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference and that all the understandings and agreements between them on this subject remain in force.

Proposals for removing remaining obstacles to reconvening the Geneva Conference were developed. Foreign Minister Dayan will consult his Government on the results of these discussions. Secretary Vance will discuss these problems with the other parties in the Geneva Conference.

Acceptance of the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. statement of October 1, 1977 by the parties is not a prerequisite for the reconvening and the conduct of the Geneva Conference.

**State archive: 6862/6 - זא**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/1A4B0050-7EF8-403E-AAEA-2F538CD99C4E/0/Egypt08APP1.pdf>

**SECRET**

October 5, 1977

WORKING PAPER ON SUGGESTIONS FOR THE RESUMPTION  
OF THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE

1. The Arab Parties will be represented by a unified Arab delegation, which will include Palestinian Arabs. After the opening sessions, the Conference will split into working groups.
2. The working groups for the negotiation and conclusion of peace treaties will be formed as follows:
  - a. Egypt-Israel
  - b. Jordan-Israel



- c. Syria-Israel
- d. Lebanon-Israel (\*)
- 3. The West Bank and Gaza issues will be discussed in a working group consisting of Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Arabs.
- 4. The solution to the problem of Arab and Jewish refugees will be discussed in accordance with terms to be agreed upon.
- 5. UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 are the agreed basis for the negotiations at the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East.
- 6. All the initial terms of reference of the Geneva Peace Conference remain in force, except those agreed by the parties.

(\*) All the parties agree that Lebanon may join the Conference when it so requests.

**SECRET**

**AGREED MINUTES OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT CARTER,  
SECRETARY VANCE AND FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN**

October 4-5, 1977

The list of names of the proposed Palestinian Arab Members of the unified Arab Delegation to the Geneva Peace Conference will be sought by the United States, which will provide the list to Israel. The U.S. has been informed of Israel's position that members of the PLO are not acceptable as participants in the United Arab Delegation to the Geneva Peace Conference. Israel will screen the list, using reasonable criteria, and will indicate to the U.S. any individuals on the list which it objects to. The U.S. will seek to eliminate those individuals from the delegation during discussions with the Arab delegation. It is understood that Israel can refuse to attend the Conference if individual Palestinian Arabs they object to are present.

**State archive: 6862/6 – זת**

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**The Committee of (Israel) Media Editors**

**Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan's briefing on the 'Working Paper'  
to ward off inaccurate political criticisms**

Tel-Aviv, October 14, 1977

What I said in my speech and what was in reality was that Member of the Knesset, Shmuel Tamir, appeared last night on television and claimed that the working paper guarantees the participation of the PLO and this is a lie. Shimon Peres claimed that we are granting legitimacy to the Arab League (I do not remember his exact words).

All these were in the Foreign and Security Committee and they read the entire document, went out publicly, to the press, to the television, everywhere. This Committee is now a reckless

institution. If I describe to its members my conversation with President Carter and it appears the following day in the press, it seems to me that even though this is a secret Committee their commitment to keep secret is worthless. I will most certainly not talk again with the President of the United States. Let us say not even with a high ranking official. A conversation that I consider to be a secret, I shall not report it to this Committee. I have no choice but to read to you the paper itself.

In my opening remarks I wish to reiterate few points that are related to the working paper, and not only to this paper. The first issue is about the procedure – and this working paper is about procedures. Even though it includes substantial matters, namely the participation of the Palestinians and other questions that by their nature are procedural, but in reality they are of substance.

**At any rate, for me, the real test is that it is forbidden that this paper will create a framework that may disturb or prevent the fulfillment of its content as it seems to the respective government.** This paper, which I consider a good one, (and now you have it in front of you in its entirety) has nothing in it that would make it more difficult to reach a peace treaty, as the Government wishes to achieve. There is nothing in this paper that guarantees that there will be such a peace treaty.

And the question whether we can reach an agreement with the Syrians over the Golan Heights, is a very difficult one. But the question is whether anybody can point with his finger, to this paper, and claim that it has a clause that might prevent a prior reaching peace in accordance with Israel's wish. This was our primary consideration. In my opinion, there is nothing in that paper that can stand in the way and prevent it from happening. But I also emphasize that there is nothing in this paper that guarantees that we will be able to achieve our aims; of course not. Another comment about the paper in regards to procedures is as follows: The question is if we seriously and honestly intend to start a discussion and negotiations for peace with the Arabs, or not. **There may** be many private citizens and political parties in the country who think that we should pretend to reach for peace, but in reality it will be difficult for us to achieve our goals, then it is altogether better not to commence that negotiation.

Today, we have a hold on all the territories and we know the Arabs' positions, the Russians' positions and more or less where the Americans are standing. So, there may be someone that we have to stay away from confronting the option of negotiation for peace. I do not think so. I think that we have to arrive at that moment, though I am not more optimistic about the consequences than those who doubt it. But I also do not think that if we don't reach an agreement we will be in a disadvantageous and a worse position and so forth. (I will relate to it soon).

As I previously said, the first question concerns the working paper. It should not stand in the way of reaching our aims.

The second question – if indeed we wish to sit at the negotiation table with the Arabs, one should ask what are the acceptable procedures, on both sides, that will allow us to sit with them. It requires minimal common sense to understand that there should not be two separate working papers, one Arab and one Israeli, if we wish to negotiate with them. This should be our starting point. I am ready to ask, what sensible person would not want to have a paper that is accepted on both sides. We are not talking here about a one-sided paper, we are talking about one that is reciprocal.

The third question has to do with a point that I have already touched on. Let us assume that at the end of the process we will not be able to reach a peace treaty with the Arabs – either all of them, or part of them – because of the gaps between our positions. There is ground for such

apprehension because the gap is so big that it might not be bridged. The question is, what do we prefer? To bring it to a brink over procedures while it is clear to everyone that we chose the path because we did not succeed in the discussing the issue of the Golan Heights with the Syrians? After all, the others are not stupid.

So what is preferable? To say that we are not going to Geneva because Rabin and Golda express their doubts about the results? I don't belong to those who prefer to not even go to Geneva. And I don't think that our situation is that bad. If indeed we do not reach an agreement with the Syrians on the Golan Heights or with the Egyptians over the Sinai or with the Jordanians and the Palestinians over the West Bank – we would then not reach an agreement with them over issues of content. It is possible that we can reach an agreement, or a partial agreement. But when the negotiations explode we can put our finger on the cause: They want us to get down from the Golan Heights, and we objected to it. This is an issue of substance, not of procedure.

If I am to assess the support of the American Jewry and others – we shall receive it only on substantial and serious matters. They will understand that it endangers us and that we are not making a tactical maneuver. After 10 years in the territories, we don't resort to a tactical move. The question does not relate only to the American Jewry but to all the Jews in Eretz Israel. What do our people here want? They want to try and reach peace, or don't they? We have to examine the possibilities. And I tell all – once the procedures agree upon, what will happen in Geneva? Do you want to have a discussion on substance, or don't you? **And to throw at Begin and at this Government that we are discussing procedures while we intend to arrive at substance. Or there are those who say why are you pushing yourselves, or ready to arrive at subjects of substance where we can find ourselves in a difficult predicament.**

I did not want to avoid, even for a minute, the subjects of substance. We came to Washington with a paper on substantial issues. But the Americans said – we want to discuss the procedures now because we wish to open the Geneva Conference before the end of this year. If we get into substance now, we shall not reach that deadline. It was not Begin, not I but Carter and the Arabs, primarily Egypt, that said that they do not wish to discuss issues of substance at the first stage. Does that mean that our option is to tell them that we are apprehensive of substance and so wish to not deal with it? Well, I don't think so. I am of the opinion that we should conduct negotiations for peace. If there are points of disagreement or conflicting views; we should be stuck with them rather than with procedural matters. Among all the subjects that are seen and disputed today, the Palestinian issue, namely, their participation in the procedural framework is central. Let us examine both positions: The position of the Alignment [political party in opposition] and what is written in this agreement.

The Alignment position is that it is necessary (or they will accept) that Palestinians participate in the negotiations in Geneva, but as part of the Jordanian delegation. That's the formula. There is no Alignment formula that forbids Palestinians from participating. I'm not a member of that Party but I am no stranger to their positions and did take some part in the writing of them in the past and I know them by heart. They never said no to the participation of Palestinians in the Jordanian delegation. And this is accepted by us as well by me, and definitely by Begin. But life and policy have their own doings. Jordan, after the Rabat resolution and more recently when they began to glorify the PLO, announced that she is not ready to include the Palestinians in their delegation. Jordan is not willing to do so also because the Palestinians who reside in the West Bank do not wish to appear with [King] Hussein. You must be familiar with it – (they even did not want to go and congratulate him) and so forth. An additional reason is

Jordan does not want to back those who undermine the Rabat resolution. The entire Arab position has been accepted in Rabat says that the Palestinians are an independent body and their representatives represent the PLO and not Jordan. Then Jordan says that she does not want their inclusion in its delegation. We cannot force her.

And now we have the following options. If Jordan does not agree to it, let it be altogether without Palestinians. We cannot accept the option that the Palestinians will appear independently. I'm very apprehensive of the possibility that there will be a situation where the Palestinians appear independently, because the meaning of it is that they potentially "represent" an independent state. If we are conducting negotiations with Egypt and Syria and with the Palestinians at the same **category**, then what are we negotiating about? If Jordan refuses to include them, we arrive at the proposal that is included in the working paper. It means that there are four states and four working groups with whom we would negotiate for peace: between Israel-Egypt, Israel-Syria, Israel-Lebanon and Israel-Jordan.

There was a demand for a fifth working group that will negotiate with her on a peace agreement with regards to the West Bank. This was an American proposal. We said – no. So, on what we do negotiate? I refer to it in a positive way because I wanted that Palestinians to be included in the Jordanian delegation, **so that will be somewhere**. It is not feasible that they will not be anywhere and we discuss the predicament of a Million and a quarter Arabs. I think that this should be discussed. But they cannot be there as having a status of a state. So what did we agree on? It should not be within the framework of the states with whom we negotiate for peace.

We are now moving to two additional clauses: One has to do with the settlement of the refugees in the countries where they reside now and finding a solution to Jewish refugees. And these issues do not entail negotiations for peace, but specifically the refugees' problem. The first part of the next two clauses is not about peace negotiations – but about the problem of the refugees. There is no discussion about the Palestinians and the West Bank. There is large issue and it is necessary to figure out who will discuss this issue. Egypt is a partner in that group because she conquered Gaza and was previously in control the Gaza Strip; Jordan may participate too since it conquered the West Bank and the Palestinian because they reside in these area; and Israel because of its presence there.

My concept is that it is not necessary to annex part of the West Bank to Jordan and that there should not be a Palestinian state under any circumstance. We must not even allow the creation of a situation where a fetus of a state could be considered. I do not see the possibility that there will be total detachment between the Arabs living in the territories and Jordan.

First, there is the issue of citizenship: there are 800,000 resident in the West Bank that are citizens of Jordan. The question is whether we are content or want to weaken it. As for me I'm very satisfied with it. There will be open bridges there. They will have their representation in Amman. Is it conceivable that in any agreement there will be not be a situation, not even a peace treaty, where a citizen cannot elect his representatives to any parliament? I don't think so.

In our proposal for an agreement, there should be two options: The local resident will vote to the Israeli Parliament, or to the Jordanian one. **Since he is now a Jordanian citizen, and has been sending his representatives for the last 10 years to the Jordanian Parliament, and been doing it willingly since 1949.** They did it instead of having a Palestinian State. They asked for Jordanian citizenship, so in my opinion maintaining this situation is the best option. But this cannot be discussed by having Jordan and the representation of these Palestinians. It cannot be decided that they will have seats in the Parliament without Jordan being represented in this group. And then there is a question of 400,000 residents in the Gaza Strip. As of today they have

no citizenship. In my opinion it will be best if they are given Jordanian citizenship. I am very much against granting them Egyptian citizenship but we may cause it by conducting the wrong policy. If we separate Jordan and them, then Egypt, population of 39 million, will grant citizenship to an additional 400,000 and the latter will send their representatives to the Egyptian parliament. Then the Egyptians will have an access to that entire desert in the Gaza Strip. We need it as “hole in the head” (this actually is not a good wording for it).

We can obtain a separation from Egypt, if we arrange demilitarize zones etc., Egypt wants to get rid of the Gaza Strip, so, the residents of Gaza will not have Egyptian citizenship. But they do not want to have an Israeli citizenship. **I would make any effort to force it upon them, as if we need additional 400,000 Arab citizens.** They wish to receive Arab citizenship and to be linked to an Arab country. It is good that during the past 10 years they had open bridges at their disposal. Jordan even granted citizenship to some of them and is open to the idea. Jordan wishes that in a framework of an agreement, she may be granted access to the sea via Gaza and a port there, In return she will grant them citizenship. But for that you need a transfer – Egypt has to do it and it will not do it to us. It may transfer it to another Arab country, or to Jordan.

You need the Palestinians in these discussions in order for them to agree, you have to sit with them. We have progressive people in the opposition parties in Israel who wonder if it is really realistic not to sit with the Palestinians. Just because we are in control and no one can make us leave does not mean that (we can ignore?) a million and a quarter Arabs, we must have a plan.

The “Alon Plan” that they rejected left many Arabs amongst us. Jerusalem – We must talk about Jerusalem. I know that we annexed Jerusalem so that we shall our sovereignty over the city (I voted for it). To say that the issue of Jerusalem is already settled and there is nothing to talk about with the Christians and the Muslims before enacting the Jerusalem Law, does not mean that all is well with Jerusalem. We have nothing to talk to them about, though by no means do I suggest that we annul the law. I do not accept a method in which we do not talk to the people with whom we wish to live. I’m saying that after spending sometime in the U.S. during the past month – I am much more decisive about things that we do not wish to relinquish – and nobody can force us to do so.

After all the conversations with Carter – the most difficult ones and so forth – **from that perspective** my feeling is much greater than before I went to the U.S. If we do not wish to exit the West Bank and say that no Palestinian state should be there, we do not remove our cannons from there; not the radar facilities; not the settlements – no one can force us to do any of these. If we do not wish to have an agreement that is not accepted by us, we cannot also dictate to the Arabs the plans that are accepted by us and expect them to make peace.

We cannot be forced to do what is not accepted by us. So, it is possible that there will be no peace. I do not claim that we can convince Assad, or force him to make peace with us while we are sitting in the Golan Heights. I don’t think we could. But if we decide by our own accord that we prefer to remain in the Golan Heights without peace, the world will be able to swallow it. At any rate, this is a question that may have a variety of assumptions about it. I use it as an argument for why I’m not reluctant or apprehensive to sit with the Palestinians. We shall go to Geneva and conduct all those discussions.

The last thing that I wish to refer to is the five points that we have assumed we came to an agreement with the Americans. This is not to say that they agree with what we say, but it was conveyed very succinctly to the Americans and to the President of the U.S. Their reactions

implied that they not only fully understand our positions but also we can pursue this point in Geneva.

First thing is that there will be no return to the pre-1967 borders. Namely, we are not obligated. They will suggest returning to the international borders in Egypt with some modifications. But, they will not say that going to Geneva, based on Resolution 242, requires of us to return to the previous borders. They will say that even the American interpretation is not obligating us. They might say that we are permitted to withdraw but not because of the Security Council's resolution. They know our position – we shall not return to the previous borders and this is our interpretation and that is your interpretation but we are going to Geneva on the basis of 242 – and it does not require us to withdraw to the previous borders. Rogers and Carter are saying that we have to, with slight modifications. That's their opinion. I am stating now the Israeli position.

The second thing is that we are not willing to accept an establishment of a Palestinian state even in the fashion of Carter's suggestions such as "homeland", "entity" and so forth. We say no to Carter's position. They heard our position and they know that we go to Geneva on the basis of this stand – that we will not discuss the establishment of a Palestinian state.

The third is that we shall not sit with the PLO in any form or fashion. We shall not sit with PLO representatives.

The fourth is that the Soviet-American agreement is not accepted by us and they cannot approach and say that there is such a framework, which is related to the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, and it is written in the agreement and you must oblige. It has to be with our consent – you may have a paper that you regard as a good one but we object to it. We are going to Geneva as if this paper does not exist. It does not obligate us in any fashion or form.

The fifth and the last thing is that the Americans, President Carter, said we have points of disputes and there will be ones in the known issues, such as a withdraw to previous borders, a Palestinian state and some others as well. But he reiterated, and Vance said yesterday, we shall not impose any pressure on you by way of economic means – economic aid, or security aid. We shall not use it as leverage against you. We shall not reduce the scope of any of these. Yes, we shall oppose you and we may not stand by you. You may find yourselves isolated in the world. I do not know how far. Theoretically, they may not prevent our expulsion from the UN or other sanctions. Carter says: 'I will not change my opinion on that matter and I will not promise you that I will not exert pressure. I will.' Though he did not say that he can tell the American Jewry: What the Israelis demand is in contrast to the American interest, are you going to act against American interest? But I am promising you that I will not reduce that and I will not reduce economic and security aid.

### **C. Secret contacts with Egypt** **Documents 10-16**

**State of Israel**

**The Foreign Ministry**  
**Jerusalem**

September 19, 1977

Secret

The subject: The conversation of the Prime Minister M. Begin  
with the President of Romania, N. Ceaucesco  
Friday, August 26, 1977 in Snagov

**Present:** Romania Prime Minister, Manea Manesco, Foreign Minister, G. Macovescu, the Ambassador Y. Kovatch, translator, Gluck.  
Israel's Director of the Foreign Office. E. Evron, Ambassador S. Kahana.

1. Approximately from 10 AM to 12, The Prime Minister and the President conducted a conversation at the presence of the above mentioned officials. After a brief intermission, the two continued at the initiative of the host to converse in the garden, accompanied by the translator. The following are the minutes of the report of the conversation in its first part only.
2. The meeting began with an exchange of greetings at the presence of photographers and reporters. The Prime Minister opened with noting the significance of the May 23rd holiday in commemoration of the uprising against the Nazis, and Romania's achievements during the 33 years that have passed since then. He defined the fighters against the Nazis as "our brothers in arms" and noted the common goal to prevent war and secure long and lasting peace.  
Ceaucesco replies that reaching a lasting and just peace is the core issue that should guide the two countries.  
The reporters exited.  
The following is the summary of the dialogue.

**The President:** Reiterated his welcome to the Prime Minister.

**The Prime Minister (PM):** Expresses his appreciation for the conversation that he conducted with Prime Minister Manesco and his high regards for Romania's achievements. The two countries have different positions on various issues and on their worldview. However, at the same time, both have an interest and a will to develop positive relations and understanding for their mutual benefit and international concerns.

**The President:** According to our custom we invite our guest to be the first to speak.

**PM:** We too have customs of welcoming guests and I'm re-extending my invitation to the President and the Prime Minister to visit us in Israel. This is the second visit of an Israeli Prime Minister to Romania and we promise that those who come from Romania to visit Israel will be met cordially.

**The President:** Thanking for the invitation. He would like to visit but so far he has not had the opportunity. He notes that the ties between the two countries were promoted by reciprocal ministerial visits. He hopes that he will be able to visit eventually. Though, it is guaranteed that Prime Minister Manesco will visit again in an appropriate time.

**PM:** Explains in detail the proposal that he submitted in Washington to the President of the U.S. He will present later on a document to Ceaucesco. He adds that President Carter inquired whether it is possible to add Lebanon to the countries that Israel will conduct negotiations with in Geneva and the PM said that he answered in the affirmative.

The PM explains what he means by the term 'precondition'. He then explains the hazardous security of the borders of June 4, 1967 that Sadat wishes us to return back to. Such borders will be a death threat. If Sadat demands the precondition that we retreat to those borders as a condition for the commencement of the negotiations in Geneva, we shall not consider to accept. However, we have no objection if he raises this demand during the negotiations.

As for us, we have critical positions such as maintaining the unification of Jerusalem. Jerusalem must remain united as it is inconceivable that Bucharest or Washington should be divided. We shall arrive with this position but we do not intend to demand a priori an Arab agreement to it as a precondition for the opening of the negotiations.

**The President:** I could have added Berlin.

**PM:** Indeed, Berlin is a problem. The Prime Minister continues to explain the procedures of the negotiations whereby the participants will be divided into four mixed committees:

Israeli-Egyptian; Israeli-Syrian; Israeli-Jordanian and Israeli-Lebanese. Each one of these will set a goal to reach a peace agreement as required and accepted by international law for nations that have been fighting one another.

The Chairman of each committee will alternate in representing its respective government. The Prime Minister adds, that since he presented this proposal, in a form of a document, to President Carter and Secretary of State Vance they have made trips to Arab capitals and to Israel. He has informed us that he concluded with some of the Arab governments that the purpose of the negotiations should be to reach peace agreements and not as the Arab's previously asserted, that there is room for arrangements but they were not ready to define them as peace agreements. Still missing is Arab consent that an indivisible part of every peace agreement should be the establishment of diplomatic relations. This position is not reasonable in our opinion because diplomatic relations are the soul of a peace agreement. We intend to insist on it. The Prime Minister notes that even in the Agreement between the Soviet Union and Japan, that was not a peace agreement, it was determined that there should be diplomatic relations.

**The President:** Expresses his thanks for the presentation of the proposal and the concepts of the Israeli Government. Romania was and continues to be interested in reaching a fast, just, and stable peace in the Middle East. From that perspective it deemed necessary to maintain ties and contacts with the countries that are involved. He made a point that he did not wish to be involved in their internal affairs and that the content of the negotiations must be determined by the countries themselves.

Romania's position is to encourage the countries to enter negotiations for the purpose of reaching peace and not to sever its relations with either side. The aim is to act in a way that assists in settling the conflict, while adhering to her general principles that guide her in the international sphere. Namely, respecting the right of every country to sovereignty and equality; negating foreign intervention; rejecting the use of force to impose solutions; attempting to settle conflicts by peaceful means.



**PM:** I accept and praise these principles.

**The President:** The continuation of the current situation in the Middle East worries Romania. It might even cause harm to her as well. He discussed these issues in the past with Arab and Israeli leaders, specifically with Mrs. Meir and recently with Sadat, Hussein, Assad and 'the president of the PLO, Arafat'. In his opinion the situation today is adequate enough to start a dialogue and instill peace. This opportunity may pass and get lost if it is not exploited. This is why it is necessary to do everything possible to start serious negotiations in order to reach a stable peace in the Middle East.

It is clear that the solution can be found in negotiations where each side can express his concepts and positions. The reconvening of the Geneva Conference may be one option, but not the only one. In his opinion, it should be recognized in advance – whether this issue comes up during negotiations or before they start – that holding the territories that were conquered in the Six Days War, cannot continue. This is a basic issue that should serve as an opening point if there is a sincere wish to reach a lasting peace. He exchanged views with Assad in January and with Sadat in May and continued his talks with them. It is clear to him that they cannot accept a situation whereby they don't receive these territories back. It is true that there is room for modifications of the borders such as preventing a division of villages. But this issue as well, requires mutual agreement and inclusion into a comprehensive solution that will be beneficial to all sides. It is hard to expect that that Assad and Sadat would go to the Geneva Conference without insisting on the liberation of these territories as an immediately and an obvious matter. They are ready to make peace now and the practical meaning of it is the recognition of Israel. The establishment of diplomatic relations is an important issue but it is difficult to solve concurrent with the making of a peace agreement.

**PM:** Why is it difficult?

**The President:** It is not imperative that a peace treaty should include the establishment of diplomatic relations. It is possible that they will follow in gradual development. It has happened in a few instances in the past. It is necessary to aspire to get economic and diplomatic relations in order, but it can be left to an extended period. This is the conclusion from talks with Arab leaders; they argue that after 30 years of hostilities, it is difficult to settle all problems – it is necessary to advance in stages. During negotiations it is possible to discuss every subject but a distinction should be made as to what can be achieved immediately and what requires a lengthier process. Such was the case between the U.S. and Vietnam. The U.S. ended the war but did not yet establish diplomatic relations with her; this did not prevent the U.S. from accepting Vietnam into the UN or the continuation of negotiations with her on a variety of issues. It is reasonable to assume that the Arab countries need a certain pause in order to alter the moods that have prevailed within them.

The main thing is that Assad and Sadat are ready for peace and it is only proper to hold on to this opportunity. His opinion is that peace treaties with adequate international guarantees will not only fortify the peace but will strengthen Israel's security as well.

'I said nothing about Hussein because I know that you have better relations with him. But I also know that his participation [in the Geneva Conference] is tied to the issues of territories and the Palestinians.'

There is a good atmosphere for convening the Geneva conference but one basic issue is lacking; namely, the participation of the representatives of the Palestinian people and specifically of the PLO.

‘It is true that the PLO resorts to various forms of struggle that might be considered as unacceptable. These are similar to an organization that you were involved in Jerusalem during the British Mandate.’

**PM:** I was very involved...

**The President:** I know. It is necessary to relate to the PLO as an organization that attempts to reach, for 3 million people, the right for their existence as an entity, and to build an independent life for them.

He assumes that during the passage of time there will develop relations between Israel and the Palestinians that will turn them into the strongest force in the region because each have talents and creativity. But, this is a long term vision.

First, it is essential to recognize the right to self-determination of these people and help them emerge from their current situation.

‘We have good relations with this organization and I specifically have with its president, Arafat’. This organization had undergone a profound transformation. Actually, they have realized that they must recognize the existence of Israel.

The Geneva Conference is dependent on the recognition of allowing the participation of the PLO and the willingness to provide for their right to have a state.

It is difficult to imagine peace without recognizing the rights of the Palestinians. It is impossible to imagine peace and security for Israel without accepting the solution of granting self-determination to the Palestinians. I’ll stop here to listen to your opinion.

**PM:** I’ll respond fast and in earnest to your full frankness.

For the other countries, it is a political issue. As for us, it is a question of life and death. But let me relate first to the question of establishing diplomatic relations. In the relations of the Soviet Union and Japan, the diplomatic exchanges preceded the peace treaty. 21 years have passed and they still have no peace agreement.

Begin then explains the background of what is called “occupied territories”. He mentions the threat and the deployment of Arab forces in May-June, 1976. The might of the Arab arsenal was equivalent to that of Germany when it advanced against the Soviet Union in 1942. The Arab threat to annihilate Israel had a direct impact on every man, child and woman of Israel because of the proximity to population centers and the potential harm to be inflicted by the Arabs.

‘You know from your own experience what aggression is. Romania was conquered but the Romanian people remain alive. In our case there was a danger of total annihilation... The Six Days War was self-defense as it is anchored in the UN Charter, Clause 51.

The territorial issue can be a subject for negotiation but until a peace agreement is reached our status in the territories is completely legal.’

After each and every war of independence territory and border problems arise, these are being settled according to the circumstances. The fact the Soviet Union is now present in what was Eastern Russia or Poland, along the river Oder Nysa, is the result of war of defense and liberation. This is a legitimate consequence.

The Prime Minister is using a map to indicate the danger to the population centers in Israel, especially the Dan Bloc, if we were to retreat to the June 4, 1967 lines.

We can learn about the intentions of the Arabs from information that was conveyed to us by Vance. He proposed to the Arab leaders that Judea and Samaria will be demilitarized, but they rejected this idea and insisted that it should be militarized.

If we are to face once more the test of Arab attacks from those borders, there is no doubt that our military will take initiative and will win. But until then, we could lose many thousands. How much more blood can the Jewish People afford to shed after it withstood four wars?

For us it is not a political question but an issue of life and death.

As for the Palestinians;

The Prime Minister explains that the source of that name was due to the conquering policy of the Romans to eradicate the name and the essence of Judea and Eretz Israel; that the Jews of Eretz Israel are 'Palestinians' and Palestine is Eretz Israel. He then moves to explain the PLO's intention, according to the Palestinian Covenant, in regard to Israel.

He refutes the attempt to compare the PLO to the liberating organizations who fought the British. Their purpose was to save the Jewish people while making all efforts and taking risks in hope of not hurting the Arabs or civilians in general. This is unlike the PLO's purpose to annihilate the people of Israel.

The PLO has made it its aim to target children and to execute genocide. The PLO wants Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem and Jaffa. There is no room for comparison.

Let us assume, theoretically, that a Hungarian minority would rise in Romania and resort to acts of terror with the purpose of ruining the country. Would the Leaders of Romania agree to negotiate with it?

If and when you shall meet Assad and Sadat, please convey to them that you have heard from an elected representative of Israel and that we want peace. We have not yet commenced negotiations. If they will insist on the participation of the PLO we will not agree to enter negotiations. Thank you for your attention.

**The President**: Let me start at the end. Even theoretically there is no comparison to a Hungarian minority in Romania. The Hungarians have their own country and there is a Hungarian minority in Romania as there is a Romanian minority in Hungary, as there are Arabs living inside the previous borders of Israel. All these are the citizens of the countries in which they reside. If Romania would have conquered Hungary then the situation would have been similar to the issue that we are discussing. Since Romania did not conquer and will not conquer a territory that does not belong to her, no one could bring claims against her.

**PM**: I was referring to it hypothetically.

**The President**: I am familiar with the Palestinian Covenant and I know that they no longer think in those terms. As of now, the PLO assumes the position that Israel exists and that the Arab countries are willing to make peace with her.

Romania on its part always emphasized that Israel is a reality that cannot be ignored. Now, we are taking into account that Israel's neighbors are willing to make peace with her. This situation should be exploited and the problems of the Palestinian Arabs within this framework (in order to be accurate I say: 'Palestinian Arabs'). This is necessary in order to convene in Geneva. I spoke about three million Israelis facing 100 million Arabs. In this balance of power it is obvious that

Israel's security is feasible only by establishing good relations with the Arabs. As of now, both sides continue to purchase arms. In 1973, it was not a remote possibility that foreign forces would have entered [the war].

**PM:** Forces of what countries?

**The President:** Let us say, Americans and Soviets. It was talked about. We have seen that when wars erupt there are countries that send forces to support one side and others to support the other one. This complicates the issue and increases the threat of spreading the war. Such development can endanger Israel more than the Arabs.

It is necessary to overcome the causes that emerge from a lengthy political process and find an answer to the problems of the existing reality.

A new Israeli policy that will recognize the Palestinian Arab's right to self-determination will have positive a impact. Otherwise three million people will remain a constant source of hostility and unrest. Therefore it is Israel's interest to solve the problem. During the discussion it is possible to search for various venues to settle this problem but the main thing is to recognize that it exists and the need to solve it. I propose a brief intermission.

**PM:** Agreed.

Later on the two conversed privately for an hour.

**Notes taken by: S Kahana**

**Source in Hebrew:**

[https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B\\_wZ8qKsEas2YnhZYTJMU0VDb1E/edit?pli=1](https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B_wZ8qKsEas2YnhZYTJMU0VDb1E/edit?pli=1)

**Top Secret**

**Protocol**

**Government Meeting**

September 4, 1977

**Ministers present:** **M. Begin**, Prime Minister, (PM) Chairman, **A. Abu-Hatzeira**, **Y. Burg**, **M. Dayan**, **Y. Horowitz**, **Z. Hammer**, **E. Weizman**, **D. Levy**, **Y. Modai**, **G. Patt**, **A. Shostak**,  
**A. Sharon**.

**Absent:** **S. Erlich** (overseas).

**Participants:** **Y. Aridor**, Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister Office, **A. Barak**, Legal Councilor to the Government, **E. Evron**, Director General of the Foreign Ministry, **C. Kovarsky**, Director General of the Interior Ministry, **C. Tavory**, Inspector General of Israel's Police.

**Agenda:** **A. Policy Issues**

**B. Prime Minister visit to Romania**

## **A. Policy Issues:**

**PM:** We shall start with international policy problems. Two documents were deposited at the hands of the Secretary of the Government. They are drafts of the Peace Treaty with Egypt with an accompanying letter of the Foreign Minister to the Secretary of State. The letter clarifies that this Peace Treaty should eventually be drafted with Jordan and Syria, and in response to Americas request, also with Lebanon. In the accompanying letter we also explain territorial issues.

The committee that the Government appointed to draft these documents included, in addition to me, Foreign Minister [Dayan], the Defense Minister, [Weizman] and the Agriculture Minister [Sharon]. The Committee approved these documents on Friday and we presented them to the U.S. Ambassador. This was done in accordance with the request of the American Secretary of State in a private conversation with me that was held at the home of the Foreign Minister. The Secretary of State requested the Arabs to prepare a draft as well, but they did not commit themselves to do so. We complied willingly to this request and I have to mention here the exceptional work that was done by the Legal Councilor of the Foreign Ministry, Mr. Rosenne and the significant assistance of the Legal Councilor to the Government.

When you read the document you'll find it to be very impressive, both from a legal and political perspective. This is the first time, since the establishment of the State, that the government will propose a peace treaty – including all the chapters and clauses that are based on precedents. These precedents include the peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Poland; peace treaties after WWI and WWII and the peace treaty between the U.S. and Japan.

An excellent job was done by our legal councilors and I wish to thank them for this accomplishment.

I would like to read the most important points from the accompanying letter for the benefit of the orientation of the Ministers. But, I request that all the members of the Government receive both documents from the government's Secretary so they can read them personally. I also request that they will be translated into Hebrew. We wrote it in English – understandably because it was not possible otherwise – but a Hebrew translation is necessary and will be made available for the Ministers.

In the coming weekend, upon the departure of the Foreign Minister to the U.S., we shall leave these two documents for review by the members of the Knesset's Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, and we hope that they will not be leaked.

**Dayan:** I'll have to meet with them, no way to avoid it. The members of the Committee claim that we have to listen to their opinions.

**PM:** The accompanying letter is based on the principles that I brought to the attention of the American President in our private meeting on July 19. Members of the government should remember the main points with regards to the Sinai, the Golan Heights, Judea, Samaria and Gaza. I will read to you the main points [in English]:

### **Israel and Egypt**

- a.** Any settlement would take fully into account the need to ensure Israel's security.
- b.** The right of Israel to unimpeded freedom of navigation and overflight through and over the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aquaba should be ensured. For this purpose

Israel will retain territorial control over Sharem-El-Sheikh and the Tiran Straits including territorial continuity to Eilat”

I want to say that there is an element of continuation here. The National Likud Government on November-December 1968 arrived at this decision and asked of the then Foreign Minister to submit it to the Americans – namely territorial continuation from Share-El-Sheik to Eilat.

- c. In order to maintain the security of its southern areas, the outer limits of Israel’s territorial control from the Mediterranean Sea to the Gulf of Aquaba should run west of the previous international boundary, in such a manner as to incorporate an area on the Mediterranean Coast south of the Gaza Strip.
- d. West of the Area under Israeli control, there shall be a part of the security arrangement, continuous buffer zones, demilitarized zones, and areas of limited armament and forces.
- e. Subject to these principles, and bearing in mind the means of implementation outlined above, Israel would be prepared in the context of a Peace Treaty, for a substantial withdrawal of its forces from the existing line in the Sinai Peninsula.

### **Israel and Syria**

In the context of a Peace Treaty, Israel is prepared to negotiate a new boundary to replace the present cease-fire line between the States.

The delimitation of the respective territories, and the security arrangements, should be such as to ensure Israel’s water sources and the security of its northern areas.

(**Begin:** You see the difference of the versions with regards to the Sinai and the Golan Heights)

### **Israel and Jordan**

- a. In Judea and Samaria equal rights and full co-existence should be ensured between Jews and Arabs.
- b. No part of this area should be subjected to any foreign rule or sovereignty.
- c. Any settlement should take Israel’s security needs fully into account. In this context our position is that Israel’s security on the eastern border should be based on the Jordan River.

(**Begin:** All in accordance with the Government decision and you may review these two Documents that are kept by the Government’s Secretary.)

I need to present you with a report on my visit to Romania. I will relate to matters that were not made public and are forbidden to be made public. But first, we should determine what the composition of the committee that will participate in the upcoming UN General Assembly will be.

**Dayan:** I received a note from the Secretary of the Government that on next Sunday the Government will not convene. This means that I’ll depart for the U.S. before a Government meeting. If someone wishes to say something ahead of my trip, better do it now.

**PM:** We shall have a meeting this Thursday.

**Dayan:** I have no reason to propose such meeting.

**PM:** Can you attend a meeting next Sunday?

**Dayan:** Yes.

**PM:** So we shall have a regular meeting. We shall start at 9 AM instead of 10.

## **B. The visit of the PM in Romania**

**PM:** I will report now on matters that cannot be made public from my visit to Romania. President Ceaucesco told me that Sadat is willing to have a meeting between representatives of Israel and Egypt. I asked him if it means a meeting between me and Sadat and he responded that at this stage the meeting should take place only between the representatives of both countries. It is obvious that this should be made public and to see how it develops based on the Ceaucesco's message that he heard directly from Sadat.

Ceaucesco spoke with Brezhnev about the renewal of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviet Union. Brezhnev answer was: 'It is not excluded'. The Foreign Minister of Romania, Macovescu told me that he spoke with Gromyko about the same issue and the answer was: 'We are waiting' and nothing else.

As for Aliya – I raised the problem from the perspective of families' reunions. The estimate is that there are currently 45,000 Jews in Romania. 25,000 did register, meaning that in the clause of nationality they wrote 'Jewish'. In Romania, like in the other East European countries, they make a distinction between nationality and citizenship. The Chief Rabbi Rosen and other activists say that about 20,000 additional Jews wrote 'Romanian' in the nationality clause without being fully aware of what they did. They based it on the fact that they are Romanian citizens. The estimate therefore is that there are close to 50,000 Jews in Romania. Do the Jews of Romania wish to make Aliya? There is only a partial answer – some do and others chose to remain by their own choice.

I raised that issue before the [Romanian] Prime Minister during our first conversation and actually I encountered a 'brick wall'. He argued that they solved the Jewish problem. They know that there are more than 400,000 ex-Romanian Jews in Israel, and there is nothing more that can be done. But, if there is a specific personal problem within a family they are always willing to approach it positively. But the problem, actually, does not exist any longer.

In a polite manner, I told the Prime Minister that I request to raise this issue with the President. The Prime Minister responded that I can raise any subject that I choose before the President. And indeed, I took advantage of that opportunity during my personal conversation with Ceaucesco. This opportunity was given to me last Friday when the President suddenly interrupted a two hour conversation and requested to take a walk with me in the garden, accompanied only by a translator.

The main concern of the President was that we have to recognize the PLO and negotiate with Arafat; Arafat is a good person – Ceaucesco has spoken with him, and there are worse than him in the PLO; Arafat is ready to recognize Israel, and so forth. There is no point to further report on this part of the conversation. He made his point and I did mine – and the Government knows exactly what could have been said by me.

Towards the end of our conversation, I raised the subject of Aliya. At the start, his response was similar to that of the Prime Minister's; namely, that the problem does not exist any longer.

He said: 'You are presenting me with a very difficult question. All Jews are well educated. We invested a lot of money in them so that they can acquire education and they are

needed for our economy. There is no problem anymore'. I pressured him and the conclusion was positive: Appeals should be submitted and all the application will be treated with a constructive attitude. Evron later spoke with the Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister at the latter's initiative. The President and I approved it. If the President agreed, then there should be no objection.

Towards the end of the visit, the Prime Minister asked me if I wish to further discuss the issue of Aliya. I replied: 'It is not necessary, I have reached an agreement with the President'. And he responded: 'I have told you what the President told you'. This was entirely incorrect but he claimed so. I chose to say nothing in response.

There is hope that Aliya from Romania will increase. I cannot guarantee it now but there is an agreement and the tendency will be to approve the applications. I asked Rabbi Rosen to encourage the Jews to submit requests, even by those who have been rejected in the past. By the end of the year we will know exactly how many applications were submitted. I made it clear to the Prime Minister that though we are not obligated to reciprocate, we can assist them in the American Senate to get an approval for Romania's request to be recognized as a preferred country.

The term 'privileged country' is very dramatic. But, it is easy from economic perspective and almost all countries sign such an agreement with one another. In any case, the Romanians are interested in the Senate's ratification and I told the Prime Minister that Senator Jackson is expected to be in Israel in November and I'm willing to talk to him, only if there will be some progress on Aliya. Apparently, they are interested in it. The fact is that the Prime Minister talked to the American ambassador at a recent reception in our Ambassador's home and said; in my presence, so that I could hear, that it will be possible to have a conversation with Jackson and Ribicoff. So, something good came out of it and it has been registered in the Romanians' memory that we shall try to assist them in the Senate – and we shall do so. But, we will know whether there is a progress in Aliya or not until November; this why I requested that the Jews start to submit their applications immediately.

As for economic talks, they want to cooperate with us in the economic area. They want to build joint industries with us. And until November's planned visit of our Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism to Romania we should have a plan regarding reciprocal exports.

I shall present you now with a very characteristic quote from Ceaucesco's conversation. He said many things that are important from his perspective but are not new. He commented on the settlements and I responded as I should have. He demanded of us to withdraw to the 1967 borders and I responded to it; I shall not repeat it in order not to waste our time.

I will not go into details because the talks lasted altogether 13 hours. But, Ceaucesco also said the following: **'If the Israeli policy of refusal to return to the 1967 lines; of not recognizing a Palestinian state; of not negotiating with the PLO, he is very apprehensive (and his anxiety was apparent) that anti-Jewish sentiments will be awakened in many parts of the world.**

I took note of it and when my turn to respond arrived I said the following: 'I wish you to know that the Jewish People are united today more than ever before on Israel'. I especially noted the unity of the American Jewry, because for a Romanian ruler the American Jewry position is decisive. I added that this also applies to Jews in Britain and France. They are all united around us. I continued and said: 'You know very well what happened in 1944. Your Transylvania was within Hungary, and we requested that the British bomb the railroads that led to Auschwitz. Thousands of airplanes bombed all kind of strategic targets, but refused to bomb those railroads. Nobody helped us. This is why the Jewish People are ready to face all dangers. I wanted you to



know that. But, if your scenario will be realized because of our policy, that means peace with security, then it is a disgrace to that particular country and we shall stand tall for our rights'. The President listened and did not utter a word.

I presented this report to you because it is very typical. At the time, during the talks between March and September, 1975, Kissinger threatened that anti-Semitism will rise. See how things evolve. The same and identical threat is expressed now by a Communist Romanian ruler. I presented a very condensed report and let us move to the next subject on the agenda unless any of you have questions about the visit to Romania. If not, let us discuss the situation in "El Al".

**State archive: 4269/6 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/6D8D153F-279A-40AD-9F69-84167EC9C6E2/0/Egypt10.pdf>

**A note by Elyakim Rubinstein, the Foreign Ministry  
Top Secret - September 11, 1977**

The Foreign Minister [Dayan] told me: The situation as of now (with regards to a meeting in Morocco with an Egyptian representative) is that the Egyptians are ready to send Tuhami; they want to establish contact and meet with the Foreign Minister. Tuhami and Mubarak are two of Sadat's trusted people. Mubarak is currently in Africa and they want to have this meeting before going to the U.S. Later there might be a meeting of Sadat or Mubarak with Begin. Hakka [Yitzhak Hofi, the Head of the Mossad] had previously understood that they wanted him to come to this meeting, but now they want to meet with the Foreign Minister. They suggested

the 11<sup>th</sup> and at the end I proposed the 16<sup>th</sup> and that the Foreign Minister will travel to New York on the 17-18, or after the meetings with Carter...

Elyakim Rubinstein

State archive: 6911/2 - זג

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/ronlyres/1AC138B8-5373-4CF8-829E-CD6B9D7F7268/0/egypt11.pdf>

## **The Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations**

**Strictly to the addressee**

**Top Secret**

(Originally in English)

October 18, 1977

Prime Minister office/778

**Subject: Dayan-Tuhami Meeting on September 16, 1977**

### **General:**

1. The Foreign Minister arrived in Rabat on a special flight at 7:15 PM on **September 16, 1977** accompanied by his bodyguard, the deputy of Dalimi and our representative in Morocco. The group left for La Bourges airport at 3:30 AM, on **September 17**.
2. Upon arrival the group was guided by Dalimi to the King's guest house, which is located next to his royal villa.
3. After a brief rest, Dalimi took Dayan and our representative to the royal residence at 8:45 PM. They entered through a special back entrance that is used, according to Dalimi, for secret visitors and undercover guests.
4. The group was met by.....who assisted Dayan in taking off his disguise and make-up and to regain his natural appearance. The group then entered one of the special vast salons, decorated with modern furniture, where the King and his entourage awaited for Dayan's arrival.
5. As Dalimi explained, Tuhami requested to meet with the King before our arrival, and the King conversed with him before we got there.
6. The people present at the meeting were the King, his Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Court Minister, Dalimi, Tuhami, Dayan and our representative in Morocco. All were sitting in semi-circles next to a tea table. Only two people did the serving. They saw Dayan in his natural appearance while he was hosted in Ifran (the King Palace).

7. The meeting lasted four hours with no intermission. It was carried on during the short period of time when the King left to meet his mother who came to visit him.
8. From the start, the atmosphere was very relaxed and friendly. The conversation was polite and interwoven with humorous exchanges. All were inspired by the informality of the King himself.
9. After the meeting, the King led the participants to an adjacent dining room where dinner was served at around 1 AM. The participants carried on political conversation and expressed general and personal impressions.
10. At 1:45 AM Dalimi led us to the guesthouse and after an hour of rest, Dalimi, Deputy for Administrative Affairs..... drove us to the airport and we took off on a special flight to La Bourges at 3:30 AM.
11. At the beginning of the meeting with Tuhami, Dayan presented the King with a set of Canaanites weapons from Dayan's personal collection. No other presents were exchanged.
12. All the technical, logistic and security arrangements concerning the trip went smoothly..... Suggested that during future visits, Dayan should wear sunglasses with darker lenses because the ones he was wearing were too transparent.
13. Dayan promised Tuhami to send him his book in English translation.

#### The dialogue

14. The following is a summary of the participants' comments and opinions in the discussion, without a chronological order of questions and responses.
15. The King
  - A. Introduced Tuhami. Tuhami enjoys Sadat's complete trust for anything concerning the inspiring purpose of peace and as a person who came to conduct non-official and discreet talks. Only Sadat, his Deputy and Tuhami are privy to this meeting that might be the dawn of a new era of direct contact in which both sides will clarify issues of their concern.
  - B. After an agreement on the main issues is reached between the two parties, they will be presented to the U.S. out of respect to what she did for reaching an agreement.
  - C. Once the major problem of the withdrawal from the territories is clarified, it will not be difficult to reach proper answers to most of the cardinal issues at the end of 'a certain period of time' and not as Tuhami suggested 'after a period of up to five years'.
  - D. These direct conversations are of utmost importance, but the U.S. should not know about them until a basic agreement is reached. This can be achieved only by working-meetings that will be conducted by the most senior persons. After the road is prepared by Dayan and Tuhami, Begin will come to talk with Sadat. Dayan has to refrain from widening the circle of those who share these secrets and arrive at the next meeting without bringing additional people. If Dayan sees fit, for the purpose of promoting the process, he may be accompanied by the Head of the Mossad.
  - E. The problem of returning the land to its sovereign people is the most important one. The King understands (looking at Tuhami) that the lands under Israel's control are used solely as an assurance for its security; therefore, we have to find proper alternatives. There is a need to arrive at an accepted solution to the issue of the Holy City so it will be not be an obstacle to peace.

- F. The Palestinians may be the most difficult subject. The King accepts Dayan's argument that they pose a threat to the future of Israel, as they do the King of Jordan. But we must deal with the problem in a reasonable fashion. The Palestinians must be the collective responsibility of the Arab countries and they will have to supervise them and provide assurances that will meet Israel's demands. The Palestinian problem is essentially an Arab problem.
- G. Despite his current declarations, the President of Syria will adhere to them only after having perceived that he has the support of Sadat and the King of Jordan. The latter one is sure that Assad will be convinced to join after an agreement is reached with Sadat.
- H. In summation, the King contradicted Tuhami's assertion that Sadat will meet Begin only after his withdrawal from the occupied territories; Begin will have to promise Sadat that he is supporting, in principle, the withdrawal from those territories. All other problems can be resolved to the satisfaction of both parties.

16. Tuhami

- A. Meeting you here under the King's roof is of great satisfaction to me. All those years I was thinking that I would only meet you in the battlefield, or in your state's defeat. And here we are both searching for peace. He expresses his thanks for the King's efforts and the trust that Sadat has in Begin and you. You are strong and brave leaders and we believe that you will dare to make courageous decisions to reach a complete and true peace. Sadat did not trust your previous Government but he trusts you.
- B. Sadat is very serious about peace. We shall discuss it between us but without the U.S. knowledge at this stage. Later on, once we formulate our positions we shall tell them. Sadat thinks that we have to discuss all the details. He believes that together with you, a solution can be found.
- C. But the problem is the returning of the territories. This is the key to peace. This is a question of sovereignty, national dignity and Sadat's survival.
- D. If Israel fails to understand it, there will be a freeze. If Begin accepts this principle, we shall then proceed to discuss all the other important issues.
- E. The question of assurance in regard to the return of territories will be a subject for negotiation once the principle is accepted.
- F. It is possible to put a stop to the dangers of the radical Palestinians if the Arab countries are allowed to deal with it. The Palestinians will become a powerful factor if we do not find a response to their national aspirations. The Arab countries can supervise their radical tendencies, most of which can be neutralized after they fulfill their aspiration for nationhood.
- G. This will allow us to deal with the Communist leanings of the Palestinians as we dealt with the Russians in Egypt.
- H. Even with our effort to reach peace we do not wish to be in touch with the Soviet Union, but only with the U.S.
- I. The Palestinian enclave in the East can be linked to Jordan. Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia will be able to supervise the extremists and secure the survival of the King. In the South, Egypt will give guarantees to supervise the Palestinians from Egypt itself.
- J. We are requesting of you, in a festive fashion, to trust the word of Sadat that he will honor all obligations verbatim. He is a man of principles, dignity, pride and nobility.

- If he has the opportunity to agree on a formula, Sadat will walk with you all the way because both of us have common vital interests.
- K. Sadat will discuss all options of assurances. We shall aspire to have the UN on both sides of the border. Assurances, you count on the U.S., or the Soviet Union, fine, though it will be better to remove the latter.
  - L. We propose, here, with the King's support of the process, to finish all matters of our mutual concerns before Geneva. This will put pressure on the President of Syria who will have to join us after we reach an agreement.
  - M. Let us show our mutual peace proposals to the U.S. We shall study them; we shall meet again and discuss them. Let us have Begin accept the principle of withdrawal. Without this, our sincere intentions will be doomed, since this is the opening of the gates for brighter future.
  - N. Our next meeting should be a working session. This is the beginning of official, full and comprehensive relations. They will have to be cultivated steadily. It may take three, four, five years (the King commented: 'You should be saying certain time and not be so specific).
  - O. We are interested in a package deal, in removing obstacles and not in a partial deal – not in public, not in Geneva. Here, between our two sides.
  - P. The Hole City constitutes an important subject. You have to arrive with a concrete plan that will satisfy the religious sensitivities of the Arab countries. This will take the sting out of their worries and objections.
  - Q. But the main problems are the occupied territories. Sadat says that he is soldier and that his land was conquered, but he wants peace without surrendering. Once he receives Begin's word that he agrees to withdrawal, Sadat's dignity will be rehabilitated and it will allow him to discuss the rest of the subjects. Sadat may discuss and argue on all subjects but not about his sovereignty over his own land. Even though Sadat will not sign a final agreement by himself, he is convinced that he will succeed in having Syria and Jordan follow his steps.
  - R. I suggest that we meet again here after we study each of the proposals. You (Dayan) will bring Begin's reactions to Sadat's requests. This can be done two weeks from now.

#### 17. The Moroccan Foreign Minister

- A. (Addresses Dayan) Is it feasible to consider that the lands that you will evacuate in the East and in the South will be transferred by the Arab countries to the Palestinians? This way we could by-pass your interaction with the Palestinians and at the same time supervise and control the dangers of radicalism.
- B. (To Tuhami) What will happen if Sadat and Begin have common understanding and the President of Syria will not join? Don't we have to be prepared for such options? (To this, both the King and Tuhami responded that they believe that the President of Syria will follow Sadat's footsteps with the active support of the King and Prince Fahd).

#### 18. Dayan

- A. Expresses his appreciation for the meeting. He assumes that what is agreed upon here will be accepted by other directly affected Arab countries. He considers himself

- solely an emissary of Begin. He will have to bring all points to Begin and he cannot relate to them before accepting Begin's opinion. These include Sadat's request of Begin's agreeing on a withdrawal as a precondition to all other discussions. The issues at hand are whether it has to serve as a guiding factor in our ensuing meetings, or whether you will agree to a Sadat-Begin meeting even if Begin cannot fully agree on the main subject?
- B. (The answer was not clear. While Tuhami understood that Begin has to commit to withdrawal from the occupied territories, the King said: 'I allow myself to correct my friend' knowing Sadat and having spoken to him recently, the King will give his word of honor that Sadat will agree to meet with Begin and shake his hand only if the latter will give his personal commitment that the talks will be conducted based on the understanding of a withdrawal from the occupied territories. The King related specifically to Tuhami's interpretation that Sadat will not be able to shake Begin's hand as long as a single Israeli soldier remains in these territories).
- C. (To the King and Tuhami) Regardless of what Begin's decision will be, he will have to have the approval of the government and the Knesset. No Israeli leader can arrive at such a decision without the approval of the Knesset. (Dayan brings an example from Jarring's failed attempts of mediation).
- D. It should be clarified what are elementary subjects that can be discussed by emissaries like Dayan and Tuhami, or would it be more efficient to have the persons who hold the highest ranks to have sincere, face to face talks where foundations will be laid for the discussions by the emissaries.
- E. As you (Tuhami) suggested that Sadat relies on our leadership, I have full trust in you. Every gentlemanly agreement with you I regard as a written obligation.
- F. I cannot say if Begin will agree to your request. Maybe yes, maybe no. But he will most certainly want to meet Sadat and discuss with him the subject that you suggested that Sadat wished to receive a-priori. Let them discuss it and all the rest of the subjects will be open for negotiations.
- G. You may agree that the proposed formula is not that simple. Our settlements were attacked for 19 years from the mountains tops. What assurances do we have now that it will not happen again? How can we secure our ships in the Red Sea? Maybe together we can find the answers.
- H. We do have rights to the territories, even if they will be transferred to the sovereignty of Arab countries. The settlements in the Golan Heights, The Wailing Wall, Mount of Olives, the University and new population centers in the South – all deserve to have satisfying responses.
- I. There is no historical precedent of 'collective agreement with organizations'. We did not have war with an organization but with each one of the Arab countries with specific characteristics. Each one has to be dealt with individually. Therefore there will be no treaty with an Arab organization of a collective nature. It is not practical. More so, Resolution 242 relates to different countries and frontiers and details their specificities. There is no mention of an organization, or the Palestinians.
- J. With regards to the demographic problem of the Palestinians, as reflected in the slogans of the President of Syria such as 'all Palestinians will return to their homes', what will really happen if they do? They will not go to small enclaves, where there is

no room or work, but rather enter Israel and cause demographic disaster. Another answer should be found. They need to be settled in other places.

- K. (To Tuhami) What will happen to our settlements in the far South if we retreat, will you let us live there under your sovereignty as foreigners?
- L. Despite the difficult and the complicated problems that we have to discuss and negotiate with you and the Jordanians, I'm not so sure about Syria. The solution to the problem of cities that are linked to religion can be easy and satisfactory to all concerned. The same goes for the Straits in the south and the Red Sea. We can find a solution to all of our problems with Jordan, but there will be no sovereign Palestinian state.
- M. We shall find an arrangement with you. We trust Sadat. We do not trust the President of Syria, but we should begin with serious issues immediately. I accept your proposal to exchange peace proposals for mutual review, so that we could meet in two weeks. I could fly here from the U.S. on the 27<sup>th</sup>, 28<sup>th</sup>, or the 29<sup>th</sup> this month.
- N. As of now I have to return to my country instead of going to the U.S. I need to report to Begin and receive his guideline.

#### 19. Agreements

Here is The King's blessing and mutual agreement:

- A. Both parties will report immediately to their respective heads of states, in order to get their approval for an additional meeting.  
Dayan will request Begin's responses to obligations for withdrawal.
- B. The peace documents that shall be prepared for the U.S. will be exchanged and examined by each party until the meeting.
- C. The meeting between Dayan and Tuhami will take place in Morocco in two weeks.

#### 20. Conversations during dinner

- A. The King asked Dayan why is Israel involved in the war in Ethiopia? No, Dayan responded, not in war, but in assistance. We are there because of moral obligations. They assisted us in the past, without hesitation, in sea ports and airfields when our ships and airplane were in dire predicaments. They were friendly to us and we shall not desert them now. More so, without them our ships and airplanes would not have a place to turn to in that region. The King argued that we have to consider the changing times and soon Ethiopia will not give up some ports and maybe it is wise to get closer to the moderates of the freedom movement along the shore. Dayan responded that it will not work out because the freedom movement is already associated with the Arab League.

- B. When he (Tuhami) related to the 1967 war.....  
.....  
.....he related to the fact that the Egyptian air force was not on alert and that the military command underrated the situation. This was explained by Tuhami and his circle that the then Egyptian President, Nasser, was a partner to a plot that he shared with Israel. 'Tell us sincerely, Tuhami requested in utmost seriousness from Dayan, was Nasser a partner with you then? Otherwise, how could such a defeat happen?' There was a sense of bitterness and contempt in Tuhami's remarks on Nasser. Tuhami plans to write a book on Nasser that will tell the whole truth about 'a madman that brought Egypt to the verge of defeat.'

- C. In a comment to our representative, Dalimi said that the King, in previous discussions, told his Prime Minister that the King will ask Sadat to send his Deputy to meet with Begin in Morocco during the expected visit of Begin with the King. Dalimi added that the King commented that sometimes it is difficult to know when Tuhami quotes Sadat accurately and which ones are reflections of his own thoughts.
- D. Dayan invited Tuhami to visit Israel and witness the demographic interrelations between Jerusalem and the expanding territories and how a clear geographic division is technically impractical today. In good spirit, Tuhami noted Dayan's invitation and will come back to it in proper time.

21. Items for delivery

- D. In addition to his book, Dayan promised to send Tuhami an updated map of Greater Jerusalem so that he could see that it constitutes a comprehensive entity in which people live in mutual economic dependency and that imposing a physical division would be incomprehensible.
- E. The peace document for Tuhami.

State archive: 4313/4 - 8

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/7BFFC442-E877-4377-989E-DE3ED63389AA/0/Egypt12.pdf>

**Top Secret**

**A conversation held at the Prime Minister office in Jerusalem  
by Prime Minister M. Begin and Foreign Minister Dayan with Ambassador Lewis  
at the presence of Brubeck and Yehuda Avner**

November 3, 1977 at 17:00 hour

The ambassador presented the Prime Minister (PM) a copy of President Carter speech at the World Zionist Congress Conference in Washington on November 2, 1977.

The PM told the Ambassador in secret, and that it should be conveyed only to the Secretary of State, that this morning arrived a special emissary from Romania's President Ceaucesco. He brought a message that said that the Romanian President proposed to Sadat that a senior Egyptian official will meet in Bucharest with an Israeli representative under the auspices of the Romanian President. Sadat agrees and has decided that Egypt will be represented by a Vice President. The PM said that Israel's representative will be the Foreign Minister, Dayan. Lewis inquired which one of the Vice Presidents will represent Egypt.

The PM replied that the Romanian emissary is travelling now to Egypt to organize the meeting and he will inform him.

The Ambassador inquired when the meeting will take place.

The PM said that it will be after November 15. Dayan is ready to go to Bucharest at about the 17<sup>th</sup> for a day or two. The PM added that he leaves for England for an official visit on the 20<sup>th</sup> and Dayan should be back in the country when he is absent.



The Ambassador expressed his satisfaction about the possibility of the meeting with the Egyptians.

The PM mentioned that during his visit to Romania he told Ceaucesco that he is ready to meet Sadat in person and the anticipated meeting may be the result of that conversation. The PM added that Ceaucesco also told him that Sadat was very impressed from the fact that Israel is ready to go to Geneva without pre-conditions and he, Sadat like the PM wishes to reach a peace treaty. The PM said that on Monday he intends to convey, through the Israeli Ambassador, to the Romanian President Dayan's willingness to set the meeting around November 16-17. The PM reiterated the need to keep it in total secrecy.

Ambassador Lewis agreed to it and mentioned that the Syrians have already begun to spread the rumor that the Egyptians intend to have a separate deal with Israel.

Along the conversation opinion were exchanged about the impact of the U.S. decision to secede for the International Labor Organization. The PM said that he has a moral obligation to discuss with the U.S. Israel's continued membership in this Organization. If we decide to maintain our membership we wish to declare that the decision was made after Israel consulted with the U.S. Ambassador Lewis expressed his personal opinion that he is proud of President Carter's decision to leave that Organization. But under the current conditions Israel should maintain its membership because otherwise it might instigate an unfavorable process against Israel in the UN. Israel should keep its membership in all the international organizations and she should not give up its privileges.

The Foreign Minister told the ambassador that Israel is keeping in touch with the Red Cross, and number two of that organization is currently visiting Israel. He added that Israel told that person that it will allow a visitation of every prisoner who is jailed for security reason in the first week after he was interned.

Later the conversation focused on political matters concerning the Geneva Conference. The PM said that he talked to Ambassador Dinitz after he conversed with the Secretary of State at noon. Lewis inquired if the PM received a full report on that conversation because Lewis received only an oral report.

The Foreign Minister said from the conversation emerge two facts: First, the U.S. still does not have tangible response from the Arabs with regards to a working paper. It appears that the Secretary of State thinks that the Saudi King may be able to influence other to move the issues forward. Second, Egypt and Jordan display look warm attitude but the Syrians persist with their extreme positions. At any rate, nothing is final yet and it is necessary to wait for the out of the talks in Saudi Arabia; and it seems that the Secretary of State does not know yet if the Geneva Conference will convene before the end of this year.

Dayan continued and said that from Dinitz-Vance conversation there is a point that needs clarification. It is not clear what Vance meant when he said that the plenum of the Conference must be in session all the time. It is our view – and Dinitz made it clear to Vance – that after the opening session, the Conference should be divided into working groups and the plenum. It seems like Dinitz and Vance have not reached an agreement on that issue yet.

Ambassador Lewis said that he was asked by the Secretary of State to raise few subject before the PM and the Foreign Minister. First there exist the problem for classifying matters and secrecy. In the last meeting (between the PM, the foreign Minister and the Ambassador on October 22) it was said by the Israeli side that at this stage that the scope of consultation between the two countries is insufficient. The Ambassador said that the Dinitz-Vance meeting came as a result of that Israeli feeling. At the same time there are possible leaks that make the consultations

difficult. The Ambassador brought as an example the Israeli television broadcast of Friday evening (October 22) that presented a close to accurate coverage of the meeting that was held earlier that day. Also today the Israeli radio broadcasted a very accurate summary of Dinitz-Vance meeting. There is no doubt, he added that there is a problem of access to a classified materials.

It is especially important because of the delicate situation of the negotiations regarding the convening of the Geneva Conference. It is obvious that are differences of opinion between what the U.S. and Israel had agreed upon in the talks in New York and between what the Arab are willing to accept. It is the opinion of the Ambassador that Egypt and Jordan are ready to go to Geneva on a basis of a working paper, even though they demand few modifications. The Syrians, on the other hand, are more rigid and exhibit their disgust from some of the points in the working paper. The U.S. is trying to motivate the Saudis and the Soviets to mitigate the Syrian stand. We do not know yet if we will succeed in such move. And that is the reason why the U.S. cannot give Israel a clear answer on the position of the Arabs. The inter-Arab situation is very complicated at the current stage. The Arabs cannot say in public things that may hurt Israel and voice negative observations on the working paper. But behind the scene the U.S is attempting to reach an agreement among the Arabs so that their stand will be accepted by Israel. There are few subject that the Arabs know that the U.S. will not alter its position; for example, the issue of the representation of the Palestinians. They realize that it has to be based on the agreement between us.

The PM said that this issue was not brought to the attention of the Knesset Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security and it is kept as an absolute secret.

The Ambassador continues and said that we are involved now in two-stage discussions – one is behind the scenes and the other are made public. But when the discreet talks become public it causes an immense damage.

The PM responded that the Ambassador should know that we shall not go public on matters that negate the substance of our position. The PM brought as an example his reaction in the Knesset to Phami's demand that the condition for peace should be the cessation of immigration to Israel. In the Knesset I said that if the Arabs will raise this demand in Geneva we will not either listen or relate to it. It is likely that every so often the Arabs may declare something publicly that negate their personal views, but such is not the case in Israel.

The Foreign Minister said that he checked the leak to the television and found out that it came from the Knesset Committee where the PM presented a brief that same morning. The Foreign Minister added that that in recent days the New York Post published accurate quotations of his talks with the President [Carter] in New York and that the newspaper claimed that the source of that information came from someone who attended the meeting and took notes.

The Ambassador requested that an utmost effort will be undertaken to avoid leaks. He said that the Arabs' psychology with regards to the working paper is that they can't accept any Israeli paper. We have reiterated that the paper is essentially and American one. The Arabs' attitude shed lights on why Egypt and Jordan cannot accept the paper without modifications. It is not clear yet what will be the nature of those corrections.

The PM asked the Ambassador when, in his opinion we shall receive the authorized Arab reaction.

The Ambassador replied that in the middle of next week he will have the details. He added that conceptually all are getting closer to Geneva, though there are still procedural obstacles. I was asked by the Secretary of State to clarify that we remain loyal to our obligations to consult with

you on all subjects that require clarifications. We understand your position and we do not intend to reveal them to others. Also, we shall honor the agreed upon protocol with regards to Palestinian representation and the Arabs are fully aware of it. We want to give the Arabs ample time to allow the moderate governments have influence on the Syrians. The process of their consultation is taken longer because it involves four countries including Saudi Arabia. There are procedural matters such as the proposal for rotating chairmen that we have not dealt with as yet. The Secretary of State requested that you should not be captive of new items in the press regarding our considerations about the Geneva Conference. We have to base our discussions on authorized information and not on speculations that are published in the media. As for specifics, the Ambassador added: No change had taken place in the U.S. position with regards to the PLO since Secretary Vance's last visit to Israel; namely, that the U.S. will not have any contact with the PLO without its acceptance of [UN Resolution] 242 and recognizing Israel's right to live in peace in secured borders. If the PLO were to announce the acceptance of these two principles it will be interpreted by the U.S. as tantamount of the cancellation of the Palestinian Manifesto. The word '**tantamount**', added the Ambassador, is the expression used by the Secretary of State; and this defined his position when he visited Jerusalem.

The PM reminded those present that Secretary Vance used three different expressions in three different occasions as his interpretation of a change (if it will ever materialize) in the PLO position. During his talks in Jerusalem the Secretary of State used the term '**per se**' and in his meeting last week with Jewish leaders in Washington he used the expression '**automatically**'. (A discussion then ensued about the meanings and the significance of those terms and it was agreed upon that this is an academic issue and at the moment there is no sign that the PLO is going to revise its position. The PM insisted that the Secretary of State gives the impression that it will be sufficed if the PLO will only accept 242 as a basis for establishing contact with the U.S.). The Foreign Minister switched back to the subject of Geneva with the emphasis that no discussion was held with the Arabs about the timing, the whereabouts and at what stage the plenum will break-up into working groups.

Ambassador Lewis said that when the Secretary of State related to this matter in his conversation with Yadin, it was only an initial thought and the U.S. has not yet decided on its position. As for the chairmen of the working groups the PM in his visit to Washington raised the idea of rotating chairmen and that the Secretary of State checked the idea with the Arabs and they rejected it. The Ambassador suggested that the chairman may be a UN representative as was the case in the first Geneva Conference. In general, he added that the U.S. is requesting of Israel to have an open approach to procedural matters; and that it may be best to leave some subjects to ambiguity. He added that the U.S. presents a similar appeal to the Arabs. Everyone is hoping that the negotiations in Geneva will generate will create its own dynamics that will overcome the various procedural problems. The U.S. continues, he said, to be determined and hopeful that the Geneva Conference will materialize. He expressed his encouragement from the information regarding the expected meeting in Bucharest.

The Foreign Minister agreed that it is too early to clarify all points that relate to the Geneva Conference, but it difficult to rely on the possibility that the Convention will generate its own dynamics without ample clarifications of some of the procedural matters. Without it the whole substance of the Conference may 'blow-up'. He mentioned that there was one point that he did not speak an\bout with the President and it had to do with the invitation of the Palestinians to the Conference. He expressed his objection to direct invitation and added that this is an example of procedural issue that has to be decided upon in advance. Ambassador Lewis agreed.

The PM reiterated that if and when the conference will convene it should not be dispersed without discussions in the working groups which have to be an integral part of conference. The Ambassador expressed his personal opinion that would be desirable but there are subjects that are not supposed to be written but should be implied. As for the link between the plenum and the working groups the U.S. position that procedural discussion should be avoided but be derived from the precedent of the first Geneva Conference. For instance – at the conclusion of the plenum meeting in 1973 Waldheim presented a consensus that said that the working groups will report to the plenum. The PM said that Israel objected to it.

Ephraim Evron clarified as one who was present at the first Conference that there is a complete difference between then and what is supposed to happen now. At that time the plenum was composed of different national delegations without a unified Arab delegation. Also at that time there only military working group whose task was not to conduct negotiations for peace, but it was limited to technical negotiations on a separation agreement of forces. In addition it was then clear to all sides that even this group was for public consumption since the real negotiations were held outside of Geneva. Hence, he concluded, there is no base for comparison.

The Ambassador said in response that the U.S. is searching for procedural structure that will lead to the opening of the new Conference; the Waldheim precedence can serve as an opening point for the upcoming conference.

The Foreign Minister said that it is not accepted that the working groups will be reporting to the plenum. A situation may arise where Egypt, as opposed to Syria will reach an agreement with us, one that is very close to a peace treaty and it should be kept in secrecy. For an example: we may be able to agree with Egypt that this agreement will be realized by an exchange of secret communications between the two sides and the U.S. without it being an agreement that is revealed to the public. Therefore, to demand that a report will be presented to the plenum will grant Syria a veto power to annul any agreement with any Arab country. The Foreign Minister added that in our paper we eliminated the idea of a report to the plenum. In addition, we have to make a distinction between those issues that we agreed upon prior to the 1973 conference and those issues that were agreed upon during the conference. The points that are included in Clause 6 of our working paper relates only to those issues that were agreed upon prior to the conference in 1973. Also, we cannot use as precedents those matters that were agreed upon during the first conference. Ambassador Lewis on the other hand insisted that there is room to learn from the discussions of the first conference.

At the conclusion of the meeting said that he talked with the Defense Minister and a date was set for his visit to the U.S. at the end of November...

In response to the request of the PM, Ambassador Lewis said that the U.S. checked the situation in Ethiopia. The Secretary of State thinks that the U.S. should not change its policy at this stage and there is no room to establish ways for the provision of arms. The situation in Ethiopia is beginning to change and the large size of Ethiopia and the strength of its military force beginning to have impact in the battlefield.

It was concluded that an additional meeting with the Ambassador will take place next week.

**Notes taken by:** Yehuda Avner

**State archive:** 4337/10 – 8

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/ronlyres/4EA8C304-7FEF-4691-A5C8-218F991B6150/0/Egypt13.pdf>

**Foreign Ministry  
A telegram dispatch**

**Top Secret**

November 4, 1977

To: The Ministry  
From: Washington

**Urgent: To the Foreign Minister only**

In my conversation today with Hezekiah [code name for Henry Kissinger] he said that he learned two things from a source of his who has access to secret material:

- A. Sadat has a plan to convene the UN Security Council in East Jerusalem with the participation of Arafat. Sadat's intention is to overpass and postpone the Geneva [Conference] and to allow the participation of the PLO in the Security Council forum to which Arafat has already been invited. The participants in this UN forum will be all the Arab countries that are in confrontation with Israel. I told him that this message seems farfetched and that we shall not sit with Arafat and his colleagues, either in the Security Council, or any other forum regardless of where it takes place. Hezekiah said that he regards this information as imaginary but because of his source's access to secret information he saw it fit to convey it to me.
- B. From that same source, he heard of secret contact, conducted between Israel (at the level of foreign ministers) and Egypt, for a meeting in Romania. Hezekiah inquired if this is true. then we are doing it in Romania where the Soviets can eavesdrop at every place. I responded that I heard of it for the first time and I doubt this information. Hezekiah requested that if there is any basis for that information I should inform him. I told him that I will convey his request directly to you.

Sent by: Dinitz

State archive: 4337/10 - 8

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/ronlyres/A87188A5-9A0A-4232-8404-2D6ABEE99E1F/0/Egypt14.pdf>

**The State of Israel  
The Prime Minister Office  
Jerusalem**

November 4, 1977

Guiding points for the Prime Minister's speech

## to the Egyptian People

- The war situation between Egypt and Israel is an unnatural predicament that stems from tragic circumstances. We believe that these tragic circumstances are not an inevitable fate. We are certain that history determined, for the two people, a major role in the construction of a new future for the Middle East.
- The Jewish People and the Egyptian People met at the dawn of history and influence one another.
- During the reign of King Solomon the Kingdom of Israel was an ally of the Egyptians. During the era of the Second Temple, and following the destruction of the Israel's Kingdom by the Romans, a remarkable Jewish culture flourished in Egypt's land, and the Jewish community there made an immense contribution to the Egyptian culture and its economy.
- Islam recognized and respected the Jewish People, its prophets and its kings. The Koran mentions 43 times in different references the Israelites and emphasizes their unique standing in the world of the Creator. And this is what we read in Chapter 45 verse 16: And he gave to the Israelites the Holy Book and the reign and the prophecy and we endowed them **form** the best crops of the land and elevated them above all the people".
- From this sense of mutual fate the Jewish People fought side by side with the Muslims against their enemies, and in Jerusalem the blood of Jews and Muslims was spilled together in the defense of the Holy City in the war against the Crusaders.
- In all corners of the Muslim Empire and especially in Egypt and in Spain the Jews significantly contributed to literature, medicine, mathematics and other branches science along side of Muslim colleagues.
- In a few weeks the Muslims will make the pilgrimage to Mecca, and I bless you all that God Almighty will receive your gesture but let us all remember that the tradition of Islam emphasizes that Abraham – our father – was the one who built the first Ka'abba in a Temple for one God and spread the belief in one God throughout the world.
- There is no reason that the two Peoples – the Jewish and the Egyptian – should not return to live next to one another in peace, in mutual respect and mutual assistance.
- The Egyptian People entered to a conflict not directly related to it. This caused huge damages, and diverted its capabilities and efforts to venues of destruction instead of venues of creativity.
- Israel appealed scores of times to the rulers of Egypt to reach an agreement and open a page of normal life for the benefit of the two nations. But the rulers of Egypt got involved and consequently involved the Egyptians in armed conflicts and spilled their blood for the sake of their personal ambitions and aspirations to appear as the rulers of the Arab world. In order to inflame the hatred towards us, the Egyptians depicted the Jewish people in the media, in literature and even in textbooks in dark shades. Their real image was distorted without recognition and the poison of hate was instilled in the souls of innocent children, so that would, when grown, become casualties in the war machine, a war with no rationale.
- The real character of the Jewish People in the direct opposite from the image that is described to you by the propaganda machine. We did not love war and we shall never love it. You too do not love war and do not wish to have one.

- As the Jewish People ache their war casualties, they also have empathy for the ache of an Egyptian mother who has lost her sons in wars that no one in Egypt can wholeheartedly explain what Egyptian purpose they served.
- You know, and the entire enlightened world knows, that the Jewish People exited Egypt for Eretz Israel at the dawn of its history. The annals of the Jewish People in Eretz Israel are tightly linked to the annals of Egypt, for better or for worse.
- The holy scriptures of all religions linked the Jewish People with the Holy Land. And the Koran reiterates the ancient ties, inspired by god's spirit that hovers over the connection between the People of Israel and the Holy Land. In the Koran we read in Chapter 5, verses 20-21: At the time Moses said to his people – oh my people remember the generosity of Allah who had prophets emerge from you and made kings for you that he granted no other nation. Oh people come to the Holy Land that was given to you by Allah and don't retreat alas you become losers".
- The Jewish people returned now to his homeland to live in peace with its neighbors for their well-being and theirs as well.
- In utmost sincerity we announce to the whole world that we desire not to hurt Egyptians and we never wished so in the past. We are ready, at any given moment to reach a peace treaty with Egypt and with any other Arab country.
- There is no difficulty in solving all the impending problems between Israel and Egypt. If your leaders will free themselves and you form the obligation to fight over matters that have no ties to the legitimate and urgent needs of the Egyptian People.
- The Jewish People in Eretz Israel knows how to appreciate the friendship of its good neighbor – Egypt the great of cultural heritage of thousands of years.
- The Jewish People are not bad, conquerors or racist. On the contrary, its hand extends and opens for peace, its heart is pure and he is proud of the words of its profit that people shall not fight other people and bear no swords and study war no more.

**State archive: 4329/6 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/194067F1-ED89-439A-B8F2-B8956045B0D7/0/Egypt15.pdf>

**Foreign Ministry**

**Top Secret**

Strictly personal

Director General  
Jerusalem,  
November 6, 1977

To: The Prime Minister/Foreign Minister

As of your instruction I invited Mr. Vasily Fongan [a special Romanian emissary] on Friday, November 4, 1977, to my office. He arrived with the Charge' d'Affaire of the Romanian Embassy but the latter departed immediately after he introduced the person to me. I told Mr. Fongan that the Prime Minister accepts the proposal that is included in President Ceaucesco letter and assigned the Foreign Minister to represent him in the meeting in Bucharest. We propose the following date: November 16-18. We think that it is desirable that [Romanian] Foreign Minister, Mr. Macovescu will extend an invitation to Mr. Dayan and this will be regarded as a natural gesture. It is easier to bring the Egyptian representative in secrecy. I added that if for any reason it is not possible to send a formal invitation to the Foreign Minister, we would carry out the meeting after coordinating it between us. I inquired about the identity of the Egyptian representative and commented that I understand that it would be the Vice-President. Fongan responded that it would be the Deputy Prime Minister. He said that he visited Egypt secretly few weeks ago on an assignment by Ceaucesco and discussed it with Sadat who told him that he only trusts the Deputy Prime Minister. As for the invitation of Dayan, he opined that our request is reasonable. He added that he will clarify it and will return with answers and proposals for arrangements. Fongan emphasized the secrecy of the matter and said that only he and Ceaucesco are privy to that issue.

Best wishes,

Ephraim Evron

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<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/ronlyres/21E8B624-0511-4136-A920-05C2A15572A1/0/Egypt16.pdf>

**Foreign Ministry  
Center for Research and Policy Planning**



Jerusalem, November 10, 1977

The Essence of the foreign policy part of Sadat speech  
(Cairo Radio Broadcasts, November 9)

At the opening of his speech, and before he talked extensively on internal affairs, Sadat made a commitment that the new budget provides the armed forces with all that they need in funds and equipments for a war of liberation.

Foreign Affairs

I have always acted for the national interest, the liberation and the reinstating of the rights of Palestine. Egypt's fate was and will be to carry the major part of the burden. This is a tax that the Egyptian people accept with conviction despite the sacrifice that it entails.

Our people were always capable of distinguishing between what is necessary and what is of secondary importance. The Jihad for our national sanctity and honor and the repelling of aggression is a sacred faith. We have to reach our aim in either war, or peace. This is the way of the Jihad that takes his steps in wisdom and confidence while observing reality with determination to make necessary changes according its principles and supreme interests.

Our nation fought in 1973 and is still sincere in its calling for reaching peace in the region because our aim, after all, is that everyone should live in peace in his own country and borders with a sense of security and prosperity.

I did not hesitate to take away the weapon that Israel is using all the time. This is the weapon of deception in claiming desire for peace. This is why I called for peace before, during and after the war. On February 1971, I called for Israel to withdraw from the [Suez] Canal by way of implementing Resolution 242.

At the height of our victory I appealed to the world from this podium, on November 16, 1973, and called for an international convention for peace with the participation of the representatives of the heroic Palestinian people, who are fundamental party to the problem. This is the idea that led to the Geneva Conference. Israel was put in a situation in which she could no longer argue that the Arabs do not want peace.

As for the Geneva Conference I hereby updating you; the Geneva Conference is not the aim but a mean to reach that aim if we use potential strength, to force Israel to choose between a just peace and a dangerous confrontation to which the Arabs will contribute their entire potential.

Great efforts were done to arrange the Geneva Conference before the end of this year. The condition is that the preparations for the conference should be serious. This will lead us to peace agreement within a reasonable time framework. The proper preparation will prevent the conference form becoming a stage for verbal confrontations and use of slogans. The U.S. invested a major part in these efforts. Carter devoted time and set dealing with this problem as a high priority. This is a phenomenon that should be commended because it reflects his right perception and understanding of the dangers that may threaten the entire world.

A special responsibility rests on the U.S. because it extends extensive aid to Israel. Carter's openness to the Palestinian problem is noted especially after Israel deceived the American public opinion. It was Carter who put the Palestinian issue in its proper place with regards to their right to have their own state and the humanitarian perspective of their plight.

The U.S. position needs to be improved from our stand point, but the truth is that this position is a first attempt to place the American policy on a path that improves an opportunity for

communication and predicts future involvement. The working paper that chronicles the efforts from February 1977 to the end of September, discusses the procedural process that includes the participation of the legitimate representatives of the Palestinians in the Conference. But on October 5, a second working paper was drafted, under Israel's shameless pressure on the American arena – the pressure that was exerted on Carter and his assistants. We of course had our reservations from this paper and we did not hesitate to present them to the U.S. out of our loyalty to our cause and the souls of our casualties.

In the beginning of October an American-Soviet working paper was published. It dealt with the substantial aspects. The working papers that were made public are not directives that originated in heaven, but the opinion of the two Super-Powers. In our current time, these countries cannot dictate their will. But it is natural for them show interest in the crisis in the Middle East because of its importance and urgency. As a result, the path to Geneva commenced onward with new and different foundations that differ from Israel's concepts.

We sense that the main and positive components of the Geneva Conference already exist.

1. The representation of the Palestinian people, free of Israel's influence and intervention.
2. A discussion on the political and the humanitarian rights of the Palestinians as far away as possible from an evasive fashion. The Geneva Conference is an opportunity to force Israel to withdraw from the conquered lands, to give-up its dreams of expansion and its objection to Palestinian rights, and an opportunity to expose its real face.

It is important for me to review our position:

1. We are not afraid of any form of confrontation with Israel after we exposed its real image, away from the legendary one. After the October War of 1973 Israel's image shrunk and we regard it as an entity that can be contained. Whatever Israel's strength and influence are we have the necessary strength beyond Israel's ability to achieve for herself. We know our enemy well enough, its methods of operation so that we can overtake it anywhere. We are masters of our will and act under no pressure.
2. We are serious about maintaining the Arab solidarity. On a trip that I made to Romania, I coordinated my position with Iran and Saudi Arabia.

I congratulate the brother to our struggle, PLO leader, Arafat, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, who sits here now among us. We had full coordination between him and me in Saudi Arabia that we kept afterwards as well. Before I entered this hall, I received a telephone call from Assad and we agreed that I'll pay him a visit after the conclusion of some urgent tasks. We shall discuss the subjects of Arab coordination and commitments in its most glorified fashion.

We all grieve of what is happening now between Morocco and Algeria. I sent Husney Mubarak to prevent a confrontation between these two brotherly nations.

### Arab Summit

Egypt does not object to Arab solidarity. But I'm apprehensive that having an Arab summit now would be pre-mature. At the Rabat Conference, we outlined a consistent strategy. If we have a summit now, I'm afraid that there will be nothing new on the agenda, since we are about to convene in Geneva. But if our Arab brothers wish to convene a summit we shall not object to it. Arab solidarity is an obligation that is essential **for** the confrontation nations with Israel.

Therefore we shall not save any effort in coordination and consultations with our brothers along the confrontation fronts with Israel. This is why I met with Arafat and talked to Assad today.

Two days ago I met with King Hussein, for matters of coordination and for the advancement of

the Arab position. We especially agreed that we should go to Geneva in a united Arab delegation, which has coordinated positions. Every step of ours should focus on substance and not on esoteric matters such as shape and form. We shall not insist on procedural matters. We shall thwart Israel's aims and play its games. We will force her into a confrontation in which we shall promptly discuss the root of the conflict. No one could make us do anything that will not fulfill our purposes that are based on internationally recognized legitimate principles.

“Working Groups”

We shall not behave hysterically. During Vance's visit here I proposed among other things to have working groups. The newspapers published it and Israel entered into a mode of hysteria but it soon became clear that this was not a new proposal. It was a sign of nervousness.

I reiterate: we shall not pay attention to procedures. We are ready to go to Geneva and conduct meetings for the purpose of reaching peace without paying attention to the procedural matters that Israel raises in order to make us nervous so that we shall appear as the ones who refuse to have peace.

I accept every procedure so that when we arrive at Geneva, Israel will not be able to sway me from adhering to our demands in regard to the conquered territories and the Palestinian's right to have their own state. Israel is playing games with words so that we will get upset and say: we shall not go to Geneva.

I do declare: I don't care at all for procedures. I am going to Geneva despite of what Israel does and its history. We shall adhere to our demands. It is not us, but Israel who is afraid of Geneva. I will not hide from you or our nation that I'm willing to go to the end of the world if it would prevent wounds and death from any of our soldiers.

On “the readiness to go to the Knesset”

Israel may be surprised to me saying it now: I am ready to go to them, to their home, the Knesset itself and argue with them. (Applause).

There is no time to waste. The decision is in our own hands, there is no need for going to get the approval of our people. Our people want us to move forward, in order to compensate ourselves for what we have lost and for the purpose of constructing [the next day] the future.

**State archive: 4172/13 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/ronlyres/B6670090-562F-4A54-A168-197FD9A7508E/0/Egypt17.pdf>

**Press Communiqué – November 10, 1977**

**The Prime Minister: If Sadat decides to come to Jerusalem – he will be received with all the honor that is due to the President**

Jerusalem

Prime Minister, Mr. Menachem Begin dispatched today (Thursday) a verbal message to President Sadat in which he said that if he decides, as he said, to come to Jerusalem he would be received with great honor. The President, Mr. Begin, also said that he would be happy to commence talks with President Sadat for the purpose of reaching a true peace in the Middle East. The Prime Minister reiterated it in his Thursday evening lecture before the delegation of the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. Congress. It was hosted in the Prime Minister's Office in Jerusalem.

Addressing the Chairman of the Committee, Melvin Price, the Prime Minister said that he is asking of him to convey a message to Egypt's President, with whom the Committee will meet tomorrow in Cairo. Israel's Prime Minister welcomes yesterday's announcement and he willing to come to Jerusalem for talks.

Mr. Begin said: "If President Sadat will decide to come to Jerusalem, I'll be happy to give an advanced notice of the date of his arrival so that we shall receive him in full honor. I will meet him personally at the airport, accompany him to Jerusalem and start our talks for reaching peace in the Middle East".

The Prime Minister added: "On the other hand, I'm ready to go to Cairo any day for that same purpose, as I said when I assumed office, I'm ready to go anywhere, at any time to meet with President Sadat and President Assad.

The talks with them on a peace treaty can take place in our respective capital cities – Cairo, Damascus and Jerusalem, or in a neutral place such as Geneva. I only hope that when I come to Cairo I will be welcomed and that the President will give me the opportunity to visit the pyramids that our ancestors assisted in building them and for that, we shall not ask for compensations..."

During his lecture before the American Committee, the Prime Minister, rejected Sadat's attempts to present pre-conditions before the convening of the Geneva Conference, or the commencement of the peace talks. The Prime Minister expressed his hope that the process will materialize.

The Prime Minister denied the published news that the U.S. Administration supposedly proposed that the Egyptian Government make revisions to the working paper that was previously accepted by Israel.

**State archives: 4313/5 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/D6F72BD4-2749-4F75-BAE7-153B53AD8A92/0/Egypt18.pdf>

**Addendum**

**Meeting between the Prime Minister, Mr. Menachem Begin and the delegation of the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives**

(Conducted in English)

November 10, 1977

Prime Minister Office, Jerusalem

His Excellency Mr. M. Begin:

“Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, may I welcome you to Israel, and to this office. I assume you have come to a propitious time because yesterday, President Sadat of Egypt made a statement to the effect that he is prepared to come to Jerusalem, to the Knesset. I assume that you will meet him tomorrow. May I ask you, Mr. Chairman, to give my message to President Sadat to the effect that I welcome his statement and if he decides to come to Jerusalem, I would like to have a days notice . We shall receive him with all the honor due to a president. I will go out myself to Lydda Airport to receive him and I shall bring him to Jerusalem and we shall be very happy to start talks to establish peace in the Middle East.

On the other hand, I am prepared to come any day to Cairo for the very same purpose. As I said when I took office, I am ready to go to any place, any time to see President Sadat and President Assad. The negotiations for a peace treaty can take place in various capitals – Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, or a neutral place like Geneva. I only hope that when I come to Cairo he will also receive me hospitably and give me a chance to glimpse at the pyramids, which our forefathers helped to construct, for which we don't ask any compensation. I'll be very grateful. And let us start talking peace. That is my message.

Secondly, the President said that when he comes to Geneva, he will ask for Israel's total withdrawal to the lines of June 4<sup>th</sup>, 1967 and for the formation of what he call a 'Palestinian State' in Judea, Samaria and in the Gaza Strip, that shall be linked with a corridor.

It is my duty to say that Israel cannot accept those demands, because they would mean a mortal danger to the State of Israel, about which Professor Brzezinski spoke about a few weeks ago on Canadian television. He said that if Israel should face mortal danger, the United State will rush to its rescue. I wrote to President Carter that we find in this statement good will. The question is why should there be a mortal danger to Israel? It has loomed over us for too long. Danger is a different story. Everybody now lives in a certain danger in every country, whether small or large. But mortal danger is a completely different term and we don't want to see again Israel being in mortal danger.

We don't want American soldiers fighting our battles. We don't want any soldier of any country to die for us. We can sustain our independence. **And, therefore,** we must be very careful to create conditions in which there is no mortal danger to Israel. **And therefore,** we cannot accept his demand.

However, President Sadat is entitled to state his position in Geneva at the Peace Conference. Here we have an opportunity to make clear of the real meaning of the word “pre-condition”. If President Sadat should say to us: ‘If you want me to be in Geneva, accept my demand for total withdrawal and the Palestinian State in advance’, that should be regarded as pre-condition. Then, we would not accept it at all. **Or, to give another example on our side and with the same of justice;** for instance, we have our position on Jerusalem. This is city is undivided, indivisible, and it will stay the capital of our country. We shall state this position when we come to Geneva. But if we had asked to accept that position of Israel in advance as a condition for us to go to Geneva, it would be regarded as a pre-condition and therefore, we do not ask for it. No side should have pre-conditions. Every side will have its position and those positions will be brought

to the peace conference table and discussed. But no side should say accept or adopt, in advance, any position that would **make my visit to Geneva conditional**. Otherwise, I shall not come. So now, everybody will understand the real meaning of the word: 'pre-condition'. And of course, if President Sadat prefers to come to Geneva, then I say welcome. As you know, ladies and gentlemen, during our meeting in Washington with the President, the Secretary of State and you, as well as your colleagues in the Senate and the House of Representatives, it was us whom suggested going to Geneva; we want to have the Geneva Conference reconvened. Thank you for your attention.

**State archive: 4350/3 – 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/6C13A8F8-D26F-468D-B0BE-74D72F7D71CA/0/Egypt18APP.pdf>

**The following is the full text of Prime Minister, Menachem Begin's broadcast today to the Egyptian people**

Jerusalem, Friday, November 11, 1977

Citizens of Egypt,

This is the first time that I address you directly, but it is not the first time that I think and talk about you.

You are our neighbors and will always be such. The tragic and unnecessary conflict between our country and yours has continued for the past 29 years.

Since the day the Government of King Farouk ordered the invasion of our country – Eretz Israel – in hope of suffocating our renewed sense of liberty and independence, to the four wars that have broke-up between you and us, much blood was spilled on both sides. Many families **“were broken up?”**, children became orphans and people were lost in both Egypt and in Israel.

Looking back, we now know that all the attempts to conquer the Jewish State were futile. Such attempts required you to sacrifice in human lives, development, the economy and social progress; all those sacrifices were in vain.

Permit me to tell you, our neighbors, that it will the future be as well.

You have to know that we returned to the land of our forefathers, and we were the ones who liberated the land from the British rule. We were the ones that established our independence in our country for all future generations.

We wish you all the best. Actually, there is no reason for hostility between our people. In ancient times, Egypt and Eretz Israel were allies – real friends and allies. We faced a common enemy in the north. Indeed, many changes occurred since then. But, maybe the principle foundation of our friendship and mutual assistance has remained unchanged. We the Israelis extend our hand to you; this is not a weak hand, as you well know. If we shall be attacked we shall always defend; as our ancestors, the Maccabeans, did and won.

We are not seeking to clash with you. Let us say to one another and let it be a silent vow between the two people of Egypt and Israel: no more wars, no more bloodshed, and no more threats.

Let us not only make peace, but embark on the friendly road, with an open heart and a will for productive cooperation. We can assist each other. We can bring about a better, happier and more comfortable life for our peoples.

Your President said two days ago, that he would be willing to come to Jerusalem, to our Parliament, the Knesset, in order to prevent an Egyptian soldier from being wounded. This is a positive declaration. And I have already welcomed it with a greeting.

I will have the pleasure of welcoming your President in a traditional hospitable way that you and us both inherited from our common forefather, Abraham. As for myself, I'll be willing to come to your capital, Cairo, for that same purpose. No more wars. Peace, true peace lasting forever.

In the holy Koran Chapter 5, our right to this land has been set and sanctified. I am asking for you to read the verses from that eternal Chapter: "Remember the time when Moses said to his people. Oh, my people, remember the good that Allah bestowed upon you, when appointed prophets from you...oh, my people, enter the holy land that Allah has given you".

It is in the spirit of our common belief in god, divine guidance, in the truth and the righteousness of all human values, inherited from the Prophet Muhammad and our Prophets Moses, Isaiah, Jeremiad and Ezekiel, that I hereby, in that human spirit, tell you with the whole and the depth of my heart: Shalom.

**State archive: 4172/13 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/FC123FE9-6DBE-473D-A9EF-CC2CE4244D9B/0/Egypt19.pdf>

Haifa,  
November 15, 1977

To  
Mr. Menachem Begin  
The Prime Minister  
The Knesset  
Jerusalem

Dear Mr. Begin,

In such case that your invitation to the President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, materializes, the Government under your leadership will enter both the annals of Jewish and world history. There is no better fitting place than "King David" hotel in Jerusalem to host the Egyptian President. This hotel, located in the capital city is named after a great king in the history of our small nation. This is the place that in 1946, a small group of Jewish people had assumed the strength and the courage to rise against the British rule.

In the "King David" hotel the negotiations with the U.S. peace delegation, headed by Dr. Kissinger, began. Also, here stayed some great world leaders whom were on their way to establish peace in WWII; among them were Churchill and Roosevelt.

A person who lives in faith may search for resemblance in history. Maybe the ambiance of the "King David" hotel will contribute to the realization of our desired dream and your foresight will come true.

Sincerely and respectfully,

Y. Federman

Copy:

Mr. Moshe Dayan

The Prime Minister Office

We are prepared to put at your disposal all of the hotel's rooms and services when asked.

**State archive: 4172/13 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/274A56C8-D426-433B-B2C8-89BA72669B90/0/Egypt20.pdf>

*The following items are:*

*Prime Minister, Menachem Begin writes to President Anwar Sadat with an accompanying letter to U.S. President Jimmy Carter. It contains an official invitation to President Sadat to visit Jerusalem and deliver a speech in the Knesset and meet with the political factions. Begin sent a cover letter to President Carter asking him to convey the invitation to Sadat, which he did.*

**Foreign Office**

**Top Secret**

**Urgent**

To: Washington

From: The Office

Top Secret

Sent: November 15, 1977 at 10:15 PM

Dinitz,

You are requested to convey to the President, if possible, in person, the following letter from the Prime Minister.

Jerusalem, November 15, 1977

The Honorable

Jimmy Carter

The President of the United States



The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

Permit me to inform you of the development connecting a possible visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem.

You will be aware, Mr. President, from my previous letters and from the reports of Ambassador Lewis, that I have in several occasions expressed my wish to meet with President Sadat. In this connection, I remember the words of the Secretary of State, Vance, during his latest visit to Jerusalem, that "he (Sadat) too would like to meet you".

Perhaps the time is indeed at hand for such meeting. Without being unduly optimistic, this would certainly seem to be a positive development. Over a period of 29 years all six of Israel's Prime Ministers, including myself, have stated their readiness to go anywhere at any time to meet the Arab rulers for talks about peace. These offers have remained without response apart from certain clandestine meetings subsequently denied publicly by both sides. Now for the first time, there is an affirmative public reply. It is my intention that later today in the Knesset we also extend an invitation to President Assad, King Hussein and President Sarkis [of Lebanon]. Today, following the debate in our Knesset, I handed Ambassador Lewis the following letter addressed to President Sadat.

Jerusalem, November 15, 1977

His Excellency  
Mr. Anwar Sadat  
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt  
Cairo

Dear Mr. President,

"On behalf of the Government of Israel I have the honor to extend to you our cordial invitation to come to Jerusalem and to visit our country.

"Your Excellency's readiness to undertake such a visit, as expressed to the People's Council of Egypt, has been noted here with a deep and positive interest. Your statement that you would wish to address the members of our Parliament, the Knesset, and meet with me are met with similar interest.

"If, as I hope, you will accept our invitation, arrangements will be made for you to address the Knesset from its rostrum. You will also, should you desire, be enabled to meet with our various Parliamentary groups, those in support of the Government as well as those in opposition.

"As to the date of the proposed visit, we shall be glad to meet with your convenience. It so happens that I am scheduled to be at the invitation of Prime Minister Callaghan and leave for London on Sunday, 20 November. I would ask for Prime Minister Callaghan's indulgence and arrange to postpone my visit to Britain, so as to be able to receive you personally and initiate talks on the establishment of peace together. For which, we both know, the peoples of the Middle East yearn and pray.

"Alternatively, should you decide to come here on Thursday, 24 November, or thereafter, I would be back from London by Wednesday afternoon and greet you upon your arrival.

“May I assure you, Mr. President, that the Parliament, the Government and the People of Israel, will receive you with respect and cordiality.

Yours Sincerely,  
(Signed.....)  
Menachem Begin

I asked Ambassador Lewis whether it would be possible for us to avail ourselves to the offices of the United States to transmit this as a written message to the President of Egypt. Your Ambassador immediately responded in the affirmative.

I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for the help you have extended to us through your Ambassador, which is of assistance to both Israel and to Egypt.

Should the President decide to come here, he will be received with all honors due to a Head of State and all the cordial hospitality due to the leader of a neighboring country of with which we wish to live in peace and friendship.

I shall, Mr. President, with your permission keep you personally informed of any further developments concerning the relations between us, Egypt and other Arab countries.

Allow me, Mr. President, also to enclose the full text of my address to the Egyptian people.

Yours respectfully and sincerely,

Menachem Begin

**State archive: 4337/11 – 8; State archive: 4155/5 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/ronlyres/B6141B0C-38B2-4542-9640-FE66138132B8/0/Egypt21.pdf>

Jerusalem, November 24, 1977

**Top Secret**

**A meeting between the Foreign Minister [Dayan] and Ambassador Lewis**

**With the participation of Ephraim Evron**

Thursday, November 17, 1977

The meeting was held at 2 PM in response to the American Ambassador's urgent request. Lewis reported that President Sadat is expected to land in Ismailia in 15 minutes on his way back to Egypt after his visit to Damascus. Soon after Sadat's arrival to Ismailia, the American Ambassador to Cairo, Herman Eilts, will present Mr. Begin's invitation to him with an accompanying letter from President Carter. He will receive the confirmation of Sadat's acceptance of the invitation. Lewis reiterated, as he already told the Prime Minister last night, that Sadat will arrive in Israel on Saturday evening, November 29, 1977. Lewis added that Vice-President Mubarak is requesting Israel's permission for the arrival of an Egyptian Boeing 737 tomorrow, Friday November 18, 1977 to Ben-Gurion Airport. The plane will take off from

an airfield in the Suez Canal region at 8 AM. The calling code of that airplane is SUA-YN. It will bring an Egyptian advance team of 65 headed by Hassan Kamel, the head of the Office of the President. Most of these people will remain in Israel to assist in the preparations of the visit. The flight course of the airplane will be from Port Said, along the coast and then break towards Ben-Gurion Airport. It will be flown by the same crew that will fly the Presidential Boeing 707 with Sadat on board the next day.

The Egyptians will bring with them flags and **the noted** of the Egyptian hymn, as Evron requested of Lewis the day before yesterday. Lewis emphasized that the Egyptians asked to not publicize anything on this matter until after Sadat's confirmation and acceptance of Prime Minister Begin's invitation. This is to be expected during the next hour.

The Foreign Minister responded that all of those arrangements are acceptable by us. He proposed that instead of flying along the coast, the Egyptian airplane may fly north of Port Said and enter Israel's flying zone via the international airway. Lewis responded that he will convey this proposal immediately to Cairo.

**Written by Ephraim Evron**

**State archive: 6911/2 - זת**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/ronlyres/22D87C80-50A1-41A1-832C-1DCAC9793C6A/0/Egypt22.pdf>

**Secret**

**Foreign Affairs and Security Committee  
The Ninth Knesset  
First Plenum**

**Protocol No. 35  
Meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee  
Friday, November 18, 1977 at 1 PM**

**Present:**

**Committee members:**

Y. Navon – Acting Chairman, Y. Ben-Meir, C. Bar-lev, S.Y. Gross, C. Drukman, Z. Warhaftig, S. Toledano, A. Katz, A. Lyn, M. Nissim, A. Nof, C. Corfu, A. Rubinstein, Y. Rom, Y. Sarid, M. Talmi.

**Speaker of the House,** Y. Shamir

**Invitees:**

**Prime Minister,** M. Begin

**Deputy Defense Minister,** M. Zipori,

**Director, Prime Minister Office,** E. Ben-Elisar

**Committee's Secretary:** A. Radai

**Stenographer:** Z. Safran

**The Agenda:**

**A report by Prime Minister, M. Begin in anticipation of the visit of the  
President of Egypt, A. Sadat.**

November 18, 1977

**The Chairman, Y. Navon:**

I hereby commence this meeting.

This meeting was summoned on a short notice because of its special circumstances. I thank the Prime Minister (PM) whom has come to meet with us even though he has to devote much of his time to this extraordinary event.

**PM Begin:** Mr. Chairman, respected members; I shall open with the explanation of the plan of the visit of President Sadat to our country. He will arrive tomorrow at 8 PM in the evening; we have taken Shabbat under consideration. Vice President Mubarak asked me if it was possible to arrive on the evening of the Sabbath and at what time the President should arrive so there will no desecration of the Sabbath. I responded: between 7:30 PM and 8 PM, and this is why he will arrive at 8 PM

After the reception, [at the airport] our President will join Sadat in the designated car and I will join the Deputy Prime Minister, our Foreign Minister, his Egyptian counter-part and two additional Ministers.

At the Lydda Airport there will be a full military ceremony. Our Airplane will not take off at that time.

When we shall arrive at the "King David" hotel I will invite him [Sadat] for a brief meeting of 10-15 minutes in order to decide on the schedule of the following day's talks. He requested to be provided with time to rest on Saturday evening and we shall respect his request. During the morning between 6 AM and 7 AM he will pray the Al-Akza Mosque. Then, he wishes to visit the Church of the sepulcher, which is holy to Christians, and afterwards - as we agreed - I will accompany him to visit Yad Vashem.

Here is how the story of Yad Vashem unfolded: I had this idea, but I thought that I should suggest it him and he would ultimately decide. Last night, I telephoned President Carter – our exchange was very cordial – and among other subjects I told him that we wish to bring Sadat to Yad Vashem as well, so that he will know what happened to our people. Carter asked if he can convey our request in an urgent telegram to Sadat and I answered in the affirmative, of course while expressing my gratitude. Dr. Ben-Elisar received a confirmation from his Egyptian counter-part with a request that I accompany Sadat. I will do it willingly.

At 4 PM the Knesset will convene. I recommended to the Government – and my recommendation was approved – that after Sadat's speech there will be two more speeches: one by me, and the other by a spokesperson from the largest Opposition Faction, and I understand that it will be Shimon Peres. This is, most likely the decision of the Knesset Committee.

**Y. Ben-Meir:** Yes.

**PM Begin:** Afterwards there will private talks. On Monday morning, Sadat will meet with our President and will come again to the Knesset and convene separately with the Factions in private talks.

**Chairman Navon:** With each one?

**PM Begin:** The Coalition; the Alignment and small Factions. Not individuals. Shulamit Aloni may join for this purpose, either the Alignment faction, or Shelly. Hausner may join as well if he wishes to do so.

The Factions will meet with President Sadat in direct talks in the hall downstairs. At the beginning they thoughts that the meetings would take place at "King David" – and there is nothing wrong with it – but I insisted on having those meetings at the Knesset so that the stately discussion will be at the House of Representatives. Dr. Ben-Elisar informed me that it will be arranged as I requested.

I have already mentioned that he will meet with the President. He will depart the country on Monday afternoon, so that the entire morning will be devoted to meetings with the Factions and with the members of the Government. Sadat came with three Ministers, one of whom is acting Foreign Minister and one whom is Coptic.

**Chairman Navon:** how much time is allotted for the Government's meeting with them?

**PM Begin:** Relatively short time because he will be busy. But we shall talk with him for a few hours. We shall form a team – the Foreign Minister, Deputy PM and me, but it will be expanded if such a need arises. He wishes to have a one-on-one conversation with me, but it has not been set yet. We received advice from a person who previously experienced meetings with Sadat. He suggested that we should be very careful and responsive to his sensitivities. A smaller number of participants in the meeting, out of respect, will enable us to get closer to his heart.

I dispatched President Carter a telegram after our very cordial telephone conversation. I thanked him for his contribution. Both the telephone conversation and the telegram are important investments for the future. There was an unpleasant feeling at the White House. This telegram took care of it. I used fairly strong words to thank the President and everything that I wrote is sincere. I think that that this development came about as a result of all the initiatives. It is possible that without Carter's contribution, this meeting would not have taken place. This is a good investment for the future.

Ceausescu too played an important role in making this meeting possible. I visited Romania and we conducted talks that lasted altogether about 6-7 hours. While we were walking back and forth, we discussed the possibility of a meeting with Arafat. Ceausescu took the initiative and said that Sadat wishes to have a meeting between representatives from Israel and Egypt. I agreed, of course, but said: 'actually I'm ready to meet with him, why can't we get together?' And he responded: 'this will also come, but at a much later stage'. Afterwards, Sadat visited Bucharest and Ceausescu presented him with a detailed report on our meetings. Ceausescu sent his emissary to report to us on his conversation with Sadat and the emissary told me that Sadat was highly impressed by what Ceausescu told him, that we really want peace; that we wish to conduct direct negotiations and that we do not have pre-conditions. Ceausescu made a significant contribution and I thanked him in a telegram and added that it is up to his discretion whether to publicize its content, or not.

By the way, they have upgraded the relations between the two countries. Once they imported oil from us and then stopped. Ceausescu did not hesitate to admit to me that they stopped it because of political reasons, though his Prime Minister told me that it was an economic matter. Later on the Prime Minister apologized. They imported oil from us via Ashkelon for \$25 million and stopped. I was informed yesterday that our person in charge of that export received a message from Romania that they wish to import \$50 million worth of oil from us. Yigal Horowitz [Minister of Industry and Commerce] will be in Romani in two weeks and the mutual decision is to re-instate reciprocal exports between the countries. They wish to establish a cooperative relationship with us. Macovescu [Romania's Foreign Minister] met with Dayan at the United Nations and it was quite friendly.

Dayan and I, the spokespersons of the Government, do not wish to engulf the nation in euphoria. No need to exaggerate. There are those who warn us of dangers and risks. I cannot reject it but when we convene again after the visit and if the need for re-evaluation arises, I will do so with no hesitation. At the moment I see no looming dangers.

... Here comes President Sadat and he will deliver a speech in the Knesset talking about complete withdrawal to the July 6, 1967 borders and a Palestinian state with a connecting corridor. I announced that we do not accept those demands and we have the backing of 113 Knesset Members. But he has the right to say it. We have our own positions and the right to express them. What is the conclusion? After all, it is not surprising, we priestly and publicly say that the Knesset is united and no one can force us to retreat or establish a Palestinian state. But we shall also talk about positive matters: we want peace; we have no differences of opinion: let us sit down, and conduct negotiations either in Cairo, or Jerusalem. I assume that they will invite me to visit Cairo and I shall go there. If Ambassador Ghorbal, Egypt's Ambassador to the U.S. said that he is sure that such invitation will be extended, he knows what he is talking about. Then, there will be a Geneva. We are ready to go there and there should be no doubt about it. This means that we shall grant a real momentum for negotiations.....

.....

.....  
...With Assad it is more difficult. I invited him to the Knesset, but I do not know if he will come. I am ready to meet with him in a neutral place; no need to despair. My assessment is that we shall continue to negotiate and this is positive matter; the fact that a ruler of a country that is in a state of war with another country, comes for a visit. I'm not so sure if this has ever happened before. I do not recall. It is very rare and one should leaf through old pages in order to find out. He will be received in honor. He is very sensitive to dignity. He was positively impressed by the phrasing of my words in my letter. He told the American Ambassador in Cairo that my letter was heartfelt. His words were such and he is sensitive to such matters. One has to take sensitivities into consideration. I assume that all will turn out well. But if not we will go on living and we shall know how to calculate our moves.

I received a message that the PLO calls upon the Arab mayors to boycott all the festivities. But this morning, we received another message to the effect that the Al-Khatib and the Al-Masri family of Nablus requested to see Sadat and be present at the airport on his arrival. We extended an invitation to them. The Coptic Patriarch asked to see Sadat – after all there are Copts in Egypt – and we consented.

**Chairman Navon:** Are there any questions or comments by the Committee members?

**Z. Warhaftig:** There is no need to emphasize this exceptional event and my impression is that it was well received. Can you please tell us, Mr. PM? In what way will the Government respond to Sadat? It would be impossible to return if the response will be negative. Would there be talks regarding one form of treaty or another with Egypt alone for the time being?

**PM Begin:** I will first respond to the second question: we are ready to sign a peace treaty with Egypt. I think that that from a political perspective it is best that he takes the initiative. We can hint but it is best if it comes straight from him. We are being suspected of using his visit and all the appeals to Egypt for one purpose – to isolate Egypt and create a rift among the Arab Countries. I can only state that we have no such intention. By the way the public announcement that was made two years ago about an attempt to insert a wedge between Egypt and Syria was erroneous.

**Chairman Navon:** Yoel Markus [an Israeli pundit] published an item about it.

**PM Begin:** Based on a message from the U.S., given by a very reliable person, that publication hurts us to this day. One says something in public and now one has to prove otherwise. We should not take the initiative to be the first, but we shall give Sadat a hint. If he proposes to discuss a plan for a separate arrangement with Egypt we shall accept it whole heartedly. We are ready to make some concessions in the Sinai that can be accepted by him. We have the problem of free navigation; there is a problem that the Southern part of our country is northern Sinai and there should not be, of course, a single Egyptian there. There, we can really create demilitarize areas. It is feasible to be able to supervise such areas in a desert. In Nablus we cannot supervise a demilitarized zone. The demilitarization of Nablus, or Jerusalem is a joke and it was as such on both sides of Jerusalem for 19 years. In populated areas one cannot supervise demilitarized zones. Every garage can store a tank. This is what happened in Germany after WWI. It is possible in the desert, and we shall suggest it to him.

We should talk to him about our common interests and we do have such with the Egyptian people. I purposely said: 'we can assist you'. Sadat is in a special predicament and can say to him: 'Come, let us help one another in developing agriculture; constructing factories. Maybe in the Sinai it is possible to build joint enterprises that we get our people closer.

If he says: 'You have to withdraw to the Green Line – this is impossible – we cannot do that. But we will say: 'Let us negotiate.' We shall not say negative things, but emphasize those that are principally positive. He presented two demands: a total withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state; he has the prerogative to propose it.

**Z. Warhaftig:** He presented three demands.

**PM Begin:** But on that issue too, we should not raise doubt, we have our reasons. We have to emphasize the positive; we want peace. I will open my speech by relating to the fate of the Jewish people, as he witnessed it in Yad Vashem, and I tell him: 'Now you understand why our desire to have peace is in our hearts.'

As for the first question: He does not accept any compromise. He told us: 'You have to execute a total withdrawal'. This means that he is not ready to compromise even on one millimeter in regard to the Green Line. This is an old issue.

**Z. Warhaftig:** The main thing is that it should be subjected to negotiations, not as an answer.

**PM Begin:** While he has a position, we have one as well. I want say that it was a good investment that I spoke with Carter at 11:30 AM. He gladly accepted my request, conveyed the message to Sadat and expressed his complements. Brzezinski also used all possible superlatives.

**Y. Ben-Meir:** I wish to point out to the PM the importance of one-on-one talks whenever such opportunities arise. I think we all accept it favorably...the physical contact between you and Sadat is very important. I also think that it is only natural to follow his visit here by your visit there.

...

**H. Corfu:** President Sadat should go back with a sense of some sort of achievement, for the sake of status in Egypt and the Arab world. There should be a continuation and a timetable, so that a vacuum will be created.

**A. Nof:** A technical question: Was there anything new in this morning's meeting about political information and ceremonial procedures?

**E. Ben-Elisar:** There were no political exchanges. We were not called here for that purpose, but for the preparations of the visit. I can point out that the preparations and logistical talks were amiable and the atmosphere was as if we had known each other for years.

**M. Talmi:** I don't intend to discuss controversies. The PM rightly stated that there is a Government and it has its positions. But it seems to me that we cannot ignore the fact that along with all the positive aspects of this visit, there are also risks. It burdens the both the guest and the hosts with a heavy. He took a daring step and the issues of the Arab world put him in a predicament. He must return home with something tangible and Israel's preparedness to make compromises. I understand that positive things can be said, but there should be an effort not to block roads, but to look for ways out.

**H. Bar-Lev:** A question and two comments. The question relates to the secret meeting of the Foreign Minister and his disappearance on his way to the U.S. The PM told the Committee: 'One day we will be able to tell you forbidden things.' My question is what would happen if that day arrived and those undisclosed 24 hours had to do with Sadat's visit. My first comment is that if Sadat wishes to have a one-on-one meeting with the PM we ought to materialize it. Second, I have a feeling that the Government has not defined for herself her aims and wishes in this event. I express this feeling based on what has been published. There is no room for lengthy discussion here but in my opinion it is not enough to give our blessing to this visit but discern how to proceed. It is obvious what Sadat will say in the Knesset. He will tell it to the people in Israel and to the whole world and it will leave huge impact. He will say: 'you can receive peace tomorrow



morning if you agree to withdraw and to a Palestinian state. I assume that the PM and the Opposition Factions will make it clear why we cannot accept that demand. As far as I can judge the world's public opinion, such an approach by Sadat can fall on fertile ground. I think that it is recognized that there should be a 'grand plan'. It is necessary to assess how much we can benefit from this initiative. My request is that the government of Israel set its primary and secondary priorities, in a concrete fashion. I do not know whether the step taken [by Sadat] is historic or not, but it sure is presently dramatic and significant.

**S. Toledano:** I suggest that we do not end this visit with 'we do not agree'. We should have a slight addition that is binding and leaves room for options. For example, in case there is a chance for peace, we shall be ready to make compromises while not using the word 'compromise'. We cannot conclude in the following fashion: 'We are not ready to do it and we have the backing of a national consensus'. Secondly, I follow the reactions of the other side. The maintenance of our position of not wishing to create a wedge among the Arab states has great impact. This phrase was extremely regrettable. I also wish to emphasize the importance of the personable and non-patronizing approach. That is how the PM acted and I request that we continue to in such fashion. It is very important.

**Y. Rom:** With all our enthusiasm we should remember the great importance of the Sinai and its strategic significance to Israel's security. I suggest to not to overreact and to not forget our perspective. We should keep our eyes open – especially on the Eastern and the Northern fronts. In light of the relations between Sadat and Assad, we should be aware what we do with these territories. I also think that we have to choose a positive course for the negotiations and this can be done with proposals of cooperation with Egypt on joint projects. It is possible to talk about plans in the Bay of Suez and in the Sinai. These can be the achievements that Sadat brings home and these are not necessarily those achievements that some of my colleagues had in mind. I propose to the Foreign Office and to the Government to consider our ties with Third World countries. In my opinion, the current situation makes it possible. Sadat's visit presents an opportunity for additional countries in Africa and Asia to renew relations. It is now the proper time to act.

**Chairman Navon:** There are matters that relevant to today, Friday. Those things you may say on Monday.

**Y. Rom:** I think that we should appreciate his political courage. But on the other hand, we should not exaggerate the issue. We should not give up on matters that are vital for Israel, just for the purpose of rewarding him for his political feat.

**S. Y. Gross:** First, is it possible to demonstrate good will to the Arabs by granting autonomy to Muslim holy places? Would it impair our national security? Secondly, as a gesture of good will for his visit, is it possible to release some of the terrorists that are kept in administrative confinement?

**A. Lyn:** You have mentioned, Mr. PM, that **the attendance of** some dignitaries from the territories requested to be present and is very important. But, the Israeli-Arabs may feel discriminated against, if none of them are invited to be a partner in the hosting of the visit. I rely on Dr. Ben-Elisar on this matter, but have yet to hear anything about it.

**Chairman Navon:** As you have mentioned Mr. PM, Sadat will visit the Church of Sepulcre in the morning. Was there a proposal that he visit the Wailing Wall, since it is holy to Muslims as well? As for the issue of the wedge; when you use the historic analogy of having an enemy in the north, it implies that the enemy is Syria.

**PM Begin:** I was referring to ancient Assyria.

.....  
**Chairman Navon:** ...As for the Arabs who will attend the meeting [with Sadat]: It is a very sensitive issue and I assume that it is being dealt with accordingly. We have to discern who are prominent and take the initiative of inviting them, even if they did not request it. I refer to Arabs from Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

Is it planned that the public receive Sadat in the streets? And if so, would it be on Sunday, or on Monday? I recommend that the Jerusalemites receive him in the streets, or at the entrance of the Knesset. It is preferable that the public, both Jewish and Arab, be out in the streets waving their hands.

**PM Begin:** We have plans for this visit: We want to have a peace treaty. If it is possible to reach one in Jerusalem, we may soon be able to sign it. The question is if it is really possible and if not, it's necessary to continue. There is reciprocity. There might be a visit to Cairo, or there will be a Geneva [Conference]. This is the intention and I do not think that it is possible to have a different plan. If we are talking about confrontation and ratification, there is not a faction within the Knesset, except for the Communists and Shelli (Hebrew acronym for Peace for Israel – a left wing faction), that are willing to accept those three demands: total withdrawal, the establishment of a Palestinian state and the recognition of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Arabs in Eretz Israel, as decided by the [Arab] Foreign Ministers Summit Meeting in Rabat. This is as we are all speaking in one voice, saying no. Sadat says: 'we present you with three demands, that in complying with them you will get peace in return.' We say: 'not possible'. Does that mean that we do not discuss peace? That we send him away in disgrace? There are colleagues among us that think that sometime answering no is the most positive answer in the perspective of our future. Is there anyone who can say that by retreating to those lines we shall achieve real peace? Or might this endanger Israel's population? What did Brzezinski say? 'Mortal danger?' It is not the right time for this Government to tell Sadat, or the world, or ourselves that we shall give up the territories in Judea and Samaria. There are some who think that by doing so we will be redeemed; I do not believe so. There is demagogy in the attempt to maintain that the Likud's policy will lead to confrontation while the Alignment's policy will bring achievement...such matter of an interim or partial solution may be advocated by [Shimon] Peres. In my opinion it is completely erroneous, but it is his prerogative. What will the outcome be of an announcement by the Arab states that they are ready to cancel the state of war? A peace treaty, in its essence, is the cessation of a state of war. Do expect that Sadat, according to his demands in the Sinai, will cease the state of war? Or will he sign a peace treaty; neither this nor that. I once talked with Heath and Wilson, the latter told me: 'When has it ever happened that two parties who conduct negotiations come to the table with identical interests?' There are always differences of opinion. At the end, what is the most revolutionary thing that happened? That he came for the talks without reporting in advance and that it is possible to talk one-on-one about matters that should be kept without publicity. **There are problems in Africa but, we have no inclination that Africa will not become part of the free world.** This is a crucial point and we should strive for cooperation, understanding and much more. **Sirs,** sometimes we don't look at the map. Please do. We are in the center of the world, not at its margins. From a geographical perspective too, something is happening in the world. The Russians almost overtook Ethiopia. We had the capability of knowing exactly what was happening there. They gave up on Somalia, a small country, but decided to take Ethiopia and gain the sources of the Nile. Huge things are happening and we can play on the keys of that piano.

If I was assured there would be no leaks, I would have answered the question regarding the mysterious 24 [hours] of Dayan. But I'm very worried. Indeed, he made contact, that much I can say, **and important ones**, but I have deep worries in my heart.

**Chairman Navon:** This can wait.

**PM Begin:** In due time, I will fulfill my promise. Why were our prophets called true ones? They never set a date but always talked about the end of days. A day will come and I will live up to my promise.

**Nof:** What Corfu said was different.

**PM Begin:** I have heard Mr. Corfu. I understand that your interpretation is different than mine. We shall do everything worldly possible to assure he [Sadat] will leave Jerusalem satisfied; everything possible; except those things that cannot be undone. I think that we have a chance to succeed; give us a chance. Ultimately, we shall all be present in the Knesset; we shall listen and voice our position. He will speak in Arabic and there will be a simultaneous translation. I asked for it so that I can know ahead of time if it is necessary to respond immediately. Dr. Ben-Elisar, have you received a message that his speech is in writing?

**Ben-Elisar:** I received a message that it is not.

**PM Begin:** I hope that there will be private meeting between the two of us. I cannot promise. There are certain matters on that issue. Representatives of all factions must be at Lod airport. I would like to remind you that the meeting with the factions will be in the Knesset building. Now, let us follow recent occurrences; In general I think that the result will be positive. The U.S. became much closer to us. You may have noticed that I did not badmouth Carter. I was asked and pressured but I never resorted to a personal condemnation. We need the personal relations very much. As of today, we have exchanged 12 personal letters in the last three months. I'm not sure if the President of France has had as many exchanges with Carter. Our exchanges were very cordial. There were also seriously conflicting opinions that were reflected in our communications. The reactions in the telephone conversation and in the exchange of a telegrams reached the apex of our friendship.

**Ben-Meir:** Will it become public?

**PM Begin:** Of course. It is very important. By the way, they [the Americans] are very sensitive in regard to every rumor that suggests that they will give up or modify content of the working paper. On October 14, I received a personal letter from President Carter in which he wrote: 'I pass the paper to Sadat, Assad and Hussein and I'll be in touch with you.' To this day, no one has conveyed anything; not even the State Department. They know what points we shall reject. If they suggest a PLO person – we shall reject; if they say a united delegation without a designation of bi-lateral committees – we shall not accept it. They do not impose demands. Today, relations are good. You should have seen U.S. Ambassador Lewis. He said: 'I'm a happy postman'. Does an Ambassador of a Super Power have to serve as a postman? There is a great and positive awakening in Europe towards us. I am unsure about how long this change will last? Up to this moment matters are fine, and on Tuesday it is possible that we shall be in the Knesset to sum it up, more or less.

**Chairman Navon:** I wish you success and to us all – Shabbat Shalom.

**State archive:** 240/1 - 8

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/63924957-A9FB-4872-9A8D-9FE7E5FC5086/0/Egypt23.pdf>

**State of Israel**

**Office of the Prime Minister  
Jerusalem**

November 18, 1977

To: Dr. E. Ben-Elisar, Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister

**Subject: Sadat visit in Al-Akza Mosque**

In my opinion, the decision to allow thousands of people in Jerusalem to participate in Sunday's prayers, may present a risk to the personal security of President Sadat. Especially, when he is inside the Mosque where Israeli policemen are not permitted to enter.

The President can get hurt, even by masses of well-wishers who would like to shake hands with him and so forth. Such enthusiasm is only natural in such an event.

I recommend that the maximum number of participants in the prayers should not exceed 1,000.

Best wishes,

Dr. Moshe Sharon

An Advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs

Copy: Brig. Gen. Ephraim Peron, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister

State archive: 7367/1 - 8

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/F137DFDC-45E3-4A17-95F0-A6851CA20253/0/Egypt24.pdf>

**Foreign Office**  
Communication Department

**Top Secret**

**Urgent**

To: The Office  
From: Washington

Sent: November 18, 1977 at 7 PM  
Received: November 19, 1977 3:57 AM

To: Boaz [Foreign Minister Dayan's code name];  
Director General, the Foreign Office

I met with Kissinger today, at his request. He told me that Brzezinski invited him for lunch today and reiterated the outline of his plan; the Palestinian problem is their first priority. They hope that convening the Geneva Conference and exploiting Sadat's visit will result in concessions from the Israelis (especially on the Palestinian issue) and enable them to have the conference. Kissinger said that he vehemently argued against this path and he thinks that Brzezinski and others in the Administration are acting blindly and do not recognize the new reality that is unfolding before them. This reality is a result of Sadat's frustration with their moves. Brzezinski told Kissinger that President Carter, in his telephone conversation with Sadat, said that he hopes to have the Israelis make concessions to the Palestinians and that Syria will convene in Geneva. It will also preserve Sadat's status in the Arab world. Carter recommended that Sadat visit "Yad Vashem" (I was informed about it by Brzezinski last night and I received a confirmation about it from Habib).

During our conversation, Kissinger had telephoned Habib. He invited him for a talk whereby he wanted to report to him information about his conversation with Sadat from that morning.

During this phone conversation, Kissinger criticized the approach of people in the Administration to matters concerning Sadat's visit. Kissinger told Habib that the Israelis are smart enough and there is no need to give them advice. He added that Sadat knows exactly what he has to do in order to maintain his standing and does not need amateurish advice from the U.S. Kissinger spoke critically against the Administration's tendency of **failing to?** arrive at an agreement between Egypt and Israel, while using the Palestinian issue as well. (Maybe Habib told him that this approach was originated in the National Security Council, because Kissinger replied: 'I know, I have just ate with him').

Kissinger then told me about his conversation with Sadat that morning. Kissinger told him that he knew and was certain that the Israelis will do everything to not let this historic move crumble and they will make efforts to reach a positive results. Sadat was very touched, thanked him and expressed his determination to reach peace. He said that he wishes to complete what Kissinger started. He added **that he place** his future on the move, believing that he will reach an understanding and an agreement with Israel. Sadat said: 'I am a man of my word. I meant it when I said war, and I mean it when I say peace.'

Sadat urged Kissinger to come visit Egypt soon and said that he needs his advice. Kissinger promised to do it soon. As for the visit, Kissinger said that he gave no advice to either side, but he told Sadat that he is certain that Israel wants Peace, as Sadat will find out when he visits there. Kissinger assumed that Sadat will talk about the interests of each of the confronting Arab countries, but he believes that first and foremost he is concerned with Egypt's interests and his ability to end the confrontation with Israel. Kissinger assumes that the personal aspect is very important in Sadat's approach and he recommends that Begin project a similar sincere attitude and a mutual wish in hope of ending the cycle of hostilities and wars.

He suggested that after the general foundations of understanding are laid between the two countries, we should make Sadat a partner in thinking how to improve relations on the Syrian and the Jordanian fronts.

Kissinger referred to his telephone conversation with the Prime Minister and repeated what he told him. He added that in his opinion the Prime Minister handled the whole situation remarkably. He concluded that in the next couple of days he will pray for the success of the meetings which he regards as a rare opportunity that can alter the entire history of the conflict; maybe the last chance. He said once again that he will be happy to assist us and requested that I keep him informed.

Dinitz

**State archive: 4337/11 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/B47EDCF1-FF81-44C9-8404-18311841A323/0/Egypt25.pdf>

### **Sadat's Acceptance of Begin's Invitation**

November 19, 1977

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have the pleasure to accept the invitation extended to me to come to Jerusalem and address the representatives of your people on one of the most important issues to both of us, an issue of war and peace.

I am pleased to hear that my readiness to undertake such a visit has been met with deep and positive interest by the Government of Israel.

I hope that my initiative, which reflects our sincere desire to establish a just and durable peace in the Middle East, would find a positive response on your part, not only at the present time but first and foremost in the future, when historical decisions have to be made in the direction of ending an era of devastating fear and tension.

As has been agreed upon, I shall start my visit on November 19. I shall have the pleasure of addressing the Knesset and later meet with your parliamentary groups as well as with other officials.

Yours Sincerely,

Singed  
Mohamed Anwar El Sadat

**State archive: 4313/5 - s**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/087008E3-B965-4966-BD44-7D69DECA67EF/0/Egypt26.pdf>

#### **An Addendum to Sadat acceptance letter**

Tel Aviv

December 14, 1977 [should be November 18 – error in original text]

His Excellency  
Menachem Begin  
Prime Minister of the State of Israel  
Jerusalem

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have special pleasure in transmitting to you one of the most historic documents of my lifetime, the original of the letter of November 19<sup>th</sup>, 1977 from President Sadat accepting your invitation to Jerusalem.

I must gently apologize for the staple marks and the document's ratty-looking appearance. This is the condition in which we received it.

With best wishes and, as always, my great respect.

Sincerely,

Signed  
Richard N. Viets  
Charge d'affaires, a. i.

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/FBA11065-4B9D-4330-BB91-4B882FE349B3/0/Egypt26APP.pdf>

**Top Secret**

**Protocol**  
**Government meeting**  
November 20, 1977

**Ministers present:** Prime Minister (PM) M. Begin, Chairman, A. Abu-Hatzeira, S. Erlich, Y. Burg, M. Dayan, Y. Horowitz, Z. Hammer, Deputy Prime Minister, Y. Yadin, I. Katz, D. Levy, Y. Modai, M. Amit, G. Pat, E. Shostak, A. Sharon, S. Tamir. **Absent:** E. Weizman (ill).

**Also present:** M. Zipori – Deputy Minister of Defense; A. Barak – Legal Councilor to the Government; S. Katz – Advisor to the Prime Minister for foreign publicity; A. Naor – Government Secretary.

**The agenda: the visit of the President of Egypt**

Our first impression from our guest is that he has plans of his own and will bring them forth; most certainly in his speech in the Knesset and also in private talks. In yesterday's conversations, he did not refer to them. Sadat told me in jest that he assumes that after his speech I will not be able to object to those plans. I responded: we shall listen.

As for procedures, he wishes to have a private meeting with me and also with our colleagues from both sides. What is a one-on-one talk? It is making a commitment that whatever I tell him will never get out. I can rely on him. He wants me to know him; He wants me to know that he can be trusted and we can speak in full trust.

.....  
.....  
..... Sadat said that he was impressed by what Carter and Ceaucesco told him about me. Obviously, Ceaucesco deserves part of the credit in making this meeting possible. The interesting part is that Sadat arrived at the idea to come Israel on his flight to Tehran after his visit to Bucharest.

I have arranged with Sadat to have a working lunch after our visit to "Yad Vashem". In this meeting there will be three participants from each side. On our side it will be Deputy Prime Minister [Yadin], Dayan and myself; on their side it will be Sadat and two of his colleagues. In the evening, after the plenum of the Knesset, 15 people from each side will take part in the talks. Our side will be represented by eight members of the Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs and an additional seven whom we want to participate. If the Committee on Security Affairs is participating in this conversation, then it has a full authority. It is possible that after that meeting I will meet him for a one-on-one conversation.

Sadat departs tomorrow at 4 PM and he will be available for talks with the factions for two hours. I would like to tell you as a side note – and you may react to it – that we proposed that he schedule meetings with four factions: the Coalition, the Alignment, the Communist and Shelli. Single representatives may join either one of these four groups. I've heard that some members of our Coalition demand to have separate meetings with him. I hereby request not to do such a



thing; because if one does, then another one may request to do the same. The main thing is that we have a Parliamentary majority, which is close to 2/3, and Sadat is impressed by it. He commented: 'It is necessary to have a majority to make decisions.' I gave him some examples from Europe.

I will now present the main points of my speech; the discussion that will follow will be on all issues.

**Shostak:** Where would the meetings take place?

**PM Begin:** In his hotel. I am having the dinner in his honor at the hotel as well. Another meeting may take place in my residence. By the way, at the beginning it was suggested that all the factions would meet him in "King David" hotel. I changed it. We have to maintain the dignity of the Parliament.

**Tamir:** What is Sadat's schedule for tomorrow?

**PM Begin:** As I said, he has two hours for talks with the factions and in addition we shall have our own talks.

I will start the day with a greeting for "Eid-al-Adha" [in Islam: Feast of the Sacrifice]. This holiday is linked to the sacrifice of Yitzhak, the Muslims argue, though, that it is related to the sacrifice of Ishmael. I will not mention either of those names, but I will mention that the idea of the sacrifice is a test that god presented to Abraham but the essential meaning of it is the prohibition of human sacrifices. This is one of the progressive symbols of our two peoples, as compared to others who did use human sacrifices for their idols. It entails deep religious meaning here and it is worthwhile mentioning to Sadat.

Afterwards, I will deliver greetings for his participation in the Knesset assembly and praise him for his courageous decision to come and visit Israel. I'll use the following expression: the flight time between Cairo and Jerusalem is very short, but the distance between was infinite; now, he [Sadat] has traveled that distance and we know how to appreciate courage.

I intend to say that sitting in this house are members of different factions who were previously senior commanders of all three organizations and fought for the liberation of our nation.

I am certain that I will express everyone's opinion that we all have one desire, to have peace.

I want to prove that we began with a desire for peace, and for that I will quote one of Ben-Gurion's readings from the Declaration of Independence where there is a clause saying that we extend our hands to our neighbors for peace etc. It is worthwhile quoting and I shall add that on the day that Ben-Gurion announced Israel's Independence, he delivered them to us and to the ears of all the countries in this region.

If the government agrees, I would like to reiterate a short quote from my speech on May 15, 1977, saying that we extend our hands for peace and wish to live in a country with good neighborly relations.

Soon afterwards, I will refer to the essence of peace. Unfortunately, I never learned Arabic and I will say [in my greeting] that I know that it is a rich language. On the other hand, I did some research and studying and I have found **form sages about** the difference between the two terms: "Salam" and "Sulcha". Both these words have one source. We want to have the essence of peace that in Arabic is "Sulcha" – meaning reconciliation. The implication is real peace and this is the peace we want. Then, I'll detail the content of peace from our perspective: peace treaty; diplomatic relations; free movement and mutual economic assistance.

A special clause in my speech will be on the ties of our people to the land. Here I intend to recount the story of the first exile and the return to Zion and discuss a quote from the Mandate

document.....

With regards to Geneva, I shall say that we want to convene and participate in the conference. We hope to reach an agreement with Sadat in order to make that conference become a reality. I shall also say that we want to conduct sincere and transparent negotiations without winners and losers, but as equals. Everything is fit for negotiations by the two sides. In response to Sadat position, total withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state, I'll say one sentence – without getting into a discussion – we cannot accept his proposals, he knows and knew before his visit, it threatens our survival. But we do want an open negotiation and everything can be negotiated, except the destruction of Israel.

In my speech I will not expand on issue of the PLO and will not delve into discussing the details of our position on that matter. I will say that Sadat knows that we cannot accept all of his proposals regarding withdrawal and a Palestinian state. I shall reiterate that we want to negotiate with our neighbors and that we have no intention to insert a wedge between them. We aspire to have a solution on all three fronts. We have always recognized the rights of the Arabs in Eretz Israel and on that issue we shall negotiate with Hussein and invite him to come over. We are prepared to sign a peace treaty with everybody and with each one separately. That is the extent of the hints I will say. If he [Hussein] proposes to have a peace treaty with us, we shall not reject him but we shall refrain from initiating a separate peace treaty.

I would like to address Syria's President and the Syrian people exclusively and directly. They declared a national morning. I shall tell them that the visit of the Egyptian President should be celebrated and that there is a basis for it. I shall say: I invite you, Assad, to also come to us and discuss the affair of war between us. By applying to him we shall reach others as well.

I intend to end my speech with a prayer for success. The main sentence should be; I pray that our ancestors' common god, ruler of heaven and earth, will instill wisdom in our heart to overcome obstacles and bring peace to our people, to yours and to the neighboring peoples.

We may now proceed with a discussion.

**Sharon:** In my opinion we have three options: first, to listen, respond in general terms and react in Cairo with a detailed plan. Second, make an attempt to reach some kind of an arrangement during this visit while conducting brief negotiations. Third, to make a dramatic gesture, followed by a serious discussion in the country –it requires a comprehensive and fundamental debate- and then arrive in Cairo with a complete plan.

I recommend the third option – making a dramatic gesture and going to Cairo with a plan of our own. When we are talking about a gesture, we have to make sure of a few things in the process: first, we should not, by our own initiative, cause a rift in the Arab World. There is certainly going to be one but we have nothing to be sorry about. Second, we should use the good services of the U.S. even though they realize that the breakthrough cannot be attributed solely to them. Third, we have to proceed on a subject that is backed by national consensus. We have to appear as initiators. If a step is taken, it is necessary to make sure that it does not impair Israel's security and it has to be on a stage that fits into the general framework of arrangements.

If we act according to these principles, I would like to point out a few issues that can be raised on the podium. These are, as follows: (1) it is necessary to emphasize that in addition to the Geneva Conference and contacts under American auspices, the road to proceed for peace is the by way of direct meetings between leaders that will set the principle tone of the negotiations. (2) Here is where the gesture comes about. We have no territorial issues with Egypt – and this should be emphasized in the Prime Minister's speech, it will have a wide spread echo – and I suggest as a

gesture to open Al-Arish for the Egyptians. I'm referring to a civilian aspect, not a military one. I will not go into details now but Al-Arish is known to every person in Egypt. The population there is about 20,000 and opening the city will bear evidence of Israel's intention since the city is the closest place to the 1967 borders. It will not impair on Israel's security and it falls within Israel's general plan for a comprehensive solution. This gesture will create a shock reaction. In another point, I suggest to not mention, even in a single word, the subject of the PLO. I propose we talk about the problems of the Arabs in Eretz Israel within negotiations with Jordan. We shall be happy if Hussein will come to us so we can discuss it. The solution to this problem is within a framework of negotiations with Jordan. We should look for a solution while changing the tone we use when dealing with the Palestinian issue; we should not hint at an intention to discuss a withdrawal in Judea and Samaria.

It is important to emphasize the willingness of the Prime Minister to visit Cairo and other Arab countries, to explain our point of view. Lastly, I propose another dramatic act by announcing that Israel's borders will be open to Egypt. The borders will be open to Egyptian ships, airplanes and vehicles. I suggest doing it even without reciprocity. We can mention that if their airplanes arrive to us for this visit, it could be continued. Together with this, we can offer scientific cooperation and students exchange programs etc.

I would keep the Al-Arish gesture for the last moment so we provide Sadat an achievement to return with.

**Tamir:** Arik saved me much of what I intended to say. I agree with almost everything that he said. As for Al-Arish it is not clear to me if it will be open for civilian or military purposes.

**Sharon:** I already said, civilian.

**Tamir:** My opinion is that for peace we must be ready to make a significant withdrawal in the Sinai. This is in compliance of the Government's policy, even before we joined it.

**Sharon:** To make it clear, I would like to emphasize that I'm referring to opening the road to Al-Arish proper.

**Tamir:** The main point I would like to emphasize today is my complete support of what the Prime Minister noted in regard to "Sulcha". It has been much discussed that Israel may propose the cancellation of the state of war situation. Yesterday, it was proven that all talks about the necessity of a cooling off period before reaching a peace are baseless. The meeting yesterday skipped the cooling off period.

**The PM:** This is why the meeting was cordial.

**Tamir:** It was at a level of Heads of States, it was in lower echelons and now it is within Israel and the people in Cairo. We should not lose this blessed momentum. The PM not only spoke about peace, but also about expanding our cooperation much further. I suggest extracting from our dictionary all the previous advice given to us. At the moment we only have to talk about a comprehensive peace. The thoughts that Arik [Sharon] brought up, including the opening of gates for ships and transportation, will meet the world's expectation of the vision of the State of Israel.

**Burg:** I feel that we are in an interim stage between discussing the speech and discussing the essence of the issue. Since the visit is a component of the issue, I would like to mention that previously the PM said that he wanted to talk about the Holocaust. I hope that it will done in right proportion.

If I understood Sharon correctly, the PM will relate to issues specifically and in some measures 'explosive'. My question is if it cannot be done by coordinated talks? Because if you announce and propose something that is more than a mere gesture, it will entail a material aspect along

with us not knowing how the other side may react. In other words, if you wish to give something, I suggest talking about it before with Sadat. Otherwise, the gesture may hang up in the air and might not be very pleasant.

**Erlich:** Since I did not participate in the previous meeting, I think that our risk is much bigger than Sadat's decision to come here for a visit. This is because I see the bigger risks. The PM's speech conveys policy. But, our risks are bigger with respect to the whole world. As far as the future of peace with Egypt, I'll say a couple of sentences: I totally support what was previously said by my colleagues. I suggest that we should open our doors towards the world and toward the President of Egypt, so that when he returns home he would be able to continue the dialogue with us, either in Geneva, Cairo, or Jerusalem; but all should see that we are committed to peace – and this, in my opinion is the central point. I agree that there is room to talk about issues that are within the national consensus and about Al-Arish, if it contributes anything. The talks should be about the termination of the state of war and about the PM visit to Cairo for the continuation of the talks...

**Modai:** There are issues that require reciprocity and others that can be executed unilaterally. I am not sure if opening Al-Arish can be done unilaterally. I do not reject it but it should not be made public today, before knowing Sadat's directions and intentions. There is always an opportunity to make it public upon Sadat's departure and it will not lose its impact. It seems to me that in the PM speech, they are missing subjects that we can propose unilaterally. The PM may have meant it when he talked about economic cooperation and so forth. It seems to me that technological cooperation has a larger impact. I propose that the PM include in his speech, in a clear fashion, the possibility of technological cooperation – and I mean agriculture, water, energy etc. I think that it will be noted by the world because of its long-term ramifications. I can see it evolving slowly while we develop cooperation even before we reach overall arrangements in the region...

**PM Begin:** I request that the Government decide on the following procedures: Yesterday Navon proposed to me that before Sadat's speech, and the two speeches that will be delivered in Hebrew, a greeting in Arabic will be delivered from the Knesset podium. If the Government approves, Navon is willing to deliver it. I told him that I shall bring it to the Government for a decision.

**Erlich:** I suggest no too. It's too provincial.

**Dayan:** This is not a wise suggestion. This is the last and only meeting that the Government will have not only before the speech in the Knesset, but also before the other talks that Sadat and his delegation will have after the initial contacts that took place yesterday with Egyptian delegation. I would like to comment about the closed talks and about the PM speech, the Egyptians' attitude is consisted of two principles: First, under no circumstances do they want a separate public gesture to be made to Egypt. It will put a burden on them. They are being blamed for aggrandizing themselves and Sadat wishes to emphasize that he came over as a representative of the Arab world. So, whatever we try to make public will only make it more difficult for him. I base my comments on answers that they gave in response to direct questions on that issue. Secondly, it may be demeaning. Sadat came for the big issues and we respond in something of less importance. He came here for the big thing, while risking himself, and we offer the opening of Al-Arish. He will argue: Did I come here for having a civilian access to Al-Arish? I came to talk about peace. I delivered such speech and you are telling me that I should have an access to Al-Arish?...

The Egyptians reiterated that the Palestinian issue stand on the top of their priorities. They are not authorized to talk for Syria, but they say that the Palestinian matter is the first issue – not

issues that are specifically, or partially Egyptian. In my opinion, the only thing that can be said publicly – and was already mentioned by Arik – is that we already have open bridges with Jordan and the ‘good fence’ with Lebanon, let us do the same at the Egyptian border. Then it will not be regarded as a gesture that was made specifically for Egypt. 120,000 people come every year from Jordan and we have an open connection to the north, so that can be done with Egypt as well. The intention is not for Israelis to travel to Egypt, but that the road is opened for the Egyptians.

**PM Begin:** On sea and on land.

**Dayan:**... In my opinion the private talks should relate to three imminent subjects.

The first is to pave the road towards the Geneva Conference. We have to ask them if they are interested and ready and from there we shall work on an accepted formula, so that Sadat may be able to tell the whole world: ‘I, Sadat, opened the road for the negotiations in the Geneva Conference’. He said publicly that procedures are not important to him, so let’s sit down and have a discussion on real issues. At the moment the whole process is frozen. To get it started again it will be necessary to engage the Americans.

The second subject has to do with the Palestinian issue. This issue is also jammed. I am glad that Sadat will meet with a delegation of the Arabs of Eretz Israel – and I speak only of representatives from the territories – so that he will be able to say: ‘I found a solution’ or ‘I met with the Arab delegation and there is some progress on the issue of Palestinian representation’. The third subject has to do with having the possibility of talking to him about the principles of an agreement solely with Egypt. There is no chance that in such a brief visit we shall reach full understanding. But it is imperative that we reach an agreement only on principles.

I hope that Sadat will invite the PM to Egypt, but if not, during his stay here, we should have a conversation with him on the principles that are essential for an agreement, and set the motion for continuation.

As for the speech – in my opinion it is best for us and for Sadat that in the PM’s response, following Sadat’s address, it should be mentioned - in addition to what the PM has mentioned already - that ‘we were very impressed by Sadat’s speech’.

**Yadin:** It is better to say that we have listened intently.

**Dayan:** Not only that we have listened, but complement him on what he said and on his desire to reach peace. There is no doubt that he will talk about peace and the proof for that assumption is based on the mere fact he came over.

We should also say that while we maintain our own firm positions on those issues mentioned in his speech, we do praise him for his courageous act; and ‘We shall add more thoughts to our previous positions. We should not say: ‘Whatever will be, will be’, but rather, ‘we should put in more thoughts’.

Lastly, if his speech includes issues that require us to express our opposition, we should do so without hesitation. I see three possible assertions that will require our response: First, if Sadat will say categorically ‘you have to return to the 1967 borders’ we ought to respond that it is not accepted by us, because the basic principle of [UN Resolution] 242 is that we do not have to retreat to the previous borders. If we ignore it then we are lending our hands to the collapse of the basic premise of 242. There is no way for us to avoid our response and we have to state it in a speech so that it could be heard around the world and no one will think that we reject the principle of withdrawal but also its formal foundation. Second, if Sadat declares, in clear and basic Arabic, something about the establishment of a Palestinian state, there is no other way but

reiterate our position against it. But if Sadat uses the term 'legitimate rights' we can live with it. Third, regarding the issue of the PLO; I hope that Sadat will say nothing on that matter. I propose – and that's my final comment – that if the PM, in his speech, invites Hussein to come here, or that he visit him, then the same should be said in regard to the President of Syria, the President of Lebanon and the representatives of the Arabs in the territories. The PM said already that we want to sit with the authentic representatives of the Arabs of Eretz Israel in order to discuss with them our neighborly relations, establishing cultural ties and create a real peace with them. If we omit this, after it was mentioned in a previous speech two-three days ago, it will stand out and may cause discomfort for Sadat; either we sit with them [the Arab representatives] or not.

**Amit:** I would like to relate to three points: First, if the issue comes up, I'm all for it being said 'no to a Palestinian state, but yes to an arrangement within a Jordanian framework'. And I propose to add the words 'with a special status for the Palestinians'. I think it can soften the issue at this stage. Second, I fully agree with the Foreign Minister [Dayan] regarding gestures that are directed solely for the benefit of Sadat. I suggest that such gesture may be to propose to build a sea port or an access to a port in the Mediterranean for Jordan. It can be in Ashdod, Gaza, or Yamit. I think it can be materialized as immediate gesture in the right direction and it does not negate our concept with regards to Jordan.

**Sharon:** The idea of Gaza does negate it. In my opinion, it is a mistake to link Judea and Samaria with Gaza. It is possible to propose Haifa, or Ashdod.

**Amit:** I agree on Ashdod. ... Third, I highly recommend, in the [PM] speech and the private talks, to discuss the procedures for normalization. It should be mentioned in the speech because this is what the world absorbs. We need to be purposeful. I may even suggest breaking into working groups.

**Horowitz:** I wish to relate to two possibilities that are still in question despite the broad enthusiasm: One is that Sadat's purpose in coming is place Israel, with his back against the wall, was to say to the entire world: 'I came, I made an effort, I am taking risks and I demand that my basic claims as a spokesman for the Arabs will be fulfilled. I demand an Arab [Palestinian] state, and Israel's withdrawal from all the territories. I am quite firm in my demands and Israel is adamant in its refusal. This presents us with a very difficult situation'. This possibility exists. He can say that today in the Knesset – reiterating his previous positions. So, this is one possibility. Another possibility is that he will pay a lip service to the Arab world and later on will deal with the agreement between Israel and Egypt. I think that already today during the meeting of the three, before his speech in the Knesset, you will be able to discern if his purpose is to talk about Israel-Egyptian dialogue, or as a representative of the entire Arab world on a mission that he assumed for himself.

**Amit:** We do not have to wait for the last moment. It is already clear that he does not speak only for Egypt.

**Horowitz:** If we will find out that he is persistent in regards to Israel's withdrawal and a third state [between Israel and Jordan], we are facing a tactical dilemma – how should we behave? In my opinion, we should not respond today in a negative fashion; we are forbidden from doing so, even though it is clear to us what our response should be. We should say that we are still forming our opinion and we shall discuss it further in a meeting in Cairo. Witnessing the general enthusiasm we should not respond negatively.

**PM Begin:** I think that Sadat is the last person who is interested in announcing that his mission has failed. If he will claim 'I was there; I tried' then he will admit it, in front of all Arabs, that he

failed and they might stone him to death. The continuation of meetings and direct telephone connections was already talked about last night.

**Horowitz:** I still have my suspicion in regards to him. He knows what our positions are...[the speaker reiterates his previous points] I hope that the process will be positive.

**Yadin:** In response to the PM comment on the meeting of the factions with Sadat, the problem is not simple, but is clear. As far as our faction is concerned, we have different opinions on a certain issue. **Some members phoned me and said that meeting together with the other factions of the Coalition, a representative of ours may wish to point out the differences in our approach.** Therefore, I'm inquiring if it is accepted that such an opinion be expressed in a general meeting, or separately.

**PM Begin:** If you decide to talk about issues that are not congruent with the national consensus and our Coalition agreement, it is your privilege. It is not an issue of freedom of expression. It is not written: 'in the meeting with Sadat'. I read today that the Alignment Faction decided not say anything controversial, but only speak of matters that all of us agree upon. At any rate, there will be one meeting.

**Yadin:** **That being that, unification** will be the common denominator. There are some members who exert pressure.

**PM Begin:** During the last few days, I have been telling myself not to say certain things in Sadat's presence; if only out of politeness, because he is a guest. I can tell him many things that he may not like to hear.

**Yadin:** There is a special sentence in your speech, that if you expand on, will be satisfactory. I think that it will be proper if you will say: 'we recognize the rights of the Arabs of Eretz Israel, and on that issue we wish to negotiate with [Hussein] and with them'. This version may provide me with the opportunity to tell my colleagues in my faction that there is no need to further expand on this issue. Also, I too think that all sorts of public gestures without proportion can be interpreted as an attempt by us to put a wedge. Those gestures may be part of the oncoming talks. As to what Dayan said about Geneva, we know that one of the principle points that will arise is the issue of the Palestinians. It is imperative to arrive at a solution between you and Sadat in regard to their representation.

**Zipori:** Why not with Hussein.

**Yadin:** If what the Foreign Minister said is true - and I have no doubt in it - that he will publicly put the emphasis not on the bilateral relations between Israel and Egypt but on the above mentioned point problems. I propose that the PM respond to Sadat by saying: 'I hope that you and I could find a solution that will make convening in Geneva possible'. This is extremely significant and will have a much larger impact on the world than discussing one territorial issue or another. I propose that it should be mentioned again that we are going to Geneva only on the basis of [Resolutions] 242 and 338. As for the representation of the PLO, it is well understood [what are position is]. One last matter to consider - you said that you will say few things to Assad in a rhetorical address. I suspect that if we supposedly protect Sadat from Assad, it will not look good. It should be said in such a way that it will not be perceived as such, because it is a sensitive matter...

**Pat:** I supposed that after Sadat's speech today, the PM will find it necessary to add points and ideas in his speech, and I propose that the Government should back him on all issues that may come up between 12 and 5 PM. I also accept the Foreign Minister's analysis that it is not necessary now to present gestures about sea ports and Arab cities and so forth. The only subject that we may talk about will be the opening of borders, modeled after our Eastern border. I do not

speaking about the Northern border because it is where we are only giving and there is reciprocity, and we wish to discuss a continuance of mutual assistance.

**Dayan:** Do we get anything in return from an open border with Jordan? Are Israelis allowed to cross it?

**Pat:** You have spoken a few times about exporting agricultural goods from the West Bank and that it solved problems.

**Dayan:** The same applies to the border with Lebanon.

**Pat:** I want to relate to technical point that we have not discussed, I'm deeply concerned about the factions meeting with Sadat. In my opinion the Coalition should sit together. I am concerned because who will be the spokesman for the factions. I know that Rabin, Peres and Alon will speak for the Alignment, but who will speak for the other factions? Who are the members that are capable of representing the other factions? This is why I suggest that all the Coalition Factions appear as one group and then it would be respectable. We have to decide now, in what way the factions will meet with Sadat.

**Zipori:** Mr. PM, in my opinion, the framework of your speech, as you perceive it, is good. The speech deals with principle issues and does not refer to any obligation. I would recommend remaining within this framework. As for gestures and obligations these should come later on as a result of the talks and especially the one-on-one meeting. Our position with regards to Judea and Samaria and a Palestinian state are clear and should be part of the forum discussions. As for the Arabs of Eretz Israel, it seems that it would be an exception if a dialogue on that issue were to come up between Egypt and us. It should be noted that we are ready to talk to them on that issue in general fashion, because we have closer partners to discuss it with, rather than with the Egyptian perspective. In the event that the talks are positive, we shall publicize their contents. There is an additional forum that is designated for it and it is the press conference that will be held tomorrow by the PM and the President of Egypt.

**Shostak:** If I received the right impression, it means that Sadat will raise the three issues that he has already talked about and our response should be that we do not accept them. I suspect that the general impression after the speech will be that these issues are supposedly new. And it will be said that the Government of Israel rejected all of Sadat's proposals. Therefore, I suggest that if he talks about the withdrawal from all the territories, the response should be that that issue should be included in the agenda of the Geneva Conference. I do not suggest that we should promptly respond that there are Resolutions 242 and 338. We should not say anything concrete, but rather give a general statement that the issue will be discussed in Geneva.

**PM Begin:** This may be interpreted as if we are ready to agree with his proposals.

**Shostak:** It will be regarded that Israel is ready for negotiations. And this is exactly what you say; that it is open for negotiations.

**PM Begin:** I said it before his arrival, but he is already here. Can he come here and demand three things that the whole world knows are unacceptable. He dares, and he is using the Knesset podium to tell [those things] the Knesset Members and we should hide?

**Shostak:** In any case, he is our guest and should enjoy the privilege **to us the harshest things**. I suggest not accepting it. I suggest that you say that it will be discussed in the next stages, during the negotiations in the Geneva Conference. If he raises the subject of the PLO there is no international hazard for us to react. It is known the world over. I'm deeply concerned, Mr. PM what will happen if we react to him instantaneously.

**PM Begin:** We are all anxious. We all wish to have grounds for a good impression and contact. We all wish to win favorable public opinion. But here you are touching an issue that is linked to



the future of our people. If we leave some doubt in Washington, we shall begin to slide downward and we don't know where it will end. I also told the American Ambassador: 'no one can force me on that issue'. The Americans know that [Resolution] 242 does not require total withdrawal. These things are the essence of our position. If he says it in public, should we hide under the table?

**Dayan:** Then we shall be blamed for deceiving him. We can't leave it open and later on, all of a sudden, we shall claim: 'what withdrawal?'

**PM Begin:** What Sadat said was that total withdrawal is not negotiable. I say: 'Negotiable by both sides'.

**Shostak:** If it is negotiable, then it okay. But don't mention 242 and 338.

**Katz:** I have two comments to make following the friendly conversation that I had with the [Egyptian] Minister of Labor and two members of the [Egyptian] National Council, one of which is a member of the Opposition. Though Dayan mentioned it, I would like to emphasize the danger of putting a wedge. As we all heard from various sources the importance of this event is that this is the first time that there is direct contact without a mediator and it is coming from a great Arab nation. These two factors are very important. We have to make every effort to cultivate the direct contact, especially because we were also partners to the initiative.

**Hammer:** From a certain perspective and in some measure the discussion today is theoretical and hypothetical. We do not know what Sadat is planning and what he expects to be the outcome of his visit. Therefore, I suggest that we should have an additional meeting of the Government during these days, after things are cleared out.

**PM Begin:** I shall try.

**Tamir:** It seems to me from the initial points that were made by the Foreign Minister, from what the PM said in the previous meeting and his answers to Shostak, that the PM's message will be positive. I have no doubt that the PM can find many ways to express things positively. Even if they will not become concrete, it is imperative that they be positive in nature. Second, when it comes to this Government and this PM there is no doubt that it will be universally interpreted in proper fashion, even if we accept those positions that are regarded as negative. The PM has the capability to express his words in a way that we otherwise would not approve if said by another PM.

**PM Begin:** Based on the proposals of Sharon and Dayan, this is what should be said publicly: 'Mr. President, let us open the borders of countries, you will be able to visit us and we will be able to visit you. You will be able to extend your visit from Al-Arish and up to the good fence in the north.' I think that this is a good solution. I don't underestimate the importance of Al-Arish.

**Yadin:** Is there a hint here for a drawn line?

**Pm Begin:** I emphasize here the concept of open borders.

**Dayan:** Why not Gaza? Why is a Jordanian allowed to come to Nablus and an Egyptian is not allowed to come to Gaza?

**PM Begin:** Al-Arish is the only city in all the area from the Suez Canal. The rest is desert. I propose that they come to us and we visit them and I give it as an example of open borders; and this is even before we enter negotiations for a peace treaty.

**Dayan:** This is more or less what we have with Jordan. With Jordan we have no peace treaty and not even negotiations and despite of it, 120,000 came as far as Tel-Aviv.

**PM Begin:** I do not want to make comparisons. It will be sufficed if I say: 'Let us open the borders, you come to us, and we come to you, even before we sign a peace treaty'. Here, even now, the Egyptians came. This will be a real gesture and it should be mutual.

**Tamir:** If it is mutual, he will say that this is a part of the negotiations. If it remains one sided, then it is mutual.

**PM Begin:** I want to propose it even before stating the negotiation on the issue of open borders. This is a nice gesture.

**Yadin:** It will be a gesture if we open the borders and they don't.

**PM Begin:** **Do we have to invite the Egyptians and** we would not be able to go to them.

**Dayan:** Even to Jordan we cannot go.

**PM Begin:** When I say let us open our countries for reciprocal movement, it is very positive. Do we have to propose a one-sided gesture? If he insists on it, I don't have to reject it.

**Erlich:** Are all the members of the factions participating, or only representatives?

**PM Begin:** All members with the exception of representatives of the Government. This is a parliamentary meeting. It would be overly exaggerated if members of the Government participate as well.

**Yadin:** It is a pity. If we were to participate, we would have set the tone.

**Hammer:** Maybe Ministers that are not members of the Knesset Committee on Security and Foreign Affairs should participate.

**PM Begin:** Why should we discuss it? We meet with him as a Government. There is a Government and there is a Parliament. They might say that we came to supervise them.

**Yadin:** I can say, about our faction, that if Katz and or Tamir participate, it would upgrade the level of the meeting.

**Erlich:** We are referring to Ministers who are not members of this Knesset Committee.

**Burg:** I support the Erlich. There are indeed some ministers who will have dinner with them, but there are Ministers that are not members of the Committee and their presence in the factions' meeting will add factors of guidance, spurring and restraint.

**PM Begin:** So be it. I would like to report to the Government, and I hope there will be a consensus. We meet with them [the Egyptians] at noon for a working-practical meeting for the first time. Hospitality dictates that they should have the privilege of presenting the opening remarks. But later on, if Sadat proposes certain issues, we should initiate a discussion about the substance of peace. This will give us the opportunity to present him with our draft for a peace treaty. There is no reason why we should not present it to him, even though the Americans already gave a copy of it to the Egyptians. But there is a difference between the two presentations. We have to discuss the issue of peace; if there are territorial problems, they will be part of the negotiations for peace.

**Dayan:** As for another Government meeting, I understand that it will be convened if the PM finds it necessary.

**PM Begin:** The Government bears responsibility and I share all issues with it.

**Tamir:** If Sadat is going to say harsh things, I think we should conclude that there will be no applause. We cannot listen to such words and applaud.

**PM Begin:** This is a matter of etiquette. I hope that there will be applause for Peres as well.

**Hammer:** Are you going to give him presents?

**PM Begin:** I will give him two antique presents – one from the period of our ancestors that I will inscribe on it: 'To the President of Egypt our highly esteemed guest, from our ancestors 'era; our common forefathers'. The second present will be from the Maccabeans period; the hint is very obvious.

**Decisions:**

- A. Approving the outline of the PM speech in the Knesset.

- B. To initiate a discussion on the substance and meaning of peace.
- C. Ministers who are not members of the Knesset Committee on Security and Foreign Affairs will participate in the factions meetings with the President of Egypt.

**Meeting is adjourned.**

**State archive: 4270/1 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/AB8F1C24-D772-4B46-9347-88F07963797C/0/Egypt27.pdf>

## **Address of Prime Minister Menachem Begin to the Knesset**

### **Welcoming President Anwar Sadat**

(Source of English version: The Knesset)

November 20, 1977, 4 PM

Mr. Speaker, Honorable President of the State of Israel, Honorable President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Worthy and Learned Knesset Members:

We send our greetings to the President and to all adherents of the Islamic faith, in our own country and wherever they may be, on the occasion of the Feast of Sacrifice, Id el-Adha.

This feast reminds us of the binding of Isaac on the altar, the test which the Creator tried the faith of our forefather Abraham - our common father. The challenge presented to Abraham, from the point of view of morality and the advancement of Mankind, heralded the principle of a ban on human sacrifice. Our two Peoples, in their ancient tradition, learned and taught that humanitarian prohibition, while the nations around us continued to offer human sacrifices to their idols. Thus, we, the People of Israel and the Arab People contributed the advancement of Mankind, and we continue to contribute to human civilization until this very day.

I greet the President of Egypt on the occasion of his visit to our country and his participation in this session of the Knesset. The duration of the flight from Cairo to Jerusalem is short but, until last night, the distance between them was infinite. President Sadat showed courage in crossing this distance. We Jews can appreciate courage, as exhibited by our guest, because it is with courage that we arose and with it we shall continue to exist.

Mr. Speaker, this small People, the surviving remnant of the Jewish People which returned to our historic Homeland, always sought peace. And, when the dawn of our freedom rose on the 14th of

May, 1948, the 4th of Iyar, 5708, David Ben-Gurion said, in the Declaration of Independence, the charter of our national independence:

"We extend our hand to all neighboring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighborliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish People settled in their own Land."

A year earlier, in the midst of the fateful struggle for the liberation of the Land and the redemption of the Nation, while still in the underground we issued the following call to our neighbors:

"Let us live together in this Land and together advance toward a life of freedom and happiness. Our Arab neighbors - do not reject the hand which is outstretched to you in peace."

But it is my duty - my duty Mr. Speaker, and not only my privilege - to assert today, in truth, that our hand, extended in peace, was rejected. And, one day after our independence was renewed, in accordance with our eternal and indisputable right, we were attacked on three fronts, and we stood virtually without arms - few against many, weak against strong. One day after the declaration of our independence, an attempt was made to strangle it with enmity, and to extinguish the last hope of the Holocaust and Resurrection generation of the Jewish People.

No, we do not believe in might, and we have never based our relations with the Arab Nations on force. On the contrary, force was exercised against us. Throughout all the years of this generation, we have never ceased to be attacked with brute force in order to destroy our Nation, to demolish our independence, to annul our right and we have had to defend ourselves.

True, we defended our right, our existence, our honour, our women and our children against recurrent attempts to crush us by brute force, and not on one front alone. This, too, is true; with the help of God we overcame the forces of aggression and assured the survival of our nation, not only for this generation, but also for all those to come.

We do not believe in might; we believe in right, and only in right. And that is why our aspiration, from the depths of our hearts, from time immemorial until this very day, is peace.

Mr. President, in this democratic chamber sit commanders of all the Hebrew underground fighting organizations. They were compelled to conduct a battle of few against many, against a mighty world power. Here sit our top military commanders, who led their forces in a battle that was imposed on them, and to a victory that was inevitable, because they defended right. They belong to various parties, and have different outlooks. But I am sure, Mr. President, that I am expressing the views of them all, without exception, when I say that we have one aspiration at heart, one desire in our souls, and we are all united in this aspiration and this desire - to bring peace; a peace to our nation which has not been known for even one day since the beginning of the Return to Zion; a peace to our neighbors to whom we wish all the best. We believe that if we achieve peace, true peace, we shall be able to assist one another in all realms of life, and a new era will be opened in the Middle East: an era of flourishing and growth, of development and progress, and of advancement, as in ancient times.

Therefore, allow me today to define the meaning of peace as we understand it. We seek a true, full peace, with absolute reconciliation between the Jewish People and the Arab People. We must not permit memories of the past stand in our way. There have been wars; blood has been shed; our wonderful sons have fallen in battle on both sides. We shall always cherish the memory of our heroes who gave their lives so that **this day, even this day**, might come. We respect the valor of an adversary, and we pay tribute to all members of the young generation of the Arab Nation who have fallen as well.

Let us not be daunted by memories of the past, even if they are bitter to us all. We must overcome them, and focus on what lies ahead: on our Peoples, on our children, on our common future. For, in this region, we shall all live together - the Great Arab Nation in its States and its countries and the Jewish People in its Land, Eretz Israel - forever and ever. For this reason the meaning of peace must be defined.

As free men, Mr. President, let us conduct negotiations for a peace treaty and, with the help of God, so we believe with all our hearts, the day will come when we will sign it, with mutual respect. Then we will know that the era of wars has ended, that we have extended a hand to one another, that we have shaken each other's hand, and that the future will be glorious for all the Peoples of the region. Of prime significance, therefore, in the context of a peace treaty is a termination of the state of war.

I agree, Mr. President, that you have not come here and we did not invite you to our country in order, as has been suggested in recent days, to drive a wedge between the Arab Peoples or, expressed more cleverly, in accord with the ancient saying, "divide et imperia." Israel has no desire to rule and does not wish to divide. We want peace with all our neighbors - with Egypt and with Jordan, with Syria and with Lebanon.

There is no need to differentiate between a peace treaty and the termination of the state of war. We neither propose this, nor do we seek it. On the contrary, the first article of a peace treaty determines the end of the state of war, forever. We wish to establish normal relations between us, as exist among all nations after all wars. We have learned from history, Mr. President, that war is avoidable. It is peace that is inevitable.

Many nations have waged war against one another, and sometimes they have made use of the foolish term "eternal enemy." There are no eternal enemies. After all wars comes the inevitable, peace. Therefore, in the context of a peace treaty, we seek to stipulate the establishment of diplomatic relations, as is customary among civilized nations.

Today, Jerusalem is bedecked with two flags - the Egyptian and the Israeli. Together, Mr. President, we have seen our little children waving both flags. Let us sign a peace treaty and establish such a situation forever, both in Jerusalem and in Cairo. I hope the day will come when Egyptian children will wave Israeli and Egyptian flags together, just as Israeli children are waving both of these flags together in Jerusalem; when you, Mr. President, will be represented by a loyal Ambassador in Jerusalem, and we, by an Ambassador in Cairo, should differences of opinion arise between us, we will clarify them, like civilized peoples, through our authorized emissaries.

We propose economic cooperation for the development of our countries. God created marvelous lands in the Middle East - virtual oases in the desert - but there are also deserts, and these can be made fertile. Let us join hands in facing this challenge and cooperate in developing our countries, in abolishing poverty, hunger and homelessness. Let us raise our nations to the status of developed countries, so that we may no longer be called developing states.

With all due respect, I am prepared to endorse the words of His Highness, the King of Morocco, who said publicly, that, if peace were to be established in the Middle East, the combination of Arab and Jewish genius could together convert the region into a paradise on earth.

Let us open our countries to free movement, so that you shall come to us and we will visit you. I am prepared today to announce, Mr. Speaker that our country is open to the citizens of Egypt, and I do not qualify this announcement with any condition on our part. I think it would be only be proper and just that there be a mutual announcement on this matter. And, just as Egyptian flags are flying in our streets, there is also an honored Egyptian delegation in our capital and in our country today. Let there be many visitors. Our border will be open to you, just as all the other borders, for, as I noted, we would like the same situation to prevail in the south, in the north and in the east.

Therefore, I renew my invitation to the President of Syria to follow in your footsteps, Mr. President, and to come to our country to begin negotiations on the establishment of peace between Israel and Syria and on signing a peace treaty between us. I am sorry to say, there is no justification for the mourning that has been decreed on the people on other side of our northern border. On the contrary, such visits, such contacts and discussions, can and should be a cause of happiness, a cause of elation for all peoples.

I invite King Hussein to come here and we shall discuss with him all the problems that exist between us. I also invite genuine spokesmen of the Palestinian Arabs to come and hold talks with us on our common future, on guaranteeing human freedom, social justice, peace and mutual respect.

And, if they should invite us to come to their capitals, we shall respond to their invitation. Should they invite us to begin negotiations in Damascus, Amman or Beirut, we shall go to those capitals in order to negotiate there. We do not wish to divide. We seek true peace with all our neighbors to be expressed in peace treaties, the context of which shall be as I have already clarified.

Mr. Speaker, it is my duty today to tell our guests and all the nations who are watching us and listening to our words about the bond between our People and this Land. The President mentioned the Balfour Declaration. No, sir, we took no foreign land. We returned to our Homeland. The bond between our People and this Land is eternal. It was created at the dawn of human history. It was never severed. In this Land, we established our civilization; here our prophets spoke those holy words you cited this very day; here the Kings of Judah and Israel prostrated themselves; here we became a nation; here we established our Kingdom and, when we were exiled from our country by the force that was exercised against us, even when we were far away, we did not forget this Land; not even for a single day. We prayed for it; we longed for it; we have believed in our return to it ever since the day these words were spoken:

"When the Lord brought back the captivity of Zion we were like those who dream. Then our mouth was filled with laughter and our tongue with joyful shouting."

That song applies to all our exiles, to all our sufferings, and to the consolation that the Return to Zion would surely come.

This, our right, has been recognized. The Balfour Declaration was included in the Mandate which was recognized by the nations of the world, including the United States of America. And the preamble to that authoritative international document states:

"Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the Jewish people based on their historical connection with Palestine (or, in Hebrew, 'Eretz Israel') and on the grounds of reconstituting their National Home in that country (that is, in 'Eretz Israel')..."

In 1919, we also gained recognition of this right from the spokesman of the Arab People. The agreement of 3 January 1919, signed by Emir Feisal and Chaim Weizmann, states:

"Mindful of the racial kinship and ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish People, and realizing that the surest means of working out the consummation of their national aspirations is through the closest possible collaboration in the development of the Arab State and of Palestine..."

Afterwards, follow all the articles on cooperation between the Arab State and Eretz Israel. That is our right; its fulfillment - the truth.

What happened to us when our Homeland was taken from us? I accompanied you this morning, Mr. President, to Yad Vashem. With your own eyes you saw what the fate of our People was when this Homeland was taken from it. It is an incredible story. We both agreed, Mr. President, that whoever has not himself seen what is found in Yad Vashem cannot understand what befell this People when it was homeless, robbed of its own Homeland. And we both read a document dated 30 January 1939, in which the word "vernichtung" appears - "if war breaks out the Jewish race in Europe will be annihilated." Then, too, we were told to pay no heed to such words. The whole world heard. No one came to our rescue; not during the nine critical, fateful months following this announcement - the likes of which had never been heard since God created man and man created Satan - and not during those six years when millions of our people, among them a million and a half small Jewish children were slaughtered in every possible way.

No one came to our rescue, not from the East and not from the West. And therefore we, this entire generation, the generation of Holocaust and Resurrection, swore an oath of allegiance: never again shall we endanger our People; never again will our wives and our children - whom it is our duty to defend, if need be even at the cost of our own lives - be put in the devastating range of enemy fire.

And further: ever since then it has been, and will continue to be, our duty, for generations to come, to remember that certain things said about our People are to be related to with all

seriousness. We must not, Heaven forbid, for the future of our People, accept any advice suggesting that we not take such words seriously.

President Sadat knows, as he knew from us before he came to Jerusalem, that our position concerning permanent borders between us and our neighbors differs from his. However, I call upon the President of Egypt and upon all our neighbors: do not rule out negotiations on any subject whatsoever. I propose, in the name of the overwhelming majority of this Parliament, that everything will be negotiable. Anybody who says that, in the relationship between the Arab People - or the Arab Nations in the area - and the State of Israel there are subjects that should be excluded from negotiations, is assuming an awesome responsibility. Everything is negotiable. No side shall say the contrary. No side shall present prior conditions. We will conduct the negotiations with respect.

If there are differences of opinion between us, that is not exceptional. Anyone who has studied the history of wars and the annals of peace treaties knows that all negotiations for peace treaties have begun with differences of opinion between the parties concerned, and that, in the course of the negotiations, they have reached solutions which have made possible the signing of agreements or peace treaties. That is the path we propose to follow.

We shall conduct the negotiations as equals. There are no vanquished and there are no victors. All the Peoples of the region are equal, and all will relate to each other with respect. In this spirit of openness, of readiness of each to listen to the other - to facts, reasons, explanations - with every reasonable attempt at mutual persuasion - let us conduct the negotiations as I have asked and propose to open them, to conduct them, to continue them persistently until we succeed, in good time, in signing a peace treaty between us.

We are prepared, not only, to sit with representatives of Egypt and with representatives of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon - if it so desires - at a Peace Conference in Geneva. We proposed that the Geneva Conference be renewed on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338 of the Security Council. However, should problems arise between us prior to the convening of the Geneva Conference, we will clarify them today and tomorrow and, if the President of Egypt will be interested in continuing to clarify them in Cairo - all the better; if on neutral ground - no opposition. Anywhere. Let us clarify - even before the Geneva Conference convenes - the problems that should be made clear before it meets, with open eyes and a readiness to listen to all suggestions.

Allow me to say a word about Jerusalem. Mr. President, today you prayed in a house of worship sacred to the Islamic faith, and from there you went to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. You witnessed the fact, known to all who come from throughout the world, that, ever since this city was joined together, there is absolutely free access, without any interference or obstacle, for the members of all religions to their holy places. This positive phenomenon did not exist for 19 years. It has existed now for about 11 years, and we can assure the Moslem world and the Christian world - all the nations - that there will always be free access to the holy places of every faith. We shall defend this right of free access, for it is something in which we believe - in the equality of rights for every man and every citizen, and in respect for every faith.



Mr. Speaker, this is a special day for our Parliament, and it will undoubtedly be remembered for many years in the annals of our Nation, in the history of the Egyptian People, and perhaps, also, in the history of nations.

And on this day, with your permission, worthy and learned Members of the Knesset, I wish to offer a prayer that the God of our common ancestors will grant us the requisite wisdom of heart in order to overcome the difficulties and obstacles, the calumnies and slanders. With the help of God, may we arrive at the longed-for day for which all our people pray - the day of peace.

For indeed, as the Psalmist of Israel said, "Righteousness and peace have kissed," and, as the prophet Zechariah said, "Love truth and peace."

**Addendum: Begin's handwritten draft of his speech (in Hebrew & English)**

State archive: 43449/2 - 8

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/88D199B7-8D09-4A0E-A9B4-DB7C7C858058/0/Egypt27APP.pdf>

**A summary of Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan of a lunch meeting with President Sadat and the Egyptian delegation**

Jerusalem, 20, 1977

**Top Secret**

The Foreign Minister dictates this rundown of this meeting to Eli Rubinstein:

Present: **Prime Minister, Yigal Yadin, Moshe Dayan.** On the Egyptian: **Sadat, Dr. Mustafa Khalil, and Dr. Butros Ghali.**

I told Begin about Carter's telegram (that it imperative to be flexible etc.) and he did not like it and he is determined that we don't relate to Carter's suggestions. As for the conversation that took place [during lunch] I do not remember exactly what Israelis said; I don't think they said anything important.

Begin suggested to Sadat to open the meeting and Sadat responded humorously that he visited Moscow four times and they told him that it is the duty of the guest to make the opening remarks and that is my he accepts this gesture. 'You have received my message and you actually know what I wish to say'. Then it was Begin's turn a talk and he spoke in general terms that we want peace and negotiations. Yadin asked 'what is behind your message?' and Dr. Mustafa (one of the Deputies of Egypt's Prime Minister) said that 'we don't want to give the impression that we are conducting direct negotiations with you'. he have said it in response to Begin's suggestion to have a direct red line similar to the one that was operative for twenty years between Russia and the U.S. he said: 'don't propose anything that might suggest that we are doing something

separate'. Sadat said: Moshe, what have you got to say', ...and I responded that I have two questions: one is what do you wish for us to say here so that when you leave your visit will not be considered a failure because the whole world is watching you taking this step. What should we do so that the visit will be a success?' I also asked 'I assume that you don't expect us to say aye, aye sir, to everything. What do expect that we should say so it will be a good visit? As to the second question – after Begin said that we are ready to discuss procedures, Sadat responded: 'I am not interested in procedures or working papers and I mean what I say'. The Prime Minister and I were under the impression, because of Carter's letter, that Sadat will relate to it. Sadat said: 'I'm interested in substance, but there should be proper preparations, otherwise it might result in failure'. I responded: you are interested in work and not in a paper. And he responded that this was exactly what he meant. I then asked him how you would like to make the preparations. As for Geneva there are three principle issues. I said that I don't think that Lebanon will be a problem, but Syria, Egypt and the Palestinians constitute a problem. Which way should we discuss those issues here with you before convening in Geneva. Secondly, I want to make sure that I understand what you mean by saying that you want discussions on substance first, and later on procedures? Do you mean not to deal with procedures at all? He responded: 'exactly'. I pressured him (this time I was less impressed with him than yesterday. His thoughts were not systematic, he had to contemplate; he did not have an answer off hand). I asked if he wants to discuss it now and responded in the affirmative stressing that this is why he came over, to push matters forward. As for my first question he said that he wants us to say what we are ready to do, and what not, and later on we shall deal with clarifications. Begin took a deep breath and seemed relieved. No one else dared to ask such question. In response to my second question he said that he is ready to discuss the essential issues...let us start. I said that I suggest that we should begin here and decide where and how we shall proceed, but he did not commit himself to anything beyond saying that we should go to Geneva better prepared, but he did not give the technical answer as to when. I responded that the Americans are repeatedly asking us about procedures, and he said that he does not care because the Americans are concerned about themselves. I asked him if he wishes to make preparation with the Syrians and the Jordanians, without the Americans; and if such is the case it will be pre-Geneva but instead of it. He did not have a decisive answer, but said that he is ready to give up on the others – if they wish they may participate, if not – they don't have to.

Yadin then remarked that every so often 'we are getting stressed about various news and rumors about military preparedness, and maybe we should make an arrangement to transmit mutual messages.' Sadat responded in a non-committed way by saying: 'why not?' Yadin later asked Dayan if he has any comment regarding his remark remarks and Dayan said that it was bad and explained that Sadat is an Arab and if we conspire to do something with him and it will be publicized it well be ill-received by the Arab world and he would be blamed by neglecting overall Arabs' interests.

Dayan then mentioned that he suggested to Begin an idea that he [Dayan] later reversed his opinion about placing a green flag [a color that is being associated with Islam] on the Omar Mosque [on the Temple Mount]. Dayan added that he mentioned it to Sadat and remarked to him that he [Sadat] may object to it, by claiming that h came to make peace and we present him tokens. Begin responded to Dayan that it is impossible to put such a flag in area of the Temple Mount.

Dayan added that his impression is that Sadat expects to discuss substantive issues, and if not in Geneva no other alternative framework has been suggested.

Dayan assessed that if Sadat is ready for a dialogue it is for the better but Dayan mentioned that many forums have discussed various issues in the past four months and only he has clear and comprehensive thoughts. Arik's [Sharon] lines are a flop, Dayan said.

Sadat cannot extend his visit [Yadin suggested it] but it was agreed that it will be announced that there will be additional meetings and that there will be joint discussions before the convening of the Geneva conference. (Sadat has not proposed yet that there will be a reciprocal visit [of Begin to Egypt]).

During the meeting, it was Sadat who talked. Ghali did not utter a single word. Mustafa remarked that they prefer not to give the impression that peace is being made solely between Israel and Egypt. With regards to Geneva Sadat said that it is impossible to conduct negotiations under the scrutiny of televisions. The main issue was that instead of discussing procedures for Geneva, there will be a preparatory negotiation about substance.

**Summary written by:** Elyakim Rubinstein.

**State archive:** 6911/2 - זת

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/20EB8D08-4BA5-4580-9671-C08303F1EA2F/0/Egypt28.pdf>

### **The Knesset**

#### **The meeting of the President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat with members of the Coalition factions**

(Verbatim)

November 21, 1977

#### **President Sadat:**

Really it is a great occasion for me to meet with you. I asked for this myself. I asked to meet you in the Knesset as the representatives of the Israeli people. I want to send through you to the Israeli people our message from Egypt. As you know, from time to time I have worked as a Speaker for our Parliament; two sessions, two and a half sessions, it was for about ten years. My main aim when I came was to sit with you and open a discussion on all the issues that we have. I have heard with great interest all you have said now but let me be frank with you because when I asked to come here, I asked to come to the Knesset, to you. Let me tell you, in all honesty, I don't agree with a lot that I have heard just now here. This is quite natural in a democracy. I heard about the Palestinian state, about security, about the land of the Sinai. One of the deputies spoke about and then our friend here friend here spoke about keeping the momentum that we have already started by this step when I came to you.

I must tell you also in all honesty, I would have liked to open this discussion and stay with you for 24 hours, or whatever it takes to discuss every issue, but you know the time is limited and I think we should not lose our time. What is our target today? Our target is to end or bring down

the great barrier that has always separated us and has built distrust; has built bitterness. My main aim, after all the discussions that I thought we were going to continue here, was to end this state of distrust between us, and as I said yesterday when I was addressing you in the plenary session that in the past yes, we did not agree to your being here but now I came here to tell you that we agree. It is a very long history if we are going to defend every point. I have heard from the deputies but as I said let us concentrate on the main issue. What is the main issue now? it should be security for Israel. I quite agree with you. I said it yesterday before you in the Knesset. We agree. In this respect, as I said yesterday, we are ready and we have no objection to do whatever measures that can be agreed upon to provide you with a full security. We gave no objection at all against this. On the contrary, as I said, whatever measures will be taken, we shall be asking for the same things for ourselves also.

The other issue is, the October War should be the last war; (applause). If we agree on these two principles – security and no war again – whatever happen can be solved through peaceful negotiations or peaceful means. If we agree that these are the main concern for you, they are concerns for us also, for me. Let us stop all that I have heard here and let us concentrate on those two main issues – full security, no solving of whatever happens between us through war – that means that the October War is the last forever.

I think if we have this task, we will really be approaching the problem from the proper approach. I should like to tell you, because I came here to address you and to discuss with you – confidence should be built, so that we can keep the momentum that our friends talked about.

From our side – I tell you this. The first point, security – we agree to whatever measures will be taken. Either it is demilitarized zone in a reciprocal basis, or it is early warning stations, on a reciprocal basis also; guarantees from whatever body you like or you agree to – we have no objection at all. United Nations forces – all this.

But in all frankness, let me tell you this. You should face the realities of this very difficult problem. And in all honesty also, I must tell you this. You have to take very decisive decisions built on two main issues: security and no war again. Most of these decisions will be hard, but you must take it and you must take your responsibility not only to this generation, but to coming generations, to give every young man we have, and every girl, the opportunity to build happy family in peace and goodwill. And let us hope or I am praying really, that God guides you in your decision. And, as I told you, they will be very hard decisions, but the example of myself, of my coming here to face you while still...this has never happened in history, that two countries are in a state of war, and you are even occupying part of my land. And then I come here and discuss with you, and address you, and tell you my opinion, and everyone gave his speech; the Leader of the Opposition also gave his speech; I gave my speech.

You have hard decision to take, and we also have hard decisions to take. Let this be the proper approach to the problem, to the conflict in this area. And I am sure the blessing of God, of every woman, every widow, and every young man who has hopes for the future – all this will guide us to the proper decision, at the proper time. Thank you very much; (applause).

Meeting adjourned.

**State archive: 4172/14 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/1C5C7FAE-5F16-4A81-83D9-3A85CCF932DE/0/Egypt30.pdf>

## **Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan converse with PM Begin**

November 21, 1977

### **Top Secret**

#### **Begin's talks about his impressions of his Meeting with Sadat.**

The Foreign Minister meets with the Prime Minister in the morning (after Begin had one on one meeting with Sadat).

Dayan then recounted:

The PM is happy.

Ezer (Weizmann met with Sadat. They set a meeting between Ezer and Gammasi with regards to taking measures to prevent an eruption of unnecessary [military] flare-ups.

Sadat told Ezer – there will be no war. I hold to my word. I told Begin – warn Ezer not to prattle.

Only two weeks ago Sadat said that it will horrible and suddenly a letdown. Begin said: yes, this is correct. But Begin himself declares to the press that the war has ended.

It was not finalize how the meeting of Ezer and Gammasi will be conducted.

Sadat told Begin that he wants me to meet with Tuhami and talk business. He said that he want me to continue with the talks. He prefers Morocco. Begin responded that we promised Ceaucesco.

The Foreign Minister added: I [Begin] told Sadat - Morocco or Teheran. And the best place is Teheran; because in order to get to Morocco it is necessary to pass Paris.

Romania is an official visit and besides, the Romanian and the Russians will eavesdrop.

Begin said that this was the result of his conversation with Sadat and it was decided that the talks should continue with Tuhami.

I [Dayan] asked if a date was set. But Begin said no, but soon.

The PM in his conversation with Dayan mentioned his [Begin's] possible visit to Egypt. During the conversation of Barbara Walters with Sadat she asked him if he will invite the Prime Minister, and Sadat responded that he is ready to invite him to Sinai. Begin said that he can invite Sadat to visit the Sinai, and Dayan remarked that Sadat response was not considerate.

Begin told Sadat that he thought that he was joking about a visit to the Sinai, but Sadat responded that the time is not ripe yet for a visit to Cairo. I was serious when I suggested Sinai said Sadat. Come to Ismailia. Begin responded that he does not see it fit. Sadat said: you see what is happening in the Arab world. Can you imagine what will happen if I invite you? Begin finally responded that he has patience. As for the idea of establishing direct telephone contact, Sadat only nodded his head.

The two then started talking about substance. Sadat said – get out of the Sinai and added that he is willing to allow the presence of UN forces in Sharem. Begin reflected by saying that he his facial expression expressed rejection and Sadat then added that he will declare the [Tiran] Straits as an international waterway. Begin told Dayan: 'I once again expressed sour face.' As for the demilitarization of the Sinai, Sadat said there will be no Egyptian soldiers in the Passages. Dayan said that it was a nice gesture. Sadat said to Begin why do you object to a Palestinian state? The

PLO will accept it...let's discuss it. Sadat told Begin that Dayan is the person who understands the Arabs and their countries.

**Notes taken by:** Elyakim Rubinstein

**State archive: 6911/2 - זא**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/ronlyres/525A0211-FAEA-46CA-AB7E-96FB12586BA0/0/Egypt31.pdf>

**Working Dinner – PM Begin and President Sadat in the King David Hotel, Jerusalem**  
November 20, 1977 at 21:00

**Participants**

**Israelis:** Y. Yadin, M. Dayan, E. Weitzman, S. Ehrlich, A. Sharon, Y. Burg, Y. Horowitz, IDF Chief of Staff, Gen. M. Gur, E. Ben-Elisar, E. Evron, A. Naor, E. Poran, Y. Katz, Y. Kadishai, Y. Avner, D. Patir, D. Levy.

**Egyptians:** Dr. Mustafa Khalil Kamel, Muhammad Tuhami, Hassan Kamel, Dr. Butros Ghali, Saad Ahmed, Mustafa Murad, Fawzi El-Hafez, Fariq Mohammad El-Mahy, Ahmed Taymour, Abed Suleiman, Salem El-Yamani, Sr. Osama El-Baz, Ossman Ahmed Ossman, Saad Nasser.

**Prime Minister Begin:** (Verbatim) Mr. President today is one of the greatest days, due to your act, your presence, your eloquence, the speech you made, the atmosphere of cordiality and candor. There were of course some interruptions during the session in our Parliament which you attended – but that is but a small example of what goes on, and the decorum today was due no doubt to the presence of the esteemed guest. Today was a great day in our parliamentary life. It demonstrated how one can debate serious matters with decorum and dignity. We listened very carefully to your speech, Mr. President. There parts with which we agreed whole heartedly. But there were other parts as well. This, after all, is the problem we face. And may I add, Mr. President, that today a miracle happened in our Parliament, our opposition even applauded me – and that Mr. President was also thanks to you.

We are very grateful to you for this outstanding day in the life of our Parliament. Except for Russia and China, the whole world listened to us. It is, indeed, an event. This is one of the greatest events of our times. I heard that the streets of Cairo and of our cities were almost empty – all the people were watching the television. I was glad to hear that President Carter voiced his opinion of deep satisfaction and prayer.

We had talks yesterday and today – very serious discussions. If anybody would ask us if we reached an agreement I wouldn't wish the answer to be of a yes or no terminology. But I believe we have laid the foundations for discussions. And we still have a night in front of us; we shall

work hard. We shall look for real decisions and solutions. We should not lose any time. Your visit is unfortunately too short. You come and you leave. It is a pity that the time is so short. President Carter sent me today a personal message. It is a cordial message. He, too, referred to the fact that it is a short visit and cannot solve everything. But it is a start. I can say with full conviction that we did make progress. May I respectfully say to our friends from Egypt about your President; he is a warm man with an open heart. The very fact that we sat together opposite Barbara Walters; and now we sit here together we have started preparing for the Geneva Conference – I call it a very good beginning.

I therefore thank you again for coming to us. It was courageous decision. The very fact that the President comes – despite everything that happened in the past – this, I think, proves the spark within him.

I thank you Mr. President. May I say that the atmosphere per se of your 30-hour stay with us constitute in itself a very valuable and practical consequence. A good atmosphere can make for positive decision, and vice-versa. (Toast) we wish you well, Mr. President, your colleagues and your people. We want peace; we want more than peace – we want genuine cooperation and co-existence. I raise my glass to you.

**President Sadat:** Let me propose a toast to dear Premier Begin. It is a matter for deep appreciation to enjoy the friendship of distinguished personalities. Let us hope that in our meetings together we shall establish peace in our time.

**State archive: 4172/14 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/9670F8E3-9D89-42CF-834C-B616B7264A41/0/Egypt29.pdf>

### **A Draft of the Joint Announcement in Conclusion of Sadat's Visit to Jerusalem** November 21, 1977

In response to the sincere and courageous move by President Sadat and believing in the need to continue the dialogue along the lines proposed by both sides during the exchange and the presentation of their positions in the historical meeting in Jerusalem, and in order to enhance the prospect of a fruitful consummation of this significant visit, the Government of Israel, expressing the will of the people of Israel, proposes that this hopeful step be further pursued through dialogue between the two parties concerned, thereby paving the way towards a successful negotiation leading to the signing of peace treaties in Geneva with all the negotiating Arab States.

**Note:** The draft was prepared upon the suggestions of Tuhami, with handwritten comments of Yadin and corrections made by Yehuda Avner.

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/50F2D067-260F-4EE5-B46A-EE29A0647E78/0/Egypt29a.pdf>

**A summary by the Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan, of his conversation with the  
Egyptian Foreign Minister Butros Ghali**

November 21, 1977 in Jerusalem

(The conversation was held on the way to Lod Airport prior to departure of the Egyptian delegation)

**Top Secret**

(Told to Elyakim Rubinstein by Dayan on November 22, 1977)

The foreign Minister recounted his conversation with Butros Ghali on the way back to Lod on November 21, 1977.

On the way back he [Ghali] initiated the conversation about the continuation of operational contacts, regardless if the visit may have been a success or a failure. All depends on continuation. True, there was an earth quake and the question is how to exploit it positively. It was obvious that he was instructed by Sadat to talk about continuity and this means conducting secret talks on the subject of peace, rather than delivering speeches at parliaments. He [Ghali] then added – the key issue is the Palestinians.

I [Dayan] replied let's talk about arrangements with Egypt. He responded that first and foremost general issues should be discussed.

I [Dayan] said that there is a problem because when we say Egypt you do not want to begin separately but together with other countries. The only framework is Geneva. You cannot talk about the Syrians without their presence, not even about the Palestinian issue without them. It needs to be negotiated solely with Egypt because you cannot speak for others. If we talk to you about procedure with regards to the Geneva Conference, you say let's talk substance. But it is impossible to convene without procedures... Sadat approach is that it is not important. I told Ghali that there are four problems: Syria, Egypt, the Palestinians and Jerusalem. See how everything is intertwined. Take Jerusalem, we should start not from sovereignty but with the status of the holy sites, such as the Omar Mosque. Ghali is an intellectual and he repeats this about himself. He said that we have to anticipate the future why should we not 'break' the existing frameworks and search for a new approach and not questions of sovereignty. I told him that if we talk about Jerusalem you also deal with Saudi Arabia; they are the last ones that will accept new ideas. You are talking sophisticated intellectual, but about the Arab world. We are not attending a political and intellectual vanguard symposium. We should find a formula that the fanatic Muslim world will be able to live with. He said that he assumes that I might be right. I told him- let's get down from the clouds and start talking seriously. We return to the starting point and agreed that there should be a way to solve the procedural factor. I said that as for Judea and Samaria and maybe Jerusalem as well it is necessary to set general rules so that no one may suggest that we dealt only with Egyptian issues and not with other places. The agenda seems foggy but then we have to return to specific concerns of Egypt.

We finally related in great details to Gaza. Ghali asked by his own initiative about the economic situation there and I explained how they can separate it from Israel. Ghali said that Sadat had few ideas as granting independence to Gaza. I responded that this is a joke – after all it will be a state without a port, industry and with great population density – not every 10,000 people should create a state because they have political motivation. Well, their [the Egyptians] way of thinking it to talk generally about principles; but with more details with regards to Egypt, and the applications of understandings in several stages.

The bottom line is that Ghali pushed throughout the conversation the idea that in order to make Sadat's visit a success, there must be a concrete follow-up. (I did not mention Tuhami's name). I responded that I



know that Sadat is ready and I said that we are ready as well at any time. I told him that as far as security arrangements are concerned it is best to have future meetings in our place and that is what we did with Jordan. It is close. Helicopter arrives and we gather in a private home. I added, that if he wishes we shall agree to meet in the northern route [in the Sinai].

**State archive: 6911/2 - 27**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/6816C1C1-5C55-4F4B-B122-6A93E3CF9BCC/0/Egypt33.pdf>

### Top Secret

#### **Meeting of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs with Ambassador Lewis at the Prime Minister's residence**

Jerusalem, November 23, 1977, at 18:00

**Present:** William Brubeck and Yehuda Avner

**PM Begin:** I promised the President in my telephone conversation with him on November 21 that I would write (the PM handed the Ambassador his letter to the President which is cabled separately). I promised I would send a copy to Simcha [Dinitz]. Its content must remain between us. I am informing Simcha that the letter is for his eyes only and he must not show it to anyone. The meetings referred to in the second passage of the letter may take place soon. We are waiting to hear from Sadat about the setting up of the two meetings. I wish now to add a few remarks about Sadat visit.

Sadat, in a private talk, brought up the question of my visiting Cairo. In the interview with Barbara Walters he had said, in reply to a question, "I would invite Mr. Begin to Sinai." In response I said to him, "I will invite you." all this was said in good humor. Later on, in a private talk, Sadat said to me: "you thought I was joking. I was not. I could for instance bring my entire Parliament to Ismailia for you, whenever you want to come." He went on to tell me that he could not invite me to Cairo for certain reasons. He did not tell me the reasons but I could guess. I should imagine, among other things that in Cairo there are uncontrollable security problems. I told him I would wait and that I don't want to make now an interim visit to Ismailia. Marvin Kalb in a report that was heard here came out with a story that we had agreed between us that an American-Palestinian professor could participate in Geneva. I want you to know Mr. Ambassador that the subject did not come up at all.

**Lewis:** Did you talk at all about the problem of representation?

**Dayan:** The subject did not come up at all. Sadat was not interested in procedure; only in substance – with a working paper, or without a working paper.

**PM Begin:** the foreign Minister jokingly remarked that you are not interested in paper only in working.

**Dayan:** about an invitation to the PM to Egypt, Sadat said to me 'so long as you keep the territory it is difficult for me to Israelis coming to Egypt'. He did not refer specifically to the PM but spoke in general terms. I am saying this because of the general attitude in this country about "normalization". I note that Meshel [Israel's Secretary General of the Federation of Labor Unions] is already inviting Egyptian trade unionists to Israel.

**PM Begin:** It is important for President Carter to know that Sadat did not raise at all the question of representation.

**Lewis:** I want to understand more about the procedural matter in light of your talks. As I understand it there will be a meeting within few weeks with Dayan and their man. Do you think one of the subjects raised will be when Geneva will be convened and on what terms – or will it deal with issues like territory, the Palestinian matter, etc.?

**Dayan:** I can tell you that Sadat said that he was not interested in procedures and that he did not want to go to Geneva without proper preparations. He said that in Geneva we face the problem of publicity, of TV and radio and one cannot negotiate intelligently. Therefore, he said we have to discuss everything beforehand. At the same time, he said that we cannot make separate peace.

**PM Begin:** we did not suggest it.

**Dayan:** From his point of view, had he wanted to negotiate a separate agreement with Israel, we could sit down with Egypt and negotiate and sign. At the same time, he does not want to do it separately and in Geneva we have the Syrians who would create a problem. Therefore, I don't know exactly what the actual intention is. Their Foreign Minister told me – and I am sure this was after he spoke to his President – that for Sadat the Palestinian question comes first. He said he thinks the first subject should be the discussion of the Palestinian Arab problem. This, he said, should be discussed with us in principle, and then they can tackle the Egyptian-Israeli problem. However, I do not know whether their Foreign Minister is the one Sadat has in mind for negotiating with us. I have the feeling it won't be him. So, the whole thing is not yet clarified. Sadat's attitude is a very general one. It is clear however that he wants substance not procedure.

**PM Begin:** I would like to say for the ear of the President – the latter is only for his eyes – that we must be very careful about leaks. We shall warn Simcha about the letter. He must be the only man who sees it.

**Lewis:** I am sure there will be security restrictions. What exactly will the Gammasi-Weizman meeting deal with?

**PM Begin:** Mainly arrangements on the ground – false alarms, etc. they may arrange further meetings whenever necessary. It is very serious and positive development. Also, I wish to emphasize that we agreed that nothing is un-negotiable on his side. Despite what he said in the Knesset, he told me privately that we shall talk on all issues.

**Lewis:** you are convinced that territory is not excluded from negotiations?

**PM Begin:** Yes – anything is negotiable. May I say again that the atmosphere of the talks was friendly and frank. The Egyptian delegation – and I believe Sadat himself – was impressed even taken by surprise by the warmth of the reception not only of our people but also of our delegation. There was, therefore, an atmosphere of confidence. We talked to each other. We have differences of opinions, but we shall talk about them. Sadat spoke through our Knesset to all our citizens. I think we proved to him what parliamentary democracy is. The Egyptians left with good feeling. You should see in the letter from Sadat to our President.

**Lewis:** I agree. Did you speak about what to do about Syria?

**PM Begin:** We did not. He said to me at the time that he neither was impressed by, nor worried about his critics. He cited the uproar against him after the disengagement and interim agreements. He said that matters will calm down. The Syrian speech yesterday in the UN was horrible.

**Lewis:** It was. Ambassador Young reported that many Third World countries were critical of that speech. Young even said that the effect of the speech may be helpful to Israel and Egypt.

**Dayan:** You, Mr. Ambassador, are a newcomer to the Middle East and I sometimes say that in America you do not understand the Arabs. Egypt can do without the other Arab countries both in

war and leadership. None of the Arab countries can do without Egypt. If Egypt turns to the African countries like Morocco, Tunis and Sudan they can do without the other Arab countries. Syria and Jordan cannot do without Egypt. The question for Sadat is whether his people and the armed forces will support him. We have the information that Gammasi's public statement of support does reflect the army's support. Another point is the criticism from Europe and may be in certain circles in the U.S. that we did not make Sadat a tangible gesture. I wish to explain that had we offered for example, some territorial concession, it would have made his position much more difficult. He came intending to show that he was not trying to get something for Egypt. We could not offer him anything for Syria and he was not authorized to accept anything for the Palestinians. About his meeting Palestinian notables, he did not make a point of it. He said to the Prime Minister, 'if you want me to meet with them I will; if not, not'. He did not want to get involved as the spokesman of the Palestinians. Had we offered him the whole of the Sinai he would have said, 'please do not do it; I did not come for Egypt but for the whole Arab people'.

**Lewis:** I agree. Certainly, we have not made any criticism of that kind. Anything you would have given or hinted just for Egypt, would have been bad for Sadat.

**PM Begin:** We shall use your good offices. I suppose this is the proper summing up: We must wait till we hear where and when Dayan will meet Sadat's man of confidence.

**Dayan:** One must give thought to the motivation of Sadat and his people for pushing for peace and for taking such a step. The issue is not the giving back Sharm el Sheik. Sharm is all but desert and it won't change the economy of Egypt. Their real target is to improve the economy of the country. In this connection much depends on America. I would suggest that you make a study in what way to help Egypt's economically if there is a peace agreement. If they know that such help is conditional on peace, you will help Sadat very much personally vis-vis his own people. I heard from some of Sadat's entourage that there are still ruins from the war of attrition. They do not have the money for repair.

**PM Begin:** Sadat described to me the economic problem. He used the word "horrible". He said the problem was horrible and he complained about the military expenditures.

**Lewis:** What about Jordan?

**PM Begin:** We may have a contact with Jordan. I will take it up with you when the time comes. We may take some initiative about a meeting.

**Lewis:** About Syria, despite their language at the UN, they have rather carefully said that the peace process is not off. In other words, they have not attacked Geneva. Assad has not burned all his bridges.

**Dayan:** You probably noted that Sadat is upset that you brought in the Russians.

**Lewis:** Did he talk to you about it?

**PM Begin:** Yes. He was not happy with the U.S. – USSR communiqué.

**Dayan:** When he spoke publicly about Geneva he remarked that Egypt has strained relationship with Russia and yet Russia is co-Chairman in Geneva. He, therefore, said he wanted to work out matters of substance before Geneva.

**PM Begin:** Remember the Russians joined Syria and the PLO in condemning the visit.

**Lewis:** (In a jocular tone). We have to think of this in historical terms. Perhaps because of the joint communiqué we helped bring Sadat to Jerusalem.

**PM Begin:** Let us learn a lesson from this. You remember when we consulted privately about Sadat's coming. All that I said I would do, I did.

**Lewis:** You did.

**PM Begin:** Therefore let us consult. Had you but consulted with us in advance on the joint communiqué, it would have been better for everybody.

**Lewis:** We Americans are slow learners. But we have learned. We won't do it again. We shall consult.

**PM Begin:** Please, no more fait accompli. I believe that Sadat during his visit here began to better understand the issue of security. From Monday morning onward he spoke over and over again about understanding our sensitivity to security. About his forthcoming address to his Parliament on Saturday, I know he can be very harsh. I am ready for it. (Begin is leaving to phone President Katzir in Mexico City concerning Sadat's letter of thanks to him).

**Dayan:** There was an hypothesis before Sadat came that he was actually coming to expose and unveil the real nature of Israel, that we did not want peace, etc. I think that this theory, too, has been proven false.

I told the Likud action last night that I had asked Sadat before the speeches – what you want us to say publicly so as to help the success of your speeches. He said 'just tell me what are you prepared to do and not prepare to do'. He said, 'just be honest and sincere'. Also, when I drove with the Egyptian Foreign Minister from Lod to Jerusalem, I asked him whether Sadat would speak publicly about the PLO. I suggested to him that the President should not mention the PLO for if he did, we would have to react and the whole thing would infect the atmosphere. If the President were to demand of us to accept the PLO, it would hardly be a message of peace as far as we are concerned. In the end Sadat did not mention the PLO. Their Foreign Minister subsequently told me that he had transmitted my message to the President. I was, of course, very happy that he did not mention the PLO, although I am not certain that it was because of my discussion.

**Lewis:** I, too, was happy. I will tell you something in the greatest confidence. I have a good reason to believe that in a semi-final draft of his Knesset speech there was a large section on the PLO. Therefore, your message may have had an effect. There is now an enormous wave of expectation in the world, except in Cairo and in Jerusalem. I am therefore a little worried about nothing overt happening for some weeks and the resulted feeling that Geneva will be drifting away.

**Dayan:** About Geneva, I am not sure that Sadat is in a hurry. I had the impression in my talk with their Foreign Minister in the car back to Lod that they want prior intensive negotiations. He remarked to me that whether the visit here will prove a failure or not, will depend on what happens next. He felt that should be ongoing negotiations. For him, the momentum does not lead directly to Geneva. I feel that Sadat is less anxious to go to Geneva with Syria, the Russians and the PLO. He is obviously very hurt by their attitude. He cannot ignore it; they call for his blood.

**Lewis:** If Geneva does not take place for a while and if Sadat cannot sign a separate agreement with you, how does he think the Palestinian question and that of Jordan be managed?

**Dayan:** he gives a high priority to the Palestinian question in principle. He does not want to sign anything. His attitude is, let us agree in principle how it will go. I think he believes he can bring Jordan eventually. I do not agree with Begin about bringing Jordan now. if we invite Hussein now he will not come.

(Begin returns after phoning President Katzir).

**PM Begin:** Our President is elated by his reception in Mexico. He will publish Sadat's letter in a few hours in Mexico City. Sadat likes our President very much. He appreciates his scientific knowledge. Sadat is intelligent but he has no background study.

**Lewis:** I read in our newspapers that an estimated 30 million people in the U.S. viewed the Knesset speeches.

**PM Begin:** The reception arrangements we prepared for Sadat were almost perfect except for the simultaneous translations of the speeches in the Knesset. Maybe the translators were nervous and excited.

**Lewis:** When are you leaving for Britain?

**PM Begin:** On December 2. I will be away for a week, including Geneva. I would like to see your Ambassador in London if I may.

**Lewis:** Certainly, it would be a good idea. His name is Brewster. I will cable him. I am going to leave for Sharem-a-Sheikh for Thanksgiving. Every time I go there I realize more and more how important Sharem is for you.

(The meeting ended at 19:30)

**Signed:** Yehuda Avner

**State archive: 4350/3 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/ronlyres/AA5AB7B2-013B-40B7-9434-99B6C60C7C75/0/Egypt34.pdf>

### **Begin to Carter on Sadat visit**

#### **The Prime Minister**

Jerusalem, November 23, 1977

**The Honorable  
Jimmy Carter  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington D.C.**

Dear Mr. President,

I write to you now in the wake of our telephone conversation of November 21.

President Sadat and I agreed to continue our dialogue on two levels: the political and the military. Meetings will take place, hopefully soon, between a personal representative of President Sadat who enjoys his full confidence, and Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan who, of course has my complete confidence and that of the Cabinet. At the same time, the Defense Ministers of our two countries, General Gammasi and Ezer Weizman, will seek to work out arrangements to make an unintentional armed clash between us impossible.

President Sadat and I agreed to go to Geneva as soon as feasible. But no date was determined. President Sadat wishes the Conference be prepared on the substantive issues. These we discussed in a preliminary manner. We promised each other to discuss them further in the future, knowing that we have differences of opinion concerning the contents of the peace treaties we seek to negotiate and sign. To make clear our positions, I gave the honored guest our draft peace treaty and the covering letter addressed by Foreign Minister Dayan to Secretary of State, Vance. I feel, Mr. President, that President Sadat's visit, the reception he received by our Parliament, Government and the people, as well as the nature of our private meetings and exchanges, are good for Egypt, Israel and for the cause of peace. We shall continue the dialogue on all levels for the purpose of concluding peace treaties. May I again express to you, Mr. President, my deep gratitude for your contribution to this last development. We shall need your understanding and help in the future.

Yours respectfully and sincerely,

Menachem Begin

**State archive: 4313/5 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/ronlyres/E4536B4F-5A69-4008-A624-25D7D7317B4D/0/Egyp35.pdf>

**The Foreign Office  
Liaison Department**

**To:** The Office  
**From:** New York

**Urgent**

Sent: November 27, 1977 at 8 PM  
Received: November 28, 1977 3:45 AM

**To the Office:** (For the Foreign Minister and Director General)  
**Sent by:** Israel Ambassador to the UN, Chaim Hertzog

Kaufmann [Netherland's Ambassador to the UN] called and asked me to come to his house for a meeting with El-Majid [Egypt's Ambassador to the UN]. We met and shook hands and exchanged greetings noting the fact that we have arrived at such a moment. Majid handed me the Enclosed letter and asked me to transmit it immediately to you.

Here is the letter:

*Cairo, November 26, 1977*  
*H.E. Moshe Dayan*  
*Minister of Foreign Affairs*

*Israel*

*Excellency,*

*I would like to inform you of the initiative of the government of the Arab Republic of Egypt to convene in Cairo, an informal meeting of the parties to the Middle East conflict, as well as the two co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference and the Secretary General of the UN. This meeting is to prepare for the convening of the Conference and to insure its success with a view to achieving a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict.*

*I therefore invite you to designate your representative to participate in this informal meeting to be held in Cairo at the date to be agreed upon as of December 3, 1977.*

*Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.*

*Dr. Boutros Ghali*

*Acting Foreign Minister  
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

He asked me to read the letter. After reading it I mentioned that it is not clear to me what the ranking is of the participants. He replied that to the best of knowledge at this stage it does not entail a ministerial ranking, because the invitation would have been sent directly to you [Dayan], and there would not be a request to appoint a representative. They are waiting for your response with regards to the representative and your preferred date after December 3, 1977.

He said that he presented Waldheim with similar request for his representative. Waldheim responded that he would like to check first with Super Powers. Majid told him that he is going to meet with me. [In my opinion] Waldheim is mistaken but not confirming immediately UN participation. Majid said [to me] that Egypt is interested in the participation of a UN representative and they will begin to pressure Waldheim.

Majid's assessment the U.S. will appoint a representative. He personally does not think that the Soviet Union will appoint one though it desires to arrive at Geneva. A representative of Syria went to the Soviet Union in order to convince it not go to Cairo. Jordan is indecisive... The Jordanians are seeking a 'golden path' with Syria, and the Saudis are very reserved. In general the Saudis behaved in a much laid back fashion in the past two weeks. But he said that I have to know that they are very calculative, wise and extremely efficient. Their problem is Syria. Assad is clever and moderate and it is definitely possible to talk with him. Sadat went to see him before his visit to Jerusalem, hoping to neutralize him. Sadat realized that he could not receive Assad's support for his move. They [the Egyptian] assess that Assad will eventually follow their footsteps, but at the moment they cause unpleasant problems. According to Majid, Assad has difficulties with the extremists. Majid scolded the PLO and expressed his hope that the current moves will bring about a moderate Palestinian-Arabs representation.

On a personal note he said that we have had bitter struggles and that Egypt is not a party to the unrestrained attacks of other Arabs against us. Between us and Egypt, he said, there is a big problem but now we have realized that the Egyptians do not hate us and they sincerely wish to create a new spirit and good relationships. We have entered a new era, he said. But he also has to warn me that we should not procrastinate. The Arabs are shocked [of Sadat's visit] and we have to slowly have them adjust to the new reality. He personally believes that it will happen. He

requested that we should keep a low profile at the UN and behave naturally. He will always greet me in public events and will shake my hands as well. But in the UN, at the presence of his Arab colleagues he asks for restraint, though he will always greet me.

As for the Tripoli Conference he believes that the outcome is positive because it will strengthen Saudi Arabia.

I asked him why Fahmi resigned and he replied that he had no public backing and thus his resignation has no impact on internal politics. He thinks that Fahmi was hurt because he was snubbed by Sadat who did not share his plans for the visit, even though he objected to such move.

I asked him what will happen in the Palestinian discussion tomorrow and he replied that he asked for its postponement but Syria and the PLO objected. In the final analysis, he said both Israel and Egypt will come out rewarded because the differences of opinions were crystallized in public statements... He feels that the Palestinians are frustrated and the UN is the only place where anyone is listening to them. He will attempt to talk to Kadumi [a PLO leader] who he considers to be wise and try to mitigate his attitude toward Sadat.

Egypt will present its traditional position and it is preferable that Israel should keep a low profile during the discussions on the Middle East so that there will be no bonding factor for the Arabs. He reiterated the risk that Sadat took upon himself and he hopes that we understand it and make it possible for the negotiations to continue. He spoke about you [Dayan] with high esteem and noted that they believe that you really understand them.

After an exchange of 1 pleasantries we conclude that we shall have direct contacts with one another. We exchanged our office and home telephone numbers.

We concluded not convey any of our conversation to the media. He suggested that we shall announce in Jerusalem about the invitation and they will do so in Cairo. Together we conveyed our thanks to Kaufmann.

[Chaim] Hertzog

**State archive: 4318/11 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/D7BA7AC2-58AE-4F8D-BA00-E0610D6551B3/0/Egypt37.pdf>

**The Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations  
(The Mossad)**

**Strictly to the addressee**  
**Top Secret**

**An additional meeting with the King of Morocco and with Tuhami  
(First one was on September 16, 1977)**

December 6, 1977



**Subject: Our representative's report of the meeting between Hassan-Tuhami-Dayan**

*(The content of the following is not a verbatim report, but a summary of the major issues that were raised by the participants in the meeting. The content of the points that were made by each participant, are not brought forth in the order of their delivery, but rather presenting them in a condensed and concise fashion).*

**The first meeting**

1. The First meeting with Tuhami took place at the presence of the King, the Minister of the Court, Dalimi's assistant...and two advisors to the King....The King and his entourage left the meeting and returned back few times in order to allow Dayan and Tuhami to meet in privacy.

**The King's remarks:**

2. The King pays tribute to Sadat's courage in his recent initiative. He noted that we are all in a single boat, we fought enough and even if Sadat may wish to halt this process we should continue. I only wish that I could get you closer for a joint effort. We have to talk. Your problems are not mine, but we have the responsibility. Sadat said that he would have been happy if Dayan were the one to take the negotiation into his hands. Since Dayan took the trouble and arrived so far to be here, his efforts should be appreciated. The peace process must continue. I will leave you [Dayan and Tuhami] to discuss your problems between the two of you.
3. After the King returned he said that Sharem Al-Sheik and your presence there is like a transistor (note: No one could figure out what was the meaning of transistor). Jerusalem is the concern of all Muslims. [He turns to Dayan] You have Sadat together with and your side. Syria would not be able to continue while being isolated. Egypt and Jordan will proceed without Syria. Please start the talk with your concerns on small issues, such as territorial arrangements. Together, please begin to concentrate on the main problems of reaching peace.

**Dayan's comments:**

4. He wishes to clarify what kind of peace you want [addressing Tuhami]. If it will not be peace as we perceive it, then it will not be strong and without sound foundation. What do you, Tuhami, wishes us to do now? Do you want that those who will conduct the negotiations will be of lower ranks, as you have suggested, for the next meeting in Cairo? They will not be able to advance the momentum for peace. Being of lower ranks – they will be like technicians. I came here to find out what you want. Before I came here I clarified our position in a lengthy discussion with Begin. Begin wants to talk with Sadat.
5. Though our proposals are not yet fully ready, the main points are as follows:
  - A. No to an independent Palestinian state.
  - B. There will not be a total withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza.

There will be a major change in the following subjects but within the framework of Clauses A and B.

6. The Golan Heights. About the same approach as to the Sinai. The Israeli settlements will remain intact and their inhabitants will be under the jurisdiction of Israeli courts and the judicial system. In the Sinai – East of the Jidi and the Mitleh Passes there will be a demilitarized zone with joint patrol until 2000 and then it will be reevaluated.
7. If you quote me I'll express my objection, but I will support the premise that the previous Egyptian territories will be 100% under Egyptian sovereignty, with UN supervision as far as Ras Muhammad.
8. Sharem a-Sheik will be under UN supervision, but we will be able to remain there with our tourists and our commercial enterprises. Maybe we can develop Joint enterprises.
9. The Golan Heights. We have problems with Assad. Something similar can be deployed there instead of military – maybe joint police patrols. Our People, all of our People, even my own children, will not agree to the removal of settlements, even it means no-peace. We simply cannot pack our settlements and leave.

Sadat himself brought-up the issue of free navigation along the shores of the Red Sea under UN supervision. This is in the core of our proposal on the subject of Sharem-a Sheik. The above mentioned can serve as a basis for negotiations. If you do not agree then we will have to reconsider the issue as a whole and all our above-mentioned suggestions will be regarded as if they were not serving as a base for our proposal.

#### **Tuhami's comments:**

10. We do not want to create additional problems to the ones that we already have. Let us check the options. You, Dayan have to come to Cairo with your Deputy Prime Minister. I waited for your arrival here to find out where we stand today. Our letter of invitation to Cairo does not exclude the possibility of a more senior ranking. You have to propose. We think that you should bring Yadin with you. Before we commit ourselves we have to wait for the results of the Tripoli Summit. If it would have positive results from our stand-point, we will be able to advance matters in a different way. We want to arrive at a peace agreement. But even if the matters will not improve, we shall take the initiative into our hands. We are planning to have a comprehensive understanding, but we do not wish that it will be perceived as a separate peace agreement. The solution of a Palestinian state has to concur with the aspiration of the Arab countries. Sadat does not wish to meet begin discreetly, but only in the open with the condition that there will be results and that is why the timing is not ripe yet. We have to meet – you, Yadin me and our teams. We need to meet overseas and not in Cairo.

The letter that we gave you has to serve as working paper. We shall discuss it. Sadat said that the settlements must be removed. Not immediately, but with a plan that entails full compensations for everything. Otherwise a peace treaty will be like a partition. Joint patrols do not constitute peace. The meaning of real peace is that our people will return to the liberated territories with their personal weapons. If Israel still holds homes on our land – this is not peace. We can negotiate on the status of the Palestinians. Let us talk about the details of mutual tourism, joint enterprises as part of the overall issues of a peace treaty.

## **Conversation at dinner**

### **The King:**

11. You [Dayan] or one member of your team can meet in an informal way, at your choice, with a representative of the PLO in the United States in a cocktail party or at a friend's home. Even if you do not agree now, think about it. You don't have to respond right now... You cannot sit on spears. You have to find a way for peace. You appear to be sad and tense, not as your usual self. You have to help Sadat overcome the difficulties.

### **Dayan:**

12. I am sad because I see no progress in the Egyptian position. We do not proceed despite the fact that what I propose represents big changes in our position. I am an honest person, I cannot see any progress with Assad, or even with Hussein now... He [Hussein] is afraid to get his fingers wet. He will not make a move without Assad. I wish that you are right when you say that Hussein will eventually join Sadat. I do not believe that it will happen. We shall not meet any representative of the PLO – they are murderers. I shall not meet with them anywhere – this has to be crystal clear. There was a proposal that we and the Egyptians will position our mutual representatives in the American embassies in each of our countries. What will be their assignments? Will they also be discussing peace negotiations? What we can conclude now? I am in a hurry and I was hoping to leave for home in the morning. It depends on Tuhami; does he wish to have another meeting with me?

### **Tuhami:**

13. [To Dayan] Why are you so angry since after we had our meeting. Let us talk amiably. We have to meet again before you leave and you have to present me with a working paper that will include all the points that you have mentioned this evening and I will read to you a paper that I received today from President Sadat. We could discuss the settlements being under UN auspices. We need an agreed upon agenda for all the arrangements. I suggest that we shall meet again in the morning.

## **A second meeting is held solely between Dayan and Tuhami**

Dayan reads to Tuhami the paper that he wrote between the two sessions.

### **Tuhami:**

14. The proposal to allow the settlements to remain after the military withdrawal is actually a breach of International Law. They can remain for a certain period, but 20 years is far too long. We have to deal with sovereign borders and the settlements will turn it into an international region. There can be a demilitarized Zone. But joint patrols will not lead to a sovereign framework. All the arrangements concerning legal authority, Egyptian flags, the role of the UN, the possibility of shared jurisdiction can be seen only in the context of a short interim period, namely, one year. The Sharem-Ras Muhammad Region is too big.
15. Do not compare the Golan Heights to the Sinai. Every country has to be dealt with separately and the Golan Heights should not appear in your working paper. After assessing the strip of Sharem and its shores, we shall guarantee complete freedom of maritime navigation. We could be partners to joint projects in Sharem, such as free tourism, but you will not have exclusive rights for developments. We could cooperate in mutual investments and economic experimentations. We shall formulate our proper

proposals. We will be able to permit fishing initiatives by you, but it should be based on equal partnership. All your settlements will have to be gradually removed to other places. The peace treaty will not be broken on those issues.

16. There is a message from Sadat. While I was waiting for your arrival, Sadat sent me a message with the following ideas:
- A. Our negotiations will be conducted in the spirit of comprehensive agreement, and not as bilateral.
  - B. We must try to discuss all the difficult issues.
  - C. Special emphasis will be put on the status of the occupied territories.
  - D. There will be an emphasis the status of the Palestinian people [here ends Sadat message].
17. What type of guarantees do you demand, of what nature, international, or others? From the perspective of your security what kind of bilateral arrangements are you looking for and what is your specific concept? We have to discuss the details of the bilateral proposals and the extent of the expectations that they entail? This discussion can be conducted either in the U.S. or in either one of our countries, or only between you and me. If it will be conducted in both our countries by our representatives, it will have to be based on yours and my cooperation. I have no objection that the Americans will be informed about the meeting and the preparations. You will hear from us. We could meet again here to discuss our concrete counter-proposals to your paper.
18. I mentioned the arrival of Yadin, together with you to Cairo. This is because at the moment our Foreign Minister has just been appointed as an acting Foreign Minister and we do not wish to replace him because we do not wish that he leaves his position after the resignation of Fahmiand Riad. Therefore, I'll serve as the senior emissary of Sadat to the negotiations and I'm requesting someone with parallel status, as that of Yadin's. Our people will not understand why I am meeting with you alone, and not Ghali. This is the official reasoning for inviting Yadin. But it will be with you that we shall reach peace.

**Dayan:**

19. The period of regional arrangement under UN supervision will be discussed again after a certain time. It will be possible to deploy Egyptian police in the area.
20. Why Israelis could not come to Sharem a-Sheik as tourists or businessmen once Israel removes its forces and military bases? It will absurd to abandon the hotels' properties there. This can be managed by international companies, such as Hilton etc. This question has psychological aspect. The War ended. Such things are done in other places, why not in Egypt?
21. We should make concrete proposals. We have to continue in Sharem because of the maritime passage.
22. The Americans know about our meeting here. Could we inform them about the content of our current talks? Where would you like to have our connection in the future – here, or the U.S.? I have to reiterate [the King joins the conversation] that I hope to be mistaken and Hussein will join the negotiations without Syria. We shall help you [to the King] you can depend on our support of the continuation of the momentum for peace. [To Tuhami] We need to hear from you. The ball is in your court. We have conveyed our concepts to you. If you wish we could maintain our contact via the King's channel or the Mossad.

**The King:**

23. When we proposed the participation of Yadin in the talks in Cairo we have done so that he would be of a parallel rank to that of Tuhami. If you [Dayan] will meet alone with Tuhami the Acting Foreign Minister will resign, and it will not serve our cause. As of this moment I shall not meet with Carter. I just postponed the meeting because of the developments in the Middle East. My presence now in the U.S. may be misinterpreted, and I wish to stay close to the events. The problem today is the gap between the moderate and the radical Arab countries. And I thank you both that you stand with us and we are grateful for your support. The momentum for peace is subjected to ups and downs. If Hussein will join Sadat these two will sign without Syria. Decisions that were made by Arab Summit Meetings were altered in the past [with regards to the Palestinians]. We will be able to do the same with the resolutions of the Rabat Summit. We need time. Let's aspire for that. The PLO is the cancer within us. Their fate does not concern me at all [the underlined are direct quotes of the King's words]. Both of you have to overcome small issues like Sharem. The final aim is peace. I'll be glad to host you again under my roof. My home is your home [he stands up to indicate the conclusion the meeting]. We have to arrive at some results. I am asking that.....[name censored] will be the first Israeli ambassador to my country. I'll be happy to host the Prime Minister here, on the 18<sup>th</sup>.

**State archive: 4082/3 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/D00C6CF8-704C-4050-96C8-391CAC8ADA37/0/Egypt37a.pdf>

**Addendum: Six additional documents concerning the negotiations with the U.S. with regard to the convening of the Geneva Conference**

**The Foreign Office  
Liaison Department**

**Top Secret**

To: The Office

From: Washington

Sent on June 29, 1977, by David Tourgeman [Special Councilor at Israel Embassy] to Director General, Ephraim Evron.

A conversation with Quandt at the National Security Council in anticipation to the Prime Minister's (PM) visit to Washington.

1. Quandt said that it is observed by everyone in the Administration that in their meeting Prime Minister and President Carter will succeed in establishing good personal relations. The Ambassador's Lewis reports and most of the information that has been gathered support that assessment. Although all these do not blur the difficulties that will prevail in the discussion of the anticipated talks.
2. Note: our conversation was filled with disagreements me I criticizing the Administration attitude while I explained our positions. Onward I'll concentrate on Quandt words because they are seemingly reflecting the lines of expected arguments of the Administration.
3. Quandt said they estimate that the PM will propose to concentrate on ways to search for ways to arrive at agreements with both Syria and Egypt, whether by a comprehensive settlement, or an extended interim agreement. As for the West Bank they do not see Israel making any concessions. In other words: if the PM will propose showing flexibility or concession with regards to self-rule, or in the expansion of the ties of the West Bank residents with Jordan, but not making real territorial concessions, this will address the real problem.
4. First, there is no ground to assume that Egypt and Syria will accept an arrangement that will leave out the Palestinians, even in a framework of an extended interim agreement. Even both agree to it they will be isolated in the Arab world and will be subjected to condemnation in the public opinion in the Arab countries. Also Jordan may not have an interest in such an arrangement and will opt to stay out. In addition there is the question how to get Saudi Arabia's support for such an agreement and most likely she will not render its support.
5. At the same time, Quandt personally assumes that if the PM will follow the lines that they anticipate, then the U.S. will be obliged to convey those proposals/ideas to Egypt and Syria and will not reject them. But after all Israel will not agree that the U.S. role will be in conveyance of messages, but would expect the U.S. to convince Assad and Sadat to accept them. Hence, Quandt does not know what the U.S. will do.
6. In our discussion of that specific point, Quandt raised the idea that if the new Government in Israel will propose any kind of an arrangement with Egypt and Syria, but will not shut the door completely about the West Bank and the Palestinians and leave it for a later stage and say that the subject remains open, then the U.S. out of no choice will choose to promote an arrangement according to those lines.
7. Quandt added that the PM attitude towards Geneva is somewhat puzzling. How does the PM perceive that it is possible to convene in Geneva and immediately, in the first stage discuss the issues by the Heads of states and continue to do so until an agreement is reached? Is not preferable to have a preparatory stage by lower ranking officials either in Geneva or someplace else. I responded that it is best to wait and to hear the PM thoughts on that issue.
8. The big question is what if all the current moves will fail; if the Arabs will say that they do not accept these conditions. After all they do not hide their intentions both politically, economically and militarily, despite their weakness in the latter one. In such case Israel will find itself isolated and the whole world would blame Israel for being responsible for

the stalemate and the crisis. The European already are proposing, despite U.S. efforts, to publish a declaration that emphasizes the necessity of withdrawal and the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity – this point is central to the International community perception with regards to the solution of the conflict in the Middle East. He accepts my argument that [UN Resolution] 242 does not mention statehood for Palestinians. He added that if we comply with 242 then we have to withdraw on all fronts, including the West Bank. The U.S. will definitely stand by Israel and will assist her in a case of war, but it is necessary to make all effort that it will not be interpreted that Israel caused a war because of her unaccepted and unmitigated demands.

9. In response to my argument about the stands of the Arabs, and more specifically that of Assad, Quandt agreed that there is no substantial revision has been made on the Arab side on the issue of peace. But he emphasized that the U.S. made it clear will not demand nor expect of Israel to retreat as long as they don't change their positions. If they won't change their position then Israel will not have any complaints against Israel. However, in the light of the new situation, let's assume that the U.S. will be successful to pressure the Arabs to accept a comprehensive peace; in such case would Israel also agree to alter its position.
10. Quandt responded to my argument about the national consensus in Israel against withdrawal to '67 lines, accept for minor modifications and against a Palestinian state, and said that no one asserts that Israel should withdraw for Tul Karem and Kalkilya. But for the sake of argument the previous Government position that even a withdrawal of 20 Kilometers is too much but if the current Government decide to withdraw only 8 Kilometers from the '67 lines, how does it guarantee Israel's security?
11. I responded that we cannot afford to allow a re-partition of the West Bank under any circumstances. Quandt said that does not want to argue with me about historical rights, but no one was able to convince him, and for that matter anyone else in the Administration about the security aspect. Why, if peace is achieved, must Israel hold to the West Bank or a substantial portion of it while it is obvious that the retreat is based on the stipulation that the whole area would be designated as a demilitarized? Under such condition he sees no danger to [Israel's] security, namely strategic security. It is true that security entails the prevention of all hostile acts, but these do not constitute a danger to Israel's existence. The answer to this can be found in devising special security measures.
12. At the end of our conversation Quandt reiterated that if they understand correctly the intention of the PM, it means that he wants to concentrate solely on Egypt and Syria. He [Quandt] once again raised the question what will happen if the political moves will fail and emphasized that it does not matter who caused it. In such case the U.S, may announce that it tries and failed and is now the road is open for others to try to bring out ideas. However it is inconceivable that the U.S. will admit that it failed on that road taken to reach a comprehensive agreement and pulls out a plan for another venue. Whoever is expecting that such would be the U.S. behavior is hallucinating.

Note: as always with my conversations with Quandt what is said was private and are not to be referred to him or be quoted.

[David] Tourgeman

State archive: 6861/8 - זא

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/BC043772-C02C-4DF3-A27E-9E2E827EB7A7/0/Egypt38.pdf>

### **An exchange of letters between President Carter and Prime Minister Begin**

August 15, 1977

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Secretary Vance has reported to me in detail on his meeting with you and your colleagues, and I am personally grateful to you for the warmth of his reception and the candor with which you and he spoke.

As I reflected on his report about his talks in the Arab capitals and in Jerusalem, I am deeply conscious of the gaps that still exist between the positions of the parties. I am not discouraged about the prospects of ultimate agreement, because all of us realize that the alternative to peace is unacceptable. I do feel, however, that it is important now to move promptly to narrow the gaps if we are to convene a Geneva Conference that has a satisfactory chance of success.

I am grateful that all the governments concerned have undertaken to give us for our own use detailed written statements that will put in concrete language what each would like to see in final peace treaties. It is in moving away from generalities toward specifics, expressed in written form that we have the best chance of identifying the approaches to compromise and agreement. If we can receive these contributions from the parties by the end of August, I believe we will be in a position to make a genuine progress in the talks with Foreign Ministers in September.

I have also heard from Secretary Vance the details of his discussions in Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem about the situation in Southern Lebanon.

I share your concern for the safety of the Christian and Moslem population in Southern Lebanon. Our information, however, does not suggest that their survival is in immediate danger, and this gives us time to think through the implications and longer-term consequence of various courses of action.

I must tell you frankly that I am deeply concerned over the possibility of Israeli military action in Southern Lebanon. I believe this would have the gravest consequences for Israel in isolating it internationally. Moreover, it would be unlikely to accomplish any permanent change in conditions there.

It seems to me, therefore, that our best hope is to press the Syrians to use their influence to enforce the ceasefire and to implement promptly the final stage of the Shtaura Agreement which would result in moving the Palestinians back into agreed areas and a reduction of large weapon. Secretary Vance spoke to President Assad after he left Israel, as he told you he would, and I am instructing Ambassador Murphy to follow up again with President Assad. I strongly urge you to refrain from any Israeli military action while we observe the results of these approaches.

Although, as I have said, we share concern for the Christians in Southern Lebanon, we do not believe their long-term position will be improved by Israeli military action.



Mr. Prime Minister, I have followed our now customary practice of writing in complete frankness, convinced that you will understand the spirit which motivates my candor. Israel and the United States are too closely bound historically, morally, emotionally for us to conceal from each other our deepest concerns. I know that we have the determination to find a way to create lasting peace for Israel and for your neighbors in the region. I am confident that you will not take actions in this delicate moment which would endanger our chances for reaching that goal.

Sincerely,  
Jimmy Carter

Secret

Jerusalem, August 16, 1977

Jimmy Carter  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

I am most grateful for your cordial message of August 15. It was a pleasure to have with us the Secretary of State, his gracious lady and his colleagues. The Secretary's wisdom and experience in international affairs added much to our important exchange.

I feel I must tell you, Mr. President, that there was at one point, a passing undertone of tension in the Cabinet Room when we discussed the problem of the so-called PLO. And no wonder. It is, admittedly, one of the sensitive, perhaps the most sensitive issue that vitally concerns our present and future.

The organization in question cannot be compared to the Irish underground or to the Algeria FLN in its day. The Irish want the British army to leave Northern Ireland; they don't want London. The FLN wanted the Frenchmen to leave Algeria. They did not want Paris.

The so-called PLO wants Jerusalem, our heart and our life. To achieve their design they employ the most barbaric genocide means by turning the civilian population into the target of their attack. They never attack our soldiers or our military installations. Since January this year our population suffered 110 casualties, all of them civilians, many of them maimed for life.

So yes, there was a passing tension in the Cabinet Room. It came and went and now I hope that there is a complete agreement between us that we cannot have that organization as a partner to negotiations in a reconvened Geneva Conference.

Mr. President, I will do my best to send you a draft peace treaty – actually three separate drafts – before our Foreign Minister arrives in New York. General Dayan is presently out of the country and will return on Saturday night.

May I inform you, Mr. President that the Foreign Minister is now visiting India where he will meet with the Prime Minister. We have to keep his journey secret but perhaps something good will come out of it.

Next week, I will be leaving for Romania on an official visit. It will be my first stay in Eastern Europe after 38 years – after the outbreak of the Second World War and the Holocaust.

Because of these engagements abroad, I think we shall be able to provide you with the draft treaties only during the first week of September. Originally, I had made an arrangement with Secretary Vance that our Foreign Minister will bring the documents with him sometime around September 15. However, I shall now certainly make an effort to have them prepared ahead of General Dayan's visit to your country.

Mr. President, we shall not act in Southern Lebanon against your wishes prior to consultation with you. I write this sentence in full acknowledgement of the contents of your message.

However, I do so in deep sadness.

The situation in Southern Lebanon is changing and deteriorating each day and each night. Again, the commander of the Christian forces told our people that he is thinking of resigning, that the morale of the Christian population, who are shelled atrociously and living now in roofless homes, is at a very low ebb. We can save them.

I told you, we don't want any part of the Lebanese territory, but we have a moral commitment not to permit the Christian minority to be massacred or to become helpless refugees with one single gate open to them: Israel.

Today, together with my colleague the Minister of Defense, I will describe the Southern Lebanese situation in depth to Ambassador Lewis for your further information.

Yours respectfully and sincerely,

M. Begin

**State archive: 6962/3 – 8 - 4337/4 ; 27**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/60C6DA65-39A4-4CC9-8432-230B10DFC320/0/Egypt39.pdf>

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Liaison Department**

**Top Secret**

**To:** The Director General [Ephraim Evron] and the Director of the Center for research and Political Planning, Moshe Sasson.

**Subject:** The Visit of the Secretary of State in the Middle East

**From:** [D. Tourgeman], Washington

**Sent:** August 19, 1977 at 13:00

**Received:** August 19, 1977 at 21:33

**A conversation with Quandt of the National Security Council**

In our conversation Quandt presented me with a summary of his general impressions of his participation in the talks in the Arab countries.

**A. The subject of peace.**

**Egypt:**

1. Quandt sees small and certain advance in Sadat's attitude. Though publicly he repeated his known position in a press conference, but in out talks there were additional shades. First, he agreed to pursue a peace treaty. Second, he did not repeat once more the period of five years from the conclusion of the withdrawal as the start of the period of normalization. Sadat reaffirmed in more clarity that the termination of a state of war will automatically lead to the cancellation of the economic embargo. At that time anyone who will be willing to trade with Israel will be able to do so. He reiterated his position on normalization but stated that 'peace relations' should not be included in the text of the peace treaty but can be agreed upon in a later stage.
2. Quandt said that he a chance to converse with Fahmi and he asked him why Egypt does not agree to include in the peace treaty what would be the final objectives such as normalization and an exchange of Ambassadors. Fahmi responded that the emphasis should be on the completion of the withdrawal and only afterwards diplomatic relations will be possible. Quandt remarked that he does not know how to react to Fahmi's reaction though Fahmi was this time more constructive than previously.

**Jordan:** As in the past there are no problems with Hussein as far as the substance of peace. He accepts the American position and reiterated that peace with Israel will entail all the ramifications of relations as are practiced by two countries that maintain peace between them.

**Syria:** there was hardly any progress, or change in the Syrian position on peace. The Syrian once again said that after the termination of a state of war relations will evolve naturally as is practiced between sovereign states. It may lead to full normalization including diplomatic relations and it may not. The conversation style may have improved slightly, though there was no change in their position.

**Saudi Arabia:**

1. Quandt remarked that that he found the most interesting development in Saudi Arabia. They said that they can definitely perceive a possibility of peace relations between Arab countries and Israel. They have no doubt about the willingness of Sadat and Hussein. They assume that Syria will advance as well in due time. If Sadat and Hussein will go forward Saudi Arabia will support them. Assad too will have to eventually follow suit.
2. The Saudis had a full knowledge about the talks that Vance held in the other capital cities. The Chief of the Saudi Intelligence followed the traveling of the Secretary's entourage and received full reports on the contents of their talks with local Arab leaders, soon after the Secretary's departure.
3. During his talks with some members of the Saudi entourage Quandt asked them if they perceive direct and reciprocal relationship with Israel in economic and technical areas, and Prince Turki responded that he hears a lot about Israel's achievements in the research of solar energy and said that this is an important issue for Saudi Arabia. Therefore he does not exclude the possibility that his country will cooperate with Israel in that specific field and apply the practical applications of Israel's research to the needs of Saudi Arabia.
4. While we were discussing the various Saudi personalities Quandt told me in one of the meals he sat next to the King Councilor [Rashid Pharun] and spoke to him in France. He

found out the Saudi to be well-versed in the intricate political picture; clever and alert and the impression was that he had great influence on the senior Princes.

## **B. Borders**

1. The Arab leaders reiterated their known positions on that issue. But it should be noted that with regards to Sinai Sadat stated unequivocally that the sovereign border of Jerusalem should be along the lines of pre-'67. After this principle will be agreed upon then he will be ready to talk on a variety of security arrangements such as warning posts, demilitarization, manpower and so forth. As for Sharem Al Sheik Sadat said that he will be ready to discuss special arrangements but once again only after Egypt sovereignty will be re-established.
2. So far there is not even a slightest hint that Sadat will be willing to relinquish Egypt's sovereignty even in small areas such as south of the Gaza Strip or in Eilat's region. Quandt assessment was that only at the end of the negotiation process if it will be agreed on all issues, it will be possible to get some slight concessions from Sadat in the above mentioned areas – but only in scope of few Kilometers, and this will be gained only at the end of an exhaustive and long process.
3. Sadat understands that the duration of the withdrawal will be long and he did not repeat his mantra that it should take only few months. Sadat rejected the notion that it might take 10 to 20 years, but on a couple of occasions he mentioned 'two years'.

## **C. PLO**

1. The Saudis said that this is the time to influence the PLO to make concessions and accept [Resolution] 242. They think that it can be achieved. They have good connections with Arafat and can influence him. In their opinion Arafat became very weak both militarily and politically as a result of the Civil War in Lebanon and this should be a vehicle to force the PLO to make concessions and line-up with the Arab countries. The Saudis mentioned that there is an alternate way to assess the PLO current strength – namely, since it became so weak, it should be ignored altogether; sign peace agreement under the assumption that the PLO will be doomed anyway.
2. But they also assessed that despite its current weakness, the PLO's demands should be considered in signing treaties, because otherwise the PLO may not see itself bound by these agreements and will attack them in the future.
3. The above mentioned arguments [clause 2] are commonly advocated by the Saudis, the Syrians and the Egyptians, but the Saudis have expanded these arguments.
4. In Syria Assad did not refer to the PLO weakness, but emphasized that Syria and the Arab countries are interested that the PLO will be a full partner and share the responsibilities [in the negotiations] in signing treaties. It was mentioned that if Arab countries will sign agreements while ignoring the PLO the latter will join other [terror] groups and will become disruptive both inside and outside the region for the purpose of undermining those agreements. The Americans noted this assessment and understood that while mentioning outside groups the Syrians meant the involvement of the Soviet Union.
5. Assad said that the Saudis and the Egyptian should assume the main role in influencing the PLO to accept [Resolution] 242. Assad said that he does not see Syria doing so because it did not directly accept this resolution, only [Resolution] 338 and had a couple of reservations about it as well. (Note: Quandt and I could not remember what two reservations Assad were referring to).

#### **D. The Foreign Ministers talks in September**

1. With regards to their talks with Vance and President Carter in September, the intention was to define them as 'talks with the Foreign Ministers and others', because of the definition of this function in Jordan, but it was finally resolved.
2. In his analysis of the Arab position that an agreement on principles should be reached before the Geneva Conference Quandt assessed that if the Foreign Minister will not reach a certain agreement on principles, the Arabs would prefer to postpone the Conference. Assad continues to be skeptical more than others about the current move and assume that it will have no results and that's why he is not rushing to Geneva.
3. In summary, Quandt's impression is that it seems that the Arabs have lessened their sense of urgency and understand that political processes require time.

**State archive: 4337/4 - 8**

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/73CA3ABC-7648-4740-A42E-DA4BB922853C/0/Egypt40.pdf>

#### **Exchange of dispatches between Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan and Prime Minister, Menachem Begin on a "working paper" for the Geneva Conference (Verbatim)**

**The Foreign Office  
Liaison Department**

**Top Secret**

**To:** The Foreign Office  
**From:** Washington  
September 19, 1977

**To:** The Prime Minister  
**From:** Boaz [Dayan's code name]

1. The convening of the Geneva Conference by the end of the year and the problem of Palestinian representation constituted the main subject in my talks today that will be reported separately.
2. In my exclusive meeting with President Carter he related elaborately to the representation of the Palestinians. After a discussion on that issue the President arrived at the following formula, that in my effort to break the stalemate in this matter, I agreed to recommend to you to accept it.
3. Here is the proposed formula:
  - A. The opening ceremony in Geneva will be with a unified Arab delegation.

- B. In that delegation there will be Palestinians who are known to be affiliated with the PLO. These Palestinians will not appear in the open ceremony as an independent body, but as part of the Jordanian delegation.
  - C. There will be no negotiations with the unified delegation.
  - D. After the ceremony the unified delegation will be divided into the countries of their origin, in order to separately negotiate those subjects that relate to them specifically.
4. I consented to recommend this formula to you. what guided me was the meeting with Vance on July 19, 1977 where it was suggested that it is possible a formal first meeting with a unified Arab delegation and afterwards it will be divided into groups that constitute individual countries.
  5. The Americans are not sure if that proposition will be accepted by the Arabs, but they will present it, if we agree, as an American proposal.
  6. I told the President that I'll convey this issue to you and will present him with your response by the coming Monday.

The Foreign Minister

**Top Secret**

**The response of Prime Minister Begin to Foreign Minister Dayan**

To: New York and Washington  
From: The Foreign Office

Sent: September 28, 1977

**Urgent**

To: Boaz and Dinitz

1. Following our telephone conversation yesterday , your telegram and the additional report by Dinitz to Evron, I wish to summarize my comments as follow:
  - A. Under no circumstance can we agree to an all encompassing definition that 'Palestinians will participate in a unified Arab delegation.' We have to adhere to the phrasing that in the Jordanian delegation Arabs of Eretz Israel (Palestinian Arabs) will be represented.
  - B. We should not agree to such phrasing that says that the problem of Judea and Samaria, Gaza, the Arab refugees and the 'Palestinian issue' will be included under one umbrella; even if the intention is that these subjects will be discussed on how they should be handled. The mere fact that they are bound together gives the impression that they constitute one subject. I'm inclined to accept that your proposal to include Arabs of Eretz Israel in the Egyptian delegation with whom we shall discuss the subject of the Gaza Strip. We shall be ready to discuss all issues

- concerning refugees outside of the Geneva Conference and then we shall also raise the subject of Jewish refugees from Arab countries.
- C. We should not accept the phrasing that we have to discuss the 'Palestinian issue'. We have to adhere to our position that there is a problem of the 'Arabs of Eretz Israel'
  - D. I suggest that we should not attempt to make a common proposal [with the Americans] that will be brought to the ratification of the Government, but rather request of the Americans to give us their proposal in writing and it will be discussed by the Government.
  - E. I am concerned about Vance suggestion of a possibility making a joint announcement by the American and the Soviet about the Middle East. Such an announcement will draw the positions of the U.S. closer to those of the Soviet Union. It might form at this stage a united American-Soviet-Arab axis and it will exert an immense pressure on us.  
I'm asking you to do as best as you can to prevent that from happening.
  - F. I was happy to hear on the radio about your interview to the New York Times. I wish to strengthen you in such a difficult battle that you are involved in and wish you and to all our colleagues a happy holiday.

### **The Prime Minister**

**State archive:** 4337/6 – א - 4337/5 ; א

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/CF8FEAE6-1B31-4538-8EFF-0E9EB9CC0146/0/Egypt41.pdf>

### **Dayan's conversation with Vance**

(Verbatim)

September 26, 1977

#### **Meeting and dinner**

**Present:** Vance, Habib, Atherton, Lewis, Quandt, Day, Korn, Dayan, Dinitz, Rosenne, Lavie, Rubinstein, Bar-On

Dayan: Could you tell us what Fahmi talked about.

Vance: I gave him a copy of the treaty but of course not the covering letter after we clarified again with you that this was agreeable to you. I believe that although there still is a big gap, there can be real negotiations.

Dayan: Will they negotiate in spite of what the position of Assad and other Arab countries is?

Vance: I believe that there is a real basis for an Israel-Egyptian agreement. The question is how to structure this.

Dayan: Is there a basis for an agreement and not only negotiations? For me the question is whether Egypt would consider at all a separate agreement if the other Arab countries would oppose this and make it difficult.

Vance: I can't give you an answer yet.

Dayan: Would they for example be ready to come to a secret agreement?

Vance: I have raised this question with Fahmi. He has gone back to his President with this. I hope I will have answers with this before you go back but I do not want to tell you that they want an agreement.

Dayan: I agree that they want to come to something.

*Mr. Dayan after this passed on to the Secretary the Prime Minister's letter to the President saying that the letter dealt with some Soviet visitors we had lately. The Secretary read the letter.*

Vance: I want to tell something on our talks with Gromyko.

Dayan: I have never met Gromyko personally. Alon did meet him. We had some signals through our delegation to the United Nations that he wanted to meet me provided that it would not appear that he invited me officially.

Vance: I would like to tell you that the President had raised twice in his conversation with Gromyko the question of prisoners of conscience and of Sharansky. I am sure that the Prime Minister will be interested in hearing this.

Dayan: Thank you very much.

Vance: Now as to the Soviet position on the Middle East. The first thing which is interesting is that they agree that peace must be more than and an end of a state of war but must include also the establishment of normal relations between the states. Gromyko is also willing to say so publicly. On borders they want a full withdrawal into the 1967 lines. On the Palestinians they believe a Palestinian independent state should be established consisting of the West Bank and Gaza. On Palestinian representation they believe that the best would be a unified Arab delegation that would serve as a vehicle for a Palestinian representation. On settlements they are very strongly against them and will vote for any resolution which will come on this question in the UN. I believe that these are the essentials of their position.

Dayan: Did they mention the PLO?

Vance: They believe that the PLO should be part of the Palestinian contingents in a united Arab delegation.

Dayan: [He] asked for clarification on the Soviet ideas of a united Arab delegation.

Vance: They seemed to think of the Syrian ideas namely of the establishment of functional groups.

Dayan: What do they exactly mean by this?

Vance: They think of one group to deal with borders, of one for Palestinian related questions, one to deal with navigational matters and one with the nature of peace.

Dayan: In other words not one a geographical basis.

Vance: Yes, not on a geographical basis but on functional basis. I will be very frank. I had the impression that what they want is to play a real part. They want to play a recognized part.

Dayan: Is this the actual position?

Vance: Because they want to play a recognized part.



Dayan: Is this the actual position?

Vance: Because they want to play a real role I believe that therefore they are not completely locked in a functional approach.

Dayan: Is this the position or do they consider this as a precondition for Geneva?

Vance: I believe that they want to negotiate.

Dinitz: If I understand correctly the main Soviet concern is to be a part of the negotiations. Do you believe that geographical procedure would give them an opportunity to play a role?

Vance: I did put this to them and they said that they would think about this.

Dayan: Do they realize that in order to have real negotiations one cannot only negotiate in Geneva?

Vance: Yes. But they believe that one must also continue to negotiate in Geneva. As a matter of fact we believe the same.

*Dayan then recalls particulars of the negotiations in Rhodes [cease-fire talks in 1949].*

Vance: The Arabs said that we have to stay in Geneva. They do not exclude talks in other places but one has to be in Geneva itself.

Lewis: [He] recalls the negotiations on SALT where there are continuing negotiations in Geneva whilst at the same time the major negotiations take place in other places.

**State archive:** 6862/5 – זג

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/CD3358AB-809B-4B55-B317-CD43B899CB7E/0/Egypt41App.pdf>

**The Foreign Office  
Liaison Department**

**Top Secret**

**Urgent**

**Sent:** October 5, 1977 at 20:50

To: The Foreign Office  
From: New York

**Top Secret**

Boaz to Yechiel Kadishai, strictly for the Prime Minister  
Copy: Director General of the Foreign Office

Enclosed is the letter that I delivered today to the Secretary of State:  
(Verbatim)

Dear Sir,

I want to reaffirm our agreement concerning the identity of the Palestinian Arabs participating in the Geneva Peace Conference. We shall be presented with a list of their names and we shall have the right to screen them. If we find among them any PLO people we shall have the right to object to them and they will not be accepted. I want to inform you that our understanding concerning Paragraph 3 is that the discussion on Gaza will be between Israel and the Egyptians and the Palestinian Arabs from the Gaza strip.

The discussion on the West Bank will be between Israel and Jordan and the Palestinians Arabs from the West Bank.

Sincerely Yours,

M. Dayan

**State archive:** 4313/1 - 8

<http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/8BB643B2-4711-4059-A877-1FE2C71E351C/0/Egypt42.pdf>